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Introduction
This PhD studies large transport infrastructure pricing and investments. To be
more specic, it aims to contribute to the understanding of pricing and investment
decisions for large infrastructures such as the Trans European Networks (TENs) or
the interstate highway system in the US. These projects have three important fea-
tures, which will be addressed in the rst three chapters of the dissertation: (i) they
are capital intensive and need to be well maintained, sometimes independent agen-
cies are therefore created to manage the network, which are then often subjected to
nancial constraints;(ii) they have long lead times, which means that decisions on
capacity levels are based on expected demand for the facility which are often highly
uncertain;(iii) they are often used by local as well as transit tra¢ c and multiple gov-
ernments are involved (e.g. EU and member states) which can lead to ine¢ ciencies.
The rst three chapters are theoretical in nature. The advantage when dealing with
theoretical issues is that one can isolate a particular item and focus on it. However,
when dealing with real life investment or pricing decisions, one needs to take several
e¤ects into account at the same time. Analytical models will then typically fail to
give clear answers. Therefore, the next to last chapter of this dissertation is de-
voted to a numerical tool which was developed during the time of this PhD, namely
MOLINO-II, which can be used to assess investment and pricing strategies. In the
nal chapter this model is applied to a real case study: the Oosterweel junction in
Antwerp, Belgium.
Three theoretical issues: the e¤ects of nancial constraint and demand
uncertainty on capacity decisions and the e¤ect of asymmetric informa-
tion on optimal pricing
Some basics: A key concept in transportation economics is congestion. Broadly
speaking, congestion occurs when the cost of travelling depends on the intensity of
use of a given facility. In transportation, the cost of travelling is the sum of two
components: a constant term (like fuel consumption and maintenance) and the time
cost which, in the presence of congestion, is an increasing function of the volume.
This sum is generally referred to as the generalised cost. There are a large number of
approaches and models to describe congestion. The simplest models are the so called
stationary-state models. In these models the ow of tra¢ c is constant over time.
The ow can be interpreted as the quantity of trips supplied by the facility per unit
of time. For congestible facilities the trip cost curve will thus be increasing in the
ow. Another interpretation for the ow of tra¢ c is the quantity of trips demanded
per unit of time. With this interpretation in mind we can dene a demand function
and as usual, equlibria occur where the generalised cost curve intersects the inverse
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demand curve. The generalised cost curve is an average cost consisting of the average
time cost plus the money price and tax that are charged.
There are two interpretation of the average time cost function. The simplest
interpretation is an average time cost for a given period (say the peak period) that
represents the variation in average speed for all users of the facility in this time
period. The second interpretation is to see the average travel cost as a reduced
form of a bottleneck model, which is widely used in the transportation economics
literature (see Vickrey [62] and Arnott et al. [2]). In this model identical individuals
all want to arrive at the same desired arrival time (say 8h30) but this is impossible
because the capacity of the bottleneck is too small. If the incoming tra¢ c ow is
larger than the capacity of the bottleneck, a queue will form. In the bottleneck model
the individuals will choose their departure time in order to minimize the total travel
cost: some people will depart earlier (or later) to avoid the queue but will arrive too
early (or too late), others will arrive closer to the desired time but these people will
have to endure some congestion at the bottleneck. The travel cost is, in this model,
equal to the travel cost at maximal speed plus the cost associated to the time spent
in the queue, plus the cost of arriving too early or too late (the scheduled delay
cost). In equilibrium the sum of all the costs will be equal for everyone independent
of their chosen departure time. It can be shown that the total scheduled delay costs
of all individuals equals the total queueing cost. By charging a toll that equals
the queueing cost at every point in time one can eliminate all queueing (this toll
is called the ne toll). Individuals will shift their departure time in a way that
the departurerate at each moment equals the capacity of the bottleneck and so no
queueing will occur. The rsts one to depart will have no toll to pay but will still
endure a large schedule delay cost, the ones who depart at the desired time will have
no schedule delay cost but the toll will be the highest. In this way we achieve a new
equilibrium where all queueing costs are transformed into toll revenues. The appeal
of this model is that if one rewrites the model in terms of average travel costs the
expressions are surprisingly simple: the average travel cost is linear in the volume
over the capacity. The expression for the average costs is similar to the average time
cost concept put forward in the rst interpretation and is very suitable for analytical
computations. If the ne toll is levied, half of the costs (on top of travel cost at
maximum speed) consists of average scheduled delay costs and half consists of the
average ne toll which is equal to the marginal external cost.
The use of marginal social cost pricing to reduce congestion is widely accepted
among transport economists but is not widely implemented. A more popular way
to deal with congestion is investing in more or better infrastructure. It is however
important to recognize that the optimal capacity will depend on how demand is
regulated and thus priced. Without any regulation, the increase of capacity will
cause an increase in demand (as generalised prices fall) and the new infrastructure
may bring little benets. With congestion tolling in place, the benets of investments
can however be more substantial because there will be less induced demand that
takes away the time gains of the investment. In addition it is well known that
investments in new capacity can be very capital intensive. The benets of rst
best tolling and the shortage of public funds raises naturally the question in which
circumstances can the congestion toll revenues pay for the capacity. A classical result
due to Mohring and Harwitz [49] states that under certain technical conditions, the
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revenues from optimal pricing will be su¢ cient to cover its capital costs in the
long run. The conditions are (1) capacity is adjustable in continuous increments,
(2) capacity can be expanded at constant marginal cost, and (3) trip costs are
homogeneous of degree zero in usage and capacity. This result is known as the self-
nancing theorem. A common misinterpretation of this theorem is to assume that it
implies that toll revenues should be reinvested in capacity, while the theorem merely
states that the yearly toll revenues will cover the rental costs. This misinterpretation
occurs when one mixes up capital costs with investment costs.
The rst chapter of this thesis elaborates on the possible e¤ects of such a misinter-
pretation and looks at the e¤ects of imposing nancing constraints and earmarking
on the agency responsible for the management of a transport network.
Financial constraints: In some countries independent agencies are created to
ensure the management of the transport network of the country. Often these agen-
cies are created as a reaction to a period where government infrastructure policy
resulted in insu¢ cient and badly maintained road infrastructure. These agencies
are therefore sometimes faced with nancial restrictions in order to limit the risk
of mismanagement. In France, Japan, Germany, Norway, US, ect. , the agency re-
ceives, at its creation, an initial infrastructure stock and corresponding outstanding
debt on which it has to pay interest. It also receives the right to toll roads but it
has to break even while its call upon the capital market is limited and sometimes
reduced to zero. There are two reasons for this limited borrowing capacity. First,
as in the case of a private rm, only part of the total investment can be borrowed
on the capital market as there remains a risk for the lender. Second, in the case of
a public agency, voters are reluctant to give an independent agency the power to
build up a parallel public debt without their consent. The possible consequences on
the development of the network of these nancial constraints are studied in Chapter
1. In this chapter the extreme case is considered where the toll revenues can only be
used to pay the maintenance, to pay existing debts and to pay the investments in the
extension of the network (throughout the chapter refered to as the strict self-nance
constraint).
In this chapter we analyze analytically and numerically the e¤ect of a strict
self-nancing constraint on the development of a network of the bottleneck type
consisting of one link or one link plus an untolled alternative and tolls are either ne
tolls or a two part toll consisting of a ne toll plus a at toll. We use the reduced
form of a dynamic (bottleneck) model with homogenous users, endogenous trip times
and one desired arrival time (see Arnott et al. [2]) as discussed previously. We nd
that the ratio between the initial infrastructure capacity and the optimal capacity is
the dominant factor to explain the ine¢ ciency associated to the strict self-nancing
constraint. There are two reasons for this. First starting with a very low capacity
makes it more di¢ cult to reach the optimal capacity. Second, a very low initial
capacity means that the interest burden on the initial capacity will be small and
so the toll surplus will be larger and this implies that investments continue until
capacity is really excessive. The use of a two-part tari¤ where a at toll can help
to build capacity more quickly and to return excessive toll revenues once optimal
capacity is reached can in theory reduce these ine¢ ciencies. Numerical simulations
show that the advantage of this more complex tolling regime is limited. When there
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is an untolled alternative in place, the strict self-nancing constraint is a handicap
when one starts with a too low capacity as the optimal toll generates less revenues
and it therefore takes more time to reach the optimal capacity. On the other hand
it limits excessive capacities as revenues are more limited.
Demand uncertainty: In this chapter we concentrate on another feature of trans-
portation infrastructure: the construction of a large transport infrastructure such
as a new motorway, a new high speed rail line or a new canal may easily take 10
years or more. This means that the capacity decisions taken today are based on
expectation of the demand for the facility 10 years from now. Studies of past large
transport infrastructure projects have shown that demand has been systematically
been overestimated for some modes (rail) (Flyberg et al. [36]). One well known
example being the Eurotunnel. The result of this overestimated demand is that
the capacity of the new infrastructure will be too large. Chapter 2 deals with this
issue and analyzes the e¤ects on investment decisions by a social planner when the
range of demand uncertainty is taken explicitly into account, rather than using an
expected demand level. Two questions are adressed. First, in a one mode world
(say, rail or road), what is the optimal capacity level when faced with uncertain
demand, long lead times and congestion? Using a simple analytical model we show
that when demand is inelastic, it is socially optimal to invest more than if only the
expected level of demand is taken into account. In this case it may be benecial
to overinvest in capacity because congestion costs are an increasing function of rel-
ative use. This result holds with or without optimal tolling. The second question
deals with two competing modes and where only one mode has long lead times for
capacity while the other has exible capacity. This is typical for the competition
between High Speed Rail and Air for the medium distance trips (500 to 1000 km), or
for the competition between inland waterways and trucks for freight. We nd that
overinvestment is less justied because the substitute mode can more easily absorb
the high demand outcomes.
Marginal social cost pricing in the presence of asymmetric information: In Chap-
ter 3 we turn our attention on the (e¢ cient) use of infrastructure rather than the
construction of it. A well known result of economic theory is that e¢ ciency re-
quires prices equal to the marginal social cost. In a White Paper of the European
Commission on transport pricing (CEC [14]), the EU acknowledges that pricing of
transport infrastructure should relate to the marginal social cost associated with the
use of the infrastructure. The current interpretation (for tolling roads) however, is
to impose a toll cap related to the infrastructure costs and not to the external costs.
In Chapter 4 we try to understand why this is the case. One of the arguments why
the EU can not impose rst-best marginal social cost pricing is that it may lack the
necessary information about the marginal social cost or it is too costly to collect
the relevant data. The member states with a high fraction of transit users can very
easily misuse the uncertainty on external costs in their advantage and pretend to
have much higher external costs than in reality or claim that their region is substan-
tially more a¤ected by the adverse impacts from transport than the average. They
can argue that their ecosystem is very vulnerable (eg Alpine and Pyrneen regions
or Omberg in Sweden [58]) or that their urban planning is such that more people
are exposed to air or noise pollution than in other regions (eg Frankfurt airport in
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Germany and Copenhague in Denmark [58]). Switzerland, for example, claims that
the the damage imposed by road tra¢ c in the Alpine region is on average a factor
of 2 higher than for a at normalarea (Maibach et al. [48])). In general it is re-
alistic to assume that the member state will have better information about the real
local marginal external costs than the EU. This is a clear example of an asymmetric
information problem where the lower level governments knows the social marginal
cost with more precision.
The rst question addressed in the chapter is whether a federal authority can still
implement optimal pricing under such asymmetry of information. If the external
cost does not a¤ect the use of the infrastructure (as in the case of some forms of
air pollution), there exist a transfer scheme by which the federal government can
induce the local government to charge the right tolls. If such a transfer scheme
can not be implemetned it can impose a toll cap equal to toll that maximizes the
expected welfare. When the external cost is of the congestion type so that the level of
congestion a¤ects the level of use, a transfer scheme to induce the local government
to implement the right toll only exists if transit tra¢ c is not important. The next
question is, what can a higher level government do in such situation? Is the toll cap
proposed by the EU as ine¢ cient as it rst may appear? It turns out that if there
is only type of tra¢ c and there are constant returns to scale in capacity extension,
one can achieve a rst best outcome for prices and investment by using the average
infrastructure cost as toll cap .
MOLINO II, a model for assessing investment and pricing scenarios, and
its application to the Oosterweel junction
The three theoretical chapters help us understand the underlying mechanisms
that govern investments and pricing of transportation but when it comes to real
case studies analytical models are, although useful for insight, often insu¢ cient for
policy advice. When decision makers face the choice of which infrastructure should
be developed, when it should be built, how its use should be priced and how it should
be nanced it needs a tool that is able to assess these di¤erent issues together. The
two last chapters of this dissertation describe and apply a multi-purpose tool (called
MOLINO-II) that can be used for this purpose.
MOLINO-II: Chapter 4 presents the methodology and analytical description
of the MOLINO-II model. MOLINO-II is developed to assess transport pricing,
investments and regulatory regimes with emphasis on the allocation of revenues
from user charges. The model di¤ers in three aspects from the traditional models
used for Cost-Benet analyzes. First, while traditional models often contain an
explicit description of the whole multi-modal transport network of an entire region or
country, we focus on a simplied network that is directly relevant for the investment.
This allows for more exibility and means that the model can easily be applied
to di¤erent case studies. Second, instead of describing users behaviour via very
data demanding discrete choice techniques, we use aggregate modules to represent
behavior as they can be calibrated with a minimum of data. Third, we allow di¤erent
types of strategic pricing behavior by network operators and governments. The latter
feature is becoming increasingly important when all transport can be priced and the
funding of investment relies more and more on user pricing. Most network models
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are so detailed that they focus on the correct computation of a user equilibrium but
are incapable of analyzing the strategic interactions between operators.
The Oosterweel junction: In the nal chapter the model is applied to a real
case study namely the Oosterweel junction, a new tunnel under the river Scheldt
that aims to alleviate the congestion on the existing tunnels and on the Ring road
of Antwerp, Belgium. The paper uses data from existing studies to calibrate the
MOLINO-II model. The model is then used to compare alternatives with and with-
out the new tunnel. The alternatives include di¤erent combinations of tolls and bans
on trucks. The study concludes that the rst priority is not to build new capac-
ity but to remove the pricing distortions on the existing capacity. The alternatives
that include a pricing reform are the only ones that generate a positive net benet,
almost all scenarios that include the new tunnel have a negative net benet.
Chapter 1
Network Development under a
Strict Self-nancing Constraint1
1.1 Introduction
The objective of the paper is to better understand the growth of a transportation
network, when it operates under "strict" self-nancing constraints. By "strict" self-
nancing constraint we mean a combination of two requirements. First, that an
agency, in charge of the maintenance and construction of new infrastructure, cannot
borrow from the capital market and has to nance maintenance and extensions
out of current toll revenues. Second, the agency is also subject to an earmarking or
hypothecation constraint as it is forced to spend all the toll revenues on maintenance
and construction of roads. Important is that these constraints apply at the end of
each period.
Although these requirements may seem extreme, they occur in some form or
another in a number of countries. Many road agencies are created as a reaction to
a period where government infrastructure policy resulted in insu¢ cient and badly
maintained road infrastructure. By creating a separate, independent agency with its
own sources of income that cannot be diverted to the government, there is a guaran-
tee that investments are made in road infrastructure. The institutional details di¤er
strongly among countries. In countries such as France, Japan, Germany, Norway,
United States, ect., an agency receives, at its creation, an initial infrastructure stock
and corresponding outstanding debt on which it has to pay interest. It also receives
the right to toll roads but it has to break even while its call upon the capital market
is limited and sometimes reduced to zero. In France, the road agency has to respect
a debt to earnings ratio of 7, in the US the Federal Highway Fund cannot borrow at
all on the capital market. There are two reasons for this limited borrowing capac-
ity. First, as in the case of a private rm, only part of the total investment can be
borrowed on the capital market as there remains a risk for the lender. Second, in
the case of a public agency, voters are reluctant to give an independent agency the
power to build up a parallel public debt without their consent. Earmarking is com-
monly used to ensure toll revenues are only used for road investments. In France
1de Palma A., Proost S. and van der Loo S. (2010), Network development under a strict self-
nancing constraint, submitted to Network and Spatial Economics.
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the use of the toll revenues is restricted to road maintenance and road extensions
(see Raux et.al. [55]). In the US, the Highway Trust Fund is supplied by excise taxes
on gasoline and the resources of the Fund are in principle hypothecated to highway
infrastructure.
To illustrate what are the e¤ects and costs of the two institutional restrictions
on debt nance and hypothecation of funds discussed above, we take the most
stringent interpretation of the restrictions. In order to gain insights we focus on
the explicit dynamic modelling of one link or at most two links (one tolled and
one parallel untolled link), homogeneous users and a bottleneck representation of
congestion. One agency is responsible for maintenance, tolling and investment, has
to break even in every period, and cannot call on the capital market to smoothen
infrastructure decisions by taking on loans. The initial conditions of infrastructure
and debt are important for the outcome. Most agencies are created when there is
dissatisfaction about the level of infrastructure supply. For this reason we will use
as initial condition a level of infrastructure supply that is smaller than the optimal
level.
More specically we address the following research questions. First what type of
capacity development can we expect on a single link when there is no possibility to
borrow on the capital market? What is the impact of the initial conditions (i.e. the
conguration of the initial network) on the future network growth? How many years
does it take to reach the optimal capacity size? Does the ne toll, that is optimal
in the static bottleneck model, lead to provision of too much capacity or to too low
capacity levels? How does this depend on the type of tolling and on the growth rate
and price elasticity of demand that are in place? The same questions can be raised
for the two link case where only one link can be tolled and extended. The revenue
capacity of the optimal second best toll is now smaller and the potential for network
extension is more limited.
We show that the smaller the initial infrastructure stock (relative to the rst
best optimal stock), the larger will be the welfare losses. Not only is the welfare
loss larger when the capacity level remains suboptimal but it will also be larger once
the optimal infrastructure stock has been reached. The reason is that in this case
one ends up in a regime with larger overinvestments in capacity. The numerical
illustrations show that the ine¢ ciency of the strict nancing constraint is equivalent
to an increase of 5% to 120% of the capacity costs in the rst best where the strict
self-nancing constraint does not apply. This implies that only severe institutional
failures would make a strict self-nancing constraint acceptable.
The link between tolling revenues and investment needs is a theme that has been
explored thoroughly in the literature. The "traditional" self-nancing theorem (see
[49] , for a recent and comprehensive literature overview of self-nancing theorem
see Verhoef and Mohring [61])) holds for our case with one bottleneck link where
there are constant returns to scale in congestion technology and constant average
costs of capacity extension. Toll revenues from ne tolling are su¢ cient to pay the
rental cost of capacity. But the use of a rental cost concept for capacity presupposes
that a nancial sector is ready to pay for the investment in exchange for a share
of the future toll revenues. Under our strict self-nancing constraint the rental cost
of capacity is irrelevant and the build up of new capacity is more di¢ cult. Verhoef
and Mohring [61] discuss the problem where one starts with an optimal capacity but
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where all toll revenues have to be reinvested into new capacity. They call this the
"naive interpretation" of the self-nancing theorem. In fact this can also be seen
as a re-investment rule. Our case is di¤erent and more realistic: we start from a
too low capacity, interest is paid on the initial capacity, there is earmarking of toll
revenues for investments and we consider two-part toll as a solution for excessive
investments.
Section 1.2 of this paper denes the one link model, the optimal ne toll and
the optimal capacity in the absence of a strict self-nancing constraint. Section 1.3
discusses the properties of the stationary state that results from ne tolling under
a strict self-nancing constraint and when demand is time independent and price
inelastic. In Section 1.4 we consider the more general case of growing and price
elastic demand and analyze the case of a two-part toll consisting of a ne toll (toll
varying within the day) and a xed component that is independent of the timing
of his trip within the day. Section 1.5 presents the two link case where one link
is untolled. Section 1.6 presents numerical simulations to illustrate the orders of
magnitude associated to the strict self-nancing constraint. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 The one link model
Consider a link, joining an origin to one destination. The capacity of this link at
the calendar time t is denoted by s(t). Capacity can be varied continuously.
We use the reduced form of a dynamic (bottleneck) model with homogenous
users, endogenous trip times and one desired arrival time (see Arnott et al. [2]). In
this model identical individuals all want to arrive at the same desired arrival time
but this is impossible because the capacity of the bottleneck is too small. In the
no-toll solution, the Nash equilibrium implies that all users have the same total cost
that consists of the sum of travel cost, queueing cost and schedule delay cost. The
schedule delay cost consists of either the cost of being too late or the cost of being
too early. The optimal toll solution for given capacity consists of using a ne toll
that varies over the day in function of the departure time. This type of toll is capable
of eliminating all queueing costs but the schedule delay costs remain. In addition,
because the average queueing cost is transformed into average toll revenue, total
demand is identical to the demand level without the ne toll. For given capacity
and given demand function, the ne toll is the most e¢ cient way to deal with
the intraday congestion problem. In this paper we are mainly interested in the
optimization of the capacity level and for that reason we can leave the intraday
dimension of the ne toll implicit and concentrate on the intertemporal evolution of
the average revenue of the ne toll, the total demand per day and the capacity.
The elementary period t represents a day or a year in which the capacity and
demand conditions (with its intraday variations) can be considered constant. In this
equilibrium, the average (over the users within one day) of the cost function during
the time interval [t; t + dt) is (up to an additive constant which equals the travel
time at maximum speed, omitted):
C(t)dt = 
N (t)
s (t)
dt; (1.1)
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where N(t) denotes the usage on time t; s (t) the capacity on time t and  is a
summary measure of the schedule delay costs  = =( + ),  being the unit cost
for early arrivals and  being the unit cost for late arrivals, with typically  < .
Eq(1.1) is the average cost in equilibrium where none of the users can reduce their
travel cost (schedule delay and queueing) by choosing another departure time within
the day. The usage at time t is growing over time: dN(t)=dt  0; we assume rst
that demand is time dependent but price inelastic. In the bottleneck model, half
of this average travel cost is due to schedule delay costs, while the other half are
the queueing costs. It is well known that the optimal toll is an intraday varying
toll, called ne toll, that totally eliminates queueing and if the ne toll is levied, all
queueing costs are transformed in toll revenues. The ne toll is therefor equal to
half the average user cost given in Eq(1.1)2.
ne(t) = 
N (t)
2s (t)
:
Alternatively, a coarse toll, with steps, eliminates a smaller fraction of the total cost.
As the number of steps goes to innity, the solution converges towards the ne toll.
In the rest of the paper we concentrate on the ne toll.
Maintenance cost M(t)dt during the interval [t; t + dt) is the sum of a term
which depends on usage, and a term which is independent of usage. The second
term depends on natural degradation, due for example to bad weather conditions
(induced potholes, cracks and the like) (see Newbery [47]). We have:
M(t)dt = a(Q)N(t)dt+ b(Q)s(t)dt;with a(Q) > 0; b(Q) > 0; (1.2)
where Q is the quality of the road, a(Q) the maintenance cost per usage and b(Q) the
usage independent maintenace cost. In the sequel, we will omit the quality depen-
dency. The optimal level of the toll (t) (in fact an average over the day), computed
using a marginal cost pricing principle, is the sum of the optimal congestion charge
(the ne toll) and the maintenance cost due to usage:
(t) = 
N (t)
2s (t)
+ a: (1.3)
Total toll revenue collected during [t; t+ dt) is:
TR(t)dt =


N (t)
2s (t)
+ a

N(t)dt: (1.4)
Without a strict nancial constraint, the rst best capacity s (t) is the capacity that
minimizes total costs which are (assuming optimal tolling), the sum of the total
scheduled delay costs, the rental cost of capacity and the maintenance costs:
Total Costs = 
N (t)
2s (t)
N (t) + is (t) + aN (t) + bs (t) ; (1.5)
where i is the interest rate and  is the unit construction cost of new capacity. We
assume constant returns to scale for road construction. With constant input prices,
2In this section we do not yet consider any nancial constraint. When nancial constraints are
in place the optimal toll described here will not necessarily remain optimal.
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this implies that the construction cost of a unit of capacity ds is ds. Capacity,
once constructed, has an innite lifetime. This implies that only interest is due.
The absence of a strict nancial constraint means that in every period, capacity can
be adapted optimally as a function of demand at a rental price equal to the interest
rate.
Solving the rst order condition yields the rst best capacity:
sopt (t) = N (t)
s

2 (i+ b)
: (1.6)
Optimal capacity is an increasing function of the number of users and the scheduled
delay cost but a decreasing function of the cost of installing and maintaining capacity.
1.3 The one link model with ne tolling and the
strict self-nancing constraint
Although the toll given in eq(1.3) optimizes the welfare for a given capacity, it is not
necessarily the toll that maximizes welfare under a strict self-nancing constraint.
The strict self-nancing constraint considered in this paper requires that the total
toll revenue collected during the innitesimal time interval [t; t + dt) is used for
maintenance, for payment of the annual interest on the initial capacity (s0) and for
construction of new capacity. We have therefore the following accounting balance:

N (t)
2s (t)
+ a

N(t)dt = aN(t)dt+ bs(t)dt+ is0dt+ ds; or

[N (t)]2
2s (t)
dt = bs(t)dt+ is0dt+  (ds) : (1.7)
We assume that the sum raised by the toll is large enough to cover the maintenance
cost, so that the residual is used to build extra capacity. In the limiting case, the
amount raised is exactly equal to the maintenance cost. It may be the case that
when the government wishes to start with an autonomous agency and a strict self-
nancing constraint, the xed maintenance cost is larger than the toll revenue. Such
situations are not impossible, but disregarded here.
Expression (1.7) is a di¤erential equation, which can be rewritten as:
ds
dt
=


[N (t)]2
2s (t)
  b

s(t)  is0: (1.8)
We assume that the initial capacity (at t = 0) is small enough (or maintenance cost
b is small enough), so that ds=dt > 0, this implies
s0 < N (0)
s

2 (i+ b)
: (1.9)
Note that the right hand side of the inequality is just the rst best capacity at t = 0
(see eq(1.6)), meaning that the initial capacity is suboptimal.
6 STRICT SELF-FINANCING CONSTRAINT
To solve the di¤erential equation in the case of time-dependent demand functions
we have to rely on numerical simulations, but when demand is constant over time
and inelastic
 
N (t) = N

we can show that eq(1.8) has a stationary state:
Proposition 1 If demand is time independent and inelastic
 
N (t) = N

then
(i) if the usage independent maintenance costs b is zero;
the stationary state bs is given by
bs = (sopt)2
s0
; (1.10)
(ii) if b 6= 0 then
bs =  is0 +
q
(i)2
 
s20   (sopt)2

+ (i+ 2b)2 (sopt)2
2b
; (1.11)
where sopt is given by eq(1.6) where N (t) = N:
Proof. If b = 0 : the stationary state is the solution of following equation
ds
dt
= 0) 

N2
2
  is0bs = 0:
Solving for bs we get
bs = N2 
2is0
=
(sopt)
2
s0
:
It is obvious that bs > sopt if s0 < sopt:
To nd the stationary state for b 6= 0 we need to solve
bbs2 + is0bs   N2
2
= 0
and
bs =  is0 +
q
(is0)
2 + 2b N2
2b
:
From eq(1.6) we get that  N2 = 2 (i+ b) (sopt)2 ; substituting this into the previous
equation and after some rearrangement of the terms we get eq(1.11).
To prove bs > sopt if s0 < sopt rewrite the inequality as
bs > sopt ,q(is0)2 + 2b N2 > 2bsopt + is0;
squaring both sides and substituting  N2 this is equivalent with
(is0)
2 + 4b (i+ b)
 
sopt
2
> 4b2
 
sopt
2
+ (is0)
2 + 4bis0s
opt;
which reduces to
4bi
 
sopt
2
> 4bis0s
opt
sopt > s0
which is true by assumption.
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To understand the intuition of this result, assume rst s0 = sopt and remember
that the level of congestion determines the level of the toll revenues, then no capacity
additions are needed and all toll revenue is used to pay for the initial capacity stock
at a cost is0. In this case one stays at the optimum capacity. Take now a somewhat
smaller initial capacity. The budget surplus that remains after paying for the initial
capacity is reinvested every year even when the optimal capacity is reached. The
capacity keeps growing until the capacity is so large that the ne toll revenues equal
the cost of paying for the initial infrastructure. Take now a very low initial capacity.
This implies that the yearly cost of this initial capacity is also very low. The ne toll
now leaves a larger budget surplus for investments and capacity extension can go
on for much longer. The resulting steady state infrastructure stock implies a much
more excessive capacity level.
The initial capacity thus plays a double role. First a higher initial capacity
implies that, before reaching the optimal capacity, the capacity level is closer to
the optimal level and welfare losses will be less important. Second, and this is less
obvious, it limits the surplus available for capacity extension and the construction of
excessive capacity in the long run. As we will later demonstrate numerically, using
price elastic demands, this insight has important policy implications. Tolling is often
introduced when capacity is much too small and then an agency is often created with
a strict self-nancing constraint and a low initial debt in order to guarantee a quick
build up of capacity. However, it is precisely under these conditions that the costs
of overinvestment will be largest.
One could think of other initial conditions for the infrastructure capacity. Given
that the agency receives the power to toll it is logical to require it to pay the cost
of the initially received infrastructure under the form of interest. One alternative
assumption is that the agency starts with no infrastructure at all but then the model
is no longer dened. Another alternative is that the agency receives for free a small
initial infrastructure. Then the strict self-nancing constraint would generate even
more extreme results.
We could also study the same issue using discrete capacity additions. This will
not change the result, only the investment path will be di¤erent. Instead of a
continous growth pattern we will have a stepwise pattern since one has to wait until
the total construction cost is set aside.
1.4 The one Link with two-part tolling and the
strict self-nancing constraint
The ne toll is not necessarily the toll that maximizes welfare under a strict self-
nancing constraint. It is obvious that the introduction of an additional xed term
could bring in extra nancial resources or allows to decrease toll revenues when
(negative or positive) they are not longer needed (the term is called xed in the
sense that it does not vary within the day unlike the ne toll). The optimal xed
term is di¢ cult to determine but one can state that it will always be optimal to
charge the ne toll in order to eliminate the queuing and convert the queuing into
8 STRICT SELF-FINANCING CONSTRAINT
toll revenues. We therefore consider a two-part toll whose rst part consists of the
ne toll ne (t) and a second part that is a xed part or "at toll" F (t) (see de
Palma and Lindsey [22]). :
toll (t) = ne (t) + F (t) : (1.12)
The at toll F (t) can be negative or positive and allows to either raise more
revenue when large investments are needed or to limit revenue raising once the
optimal capacity is reached. We need to distinguish the case of price inelastic and
price elastic demand.
When demand is inelastic and varying over time, the optimal tolling and invest-
ment regimes can be achieved as follows: if we start with a capacity s0 with s0 < sopt
then invest in rst period sopt (t)  s0: This investment is nanced by a ne toll plus
a at toll: 
ne (t) + F (t)

N (t)  is0 +

sopt (t)  s0

+ bsopt (t) ; (1.13)
in the second period, when the rst best capacity is reached the at toll becomes a
subsidy
F (t)N (t) =  ne (t)N (t) + bsopt (t) + is0: (1.14)
Because demand is inelastic the at part of the toll allows to overcome the strict
self-nancing constraint by simply charging all users the sums necessary to reach
optimal capacity and by redistributing the surplus once the optimal capacity is
reached. We assumed implicitly that the at toll does not exceed the income of
the representative consumer, if this would be the case, one has to proceed more
gradually.
When demand is elastic and time-dependent, nding the optimal two-part tari¤
is a di¢ cult optimal control problem. We limit ourselves here to a heuristic approach
for case where demand is elastic but time-independent . The search for the optimal
structure of the at toll (F (t)) relies on two principles. First, the at toll can be
used to raise more revenues and increase the rate of the investments; we will assume
the at toll to be proportional to the di¤erence between the actual capacity and
some capacity (sIII (t)) which we will call third-best capacity for reasons that will
become clear later. Second, once the third best level of capacity (sIII (t)) is reached,
we would like to remain at that level and not invest anymore; the at toll can then
be used to set the level of the total toll revenues equal to the cost of the initial
capacity and the maintenance cost so that no residual toll revenues are left . To be
more precise, F (t) is of the form:
F (t)N (t) =


 
sIII (t)  s (t) if s (t) < sIII (t)
 ne (t)N (t) + is0 + bsIII (t) if s (t) = sIII (t)

: (1.15)
The rst best capacity derived in eq(1.6) is the capacity that maximizes welfare given
that the toll equals the ne toll and that there is no strict nancing constraint. In
our case, however, the toll is not equal to the ne toll so the "optimal" capacity
level can be di¤erent from the rst best capacity derived in eq(1.6)).
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In the case of an iso-elastic demand (N (p) = p ) ;we dene sIII (t) as the ca-
pacity that maximizes welfare given that the at toll is such that no residual toll
revenues are left to invest, namely:
W =
Z 1
p
N (p0) dp0   is  bs:
The welfare is the sum of the consumer surplus and the net toll revenues (which,
in this case, are zero) minus the investment and maintenance costs. The optimal
capacity under these conditions will solve the rst order condition,
@W
@s
=  N @p
@s
  i  b = 0:
The toll is a combination of the ne toll and a at toll, which combined sum up
to zero. The generalized price p is thus the sheduled delay cost since queueing has
been eliminated by the ne toll and equals
p =
N
2s
:
Substituting this in the rst order conditions and solving for s; yields
sIII (t) = N (t)
s

2 (1 + ) (i+ b)
: (1.16)
This capacity level is third-best because three constraints are present: rst there
is the strict nancial constraint, second the initial capacity is assumed to be ine¢ -
ciently low and third it maximizes welfare in a myopic way.
1.5 Two parallel links: the untolled alternative
Consider the case of two parallel links connecting an origin O to a destination D.
Suppose one link (link U) is untolled and has a xed capacity sU . The second link
(link T ), on the other hand, can be tolled and has a capacity sT : Consider any
period t so that we can save on notation by dropping the time index. Let N be the
total demand for trips from O to D, the number of users using link U or T; is NU
or NT and N = NU + NT : Both alternatives are assumed to be perfect substitutes
implying that, in equilibrium, both links will have equal generalized prices:
pU (NU) = pT (NT ) = p (N) ; (1.17)
where pl (Nl) is the generalized price on link l; l = U or T and p (N) the inverse
demand function for trips from O to D. From de Palma and Lindsey [22] we know
that the second-best toll is the ne toll to eliminate queueing on link T corrected
by a term (the at toll fT ) to control the number of users on link U :
fT =   jp
0j
jp0j+ p0U
p0UNU ; (1.18)
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where p0U =
@pU (NU )
@NU
and p0 = @p
@N
:The intuition for the use of a ne toll structure
on link T is easy: a ne toll makes sure the queueing costs of the existing users
is transformed into toll revenue without any change in total use of link T . The
average ne toll has to be smaller than in the one link case because this way one
can attract users of the other (congested and ine¢ ciently managed) link U to the
better managed link T .
Whenever the at toll is absent (fT = 0) and only the ne toll is levied then the
usage of the tolled link T is equal to:
NT =
sT
sT + sU
N: (1.19)
Since the fraction sT
sT+sU
< 1; the right hand side of eq(1.19) is always smaller than
N , the demand on a single link with the same capacity. Toll revenues will hence also
be smaller. For a given capacity sT ; it is thus clear that toll revenues in the single
link case will always exceed toll revenues in the parallel case. We therefore expect
the capacity build up over time under the strict nancial constraint to give a similar
pattern in both cases but capacity in the parallel case will increase more slowly. If
the second best toll is charged, demand and thus toll revenues and investments will
be even smaller for link T .
It is di¢ cult to get analytical results for the parallel link case and we therefore
refer to the simulation results.
1.6 Numerical simulations
For the numerical simulations in the single link case we use a time dependent iso-
elastic demand function, with the elasticity with respect to generalized price p equal
to ,
N (p (t)) = (1 + t)p (t)  ; (1.20)
where N is the usage on the link, t the time period,  and  positive parameters
and p the generalized price. The generalized price is equal to the time cost plus the
toll (which consist of the ne toll ne (t) plus the at toll F (t))
p (t) =
N (p (t))
2s (t)
+ ne (t) + F (t) ; (1.21)
with
ne (t) =
N (p (t))
2s (t)
: (1.22)
In the numerical simulations we assume that maintenance costs are zero (a = b = 0) :
Welfare TW (t) is the discounted integral over time of the sum of the consumer
surplus (CS (t)) and the toll revenues (TR (t)) minus the cost of capacity (CC (t))
at a given time t: Since the last two are constrained to be equal the following holds:
TW =
Z 1
0
W (s (t)) e itdt; (1.23)
where
W (s (t)) = CS (s (t)) =
Z 1
p(t)
N (p0 (t)) dp0: (1.24)
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We call this the "real" welfare, i.e. the welfare under the strict nancial constraint.
As a benchmark or reference we use the rst best welfare (i.e. the welfare if there is
no nancial constraint, the toll equals the ne toll and capacity is always at its rst
best level given in eq(1.6)):
TW opt =
Z 1
0
W opt
 
sopt (t)

e itdt; (1.25)
W opt
 
sopt (t)

= CSopt (t) + TRopt (t)  CCopt (t) : (1.26)
In order to compare the welfare in both cases, we normalize the welfare loss by the
cost of capacity in the rst best. For some factor  cs the rst best welfare will
become equal to the "real" welfare:
CSopt
 
sopt (t)

+ TRopt
 
sopt (t)
   csCCopt  sopt (t) = CS (s (t)) : (1.27)
Using TRopt (sopt (t)) = CCopt (sopt (t)), the equation can be rewritten as:
CSopt (t)  CS (t) = CCopt (t) ( cs   1) (1.28)
and
 cs   1 = CS
opt (t)  CS (t)
CCopt (t)
: (1.29)
Dene
 CS  i
Z 1
0
CSopt (t)  CS (t)
CCopt (t)
e itdt+ 1: (1.30)
We use this index  CS as a measure of the welfare loss when the strict nancial
constraint is imposed and one starts with a suboptimal level of capacity. To under-
stand better the meaning of  CS consider rst  CS = 1; then there is no welfare
loss, if  CS = 2; this means that if in the rst best, capacity costs were doubled, one
ends up with the same level of welfare as in the case with strict nancial constraint.
Or put di¤erently; the fact that one starts with a sub-optimal level of capacity and
there is a strict self-nancing rule, is equivalent to a doubling of the cost of capacity
if  CS = 2.
For the case with two perfectly substitutable links, we assume similar expressions
for the demand function. The generalized prices for the tolled and untolled link are
respectively:
pT (NT ) =
NT
2sT
+ neT + fT ; (1.31)
pU (NU) =
NU
sU
(1.32)
where
neT =
NT
2sT
: (1.33)
The welfare is now the sum of the consumer surplus on both links, the toll revenues 
TRT

on the tolled link and the investment cost of the tolled link (we again neglect
maintenance costs):
SS =
Z N
0
p (n) dn  pT (NT )NT   pU (NU)NU + TRT   isT ; (1.34)
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where the toll revenues are
TRT = fTNT +
N2T
2sT
: (1.35)
Substituting this expression in SS :
SS =
Z N
0
p (n) dn  N
2
T
2sT
  N
2
U
sU
  isT : (1.36)
The index which gives us a measure of the welfare loss is now dened as
 SS  i
Z 1
0
SSopt (t)  SS (t)
CCopt (t)
e itdt+ 1; (1.37)
where SS (t) is given by eq(1.34) with SSopt (t) = SS
 
s = soptT

and CCopt (t) =
isoptT .
We discuss rst the case of a single link with a ne toll and a two-part toll. We
continue with the case of two parallel links where one link is untolled.
1.6.1 Numerical simulations for the single link with ne toll
In order to make the simulation one needs some assumptions on the values of the
parameters. We continue to assume maintenance costs equal to zero: a = b = 0.
The value of the parameter  is based on the value found in [2] and is:  = 2:427:
For the costs of capacity we assume i = 15:157; where i is the interest rate and
is equal to 5%. The initial capacity s0 is taken to be a percentage of the rst best
capacity at t = 0. We will take 20%, 50% and 80%. Finally, the time horizon is 50
years.
First we consider the case where demand is time-independent ( = 0) and inelas-
tic ( = 0) ; with other words; demand is xed and normalized to one.
The evolution of the capacity level (vertical axis) over time (horizontal axis) for
di¤erent initial capacities is given in Figure 1.1. The dotted horizontal line is the
optimal capacity, the full lines represent capacity extensions when initial capacity is
20, 50 and 80% of the optimal capacity.
The rst-best capacity (sopt = 0:283) will be reached more or less after the same
period (t s 10) in the three cases. The steady state levels (s^) are, however very
di¤erent. For initial capacities of respectively 20%; 50% and 80% of the optimal
capacity level, the steady states are s^ = 1:41; s^ = 0:56 and s^ = 0:35: These values
are consistent with eq(1.10). For example, for an initial capacity equal to 20%
of the rst best capacity the steady state will according to eq(1.10) be equal to;
s^ =
(sopt)
2
s0
=
(sopt)
2
0:2sopt
= 5sopt = 1:41. Note that if we would have started with 100%
of the optimal capacity, the toll revenues would just cover the interest rate and no
additional investment will be made, this is entirely consistent with the self-nancing
theorem of [61]
We see that starting with a very low capacity (20% of the optimal capacity)
generates more revenues (higher congestion and lower interest payments) and the
increase of the capacity level before reaching the optimal capacity will be steeper
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Figure 1.1: The one mode capacity evolution with ne toll for di¤erent initial ca-
pacities when  =  = 0:
for low initial capacity levels. The low cost of the initial capacity will, however, lead
to a larger toll revenue surplus when optimal capacity is reached which generates a
larger overinvestment in the long run.
Values of  CS for di¤erent combinations of growth () and price elasticity () are
provided in Table 1.1.
From Table 2.1 we see that starting with a capacity level which is only 20% of the
optimal capacity level and imposing a strict self-nancing constraint is equivalent
with increasing the capacity costs by 40% 120%. Starting with half of the optimal
level reduces this to 20%  80%: Larger initial capacity (80%) will create only small
welfare losses (around 5  60%). Larger growth in demand will increase the welfare
loss. A higher price elasticity, however, will correspond to slightly lower values for
 cs: This can be expected as the higher price elasticity means better substitutes in
case of sub-optimal capacity levels.
The lower the initial capacity, the larger will be the excessive capacity in the long
run: There are, however, no general statements to be made about the moment that
capacity reaches sopt : dening tp as the time where the capacity reaches the rst
best level starting from an initial capacity s0 = p  sopt, we have; if  = 0:2;  = 0:2 :
then t0:2 = 17; while t0:8 = 21; the lower the initial capacity the quicker the rst
best level is reached: For the same growth parameter but an elasticity of  = 4; the
opposite is true t0:2 = 42; while t0:8 = 41:
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(; ) (0; 0) (0:1; 0) (0:2; 0) (0:5; 0)
0:2sopt 1:46 1:61 1:75 2:17
0:5sopt 1:18 1:3 1:43 1:81
0:8sopt 1:05 1:14 1:25 1:61
(;) (0; 0:5) (0; 1) (0; 2)
0:2sopt 1:42 1:39 1:33
0:5sopt 1:18 1:17 1:16
0:8sopt 1:05 1:05 1:05
(; ) (0:2; 0:5) (0:2; 1) (0:5; 0:5) (0:5; 1)
0:2sopt 1:64 1:56 1:93 1:79
0:5sopt 1:39 1:35 1:68 1:59
0:8sopt 1:23 1:22 1:53 1:46
Table 1.1: Relative e¢ ciency losses of a strict nancing constraint for di¤erent initial
capacities, di¤erent growth rates of demand and di¤erent price elasticities
1.6.2 Numerical simulations results for the single link with
two-part toll
In the following simulations the at toll, F (t) is di¤erent from zero and is given
by eq(1.15). First we consider the case without growth ( = 0) ; as price elasticity
we take  = 0:5 and the initial capacity is 20% of the rst best capacity: s0 =
0:2  sopt; where sopt = 0:096: The third best capacity as dened in eq(1.16) is for
these parameter values equal to sIII = 0:1: We see that this is higher than the rst
best capacity.
We rst assume that we have ne tolling until the third best capacity is reached
followed by a at toll that returns all surplus toll revenues under the form of a
at subsidy per trip ( = 0 in eq(1.15)). In this case the capacity will reach the
third best level at t = 18: The value of  CS is now 1:32 which is only a very slight
improvement compared to the case where we had ne tolling and we allowed the
capacity to continue to increase above the optimal level ( CS = 1:42). Things can
be improved by allowing  to be di¤erent from zero. The best performing  turns
out to be  = 0:07. For this value of ,  CS is equal to 1:3: As can be seen in Figure
1.2 (where the dotted line corresponds to  = 0; and the dashed line to  = 0:07)
the extra at toll can be used to reach the third best capacity at an earlier point in
time (t = 13).
As a second illustration we take the same parameter values as above but now
 = 0:2 instead of 0:5. Again we compare the case when  = 0 (no at toll) with
the best performing :When  = 0;  CS = 1:32 (compared to 1:44 in the case with
only ne tolling). After 15 periods the third best capacity level is reached (dotted
line in Figure 1.2). The best performing  = 0:19 yields a  CS = 1:26 which is a
10% improvement compared to  = 0, the evolution of the capacity in this case is
given by the dashed line in Figure 1.2 (where again the dotted line corresponds to
 = 0; and the full line to  = 0:19):
Concluding the numerical simulations of the two-part toll we see that when
demand is price elastic, a two-part toll is a limited instrument to reduce the welfare
losses associated to the strict self-nancing constraint. The main reason is that the
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at toll (or subsidy) can only transform the e¢ ciency loss associated to an excessive
investment into an ine¢ cient pricing regime as user prices will be di¤erent from
marginal social costs.
Figure 1.2: The one link capacity evolution with two-part toll for di¤erent values of
,  and :
1.6.3 Numerical simulation results for two parallel links
We take the same parameter values for ;  and i as previously. We restrict ourselves
to the case without growth ( = 0) and  = 0:5 and where the initial capacity of the
tolled link is half of the optimal level:
The results will depend on the characteristics of the untolled alternative, more
precisely on the relative importance of the untolled capacity compared to the tolled
initial capacity. In Table 1.2 we summarize the results for di¤erent capacities of the
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sU s
opt
T s0  SS
0:0001 0:0966 0:0483 1:18
0:01 0:0956 0:0481 1:67
0:04 0:086 0:043 1:58
0:07 0:0713 0:0365 1:31
Table 1.2: Relative e¢ ciency losses of a strict self-nancing constraint in the two
link case for di¤erent initial capacities of the tolled link and di¤erent capacities of
the untolled link when the toll is equal to the ne toll.
sU s
opt
T  T  SS
0:01 0:094  1:084 1:15
0:04 0:082  2:207 1:12
0:07 0:068  2:67 1:28
Table 1.3: Relative e¢ ciency losses of a strict self-nancing constraint in the two
link case for di¤erent initial capacities of the tolled link and di¤erent capacities of
the untolled link for the second best toll.
untolled link and for the case where only the ne toll can be used on the tolled link
(at toll=0):
In the second column we report the optimal capacity of the tolled link given the
capacity of the untolled link and given that the toll equals the ne toll. Column
three gives the di¤erent initial capacities of the tolled link and the last column gives
the values of the e¢ ciency parameter  SS. We see that when capacity of the untolled
link increases, the welfare loss increases until a certain point where it decreases again.
If instead of the ne toll one charges the second best toll that takes into account
the existence of an untolled alternative (see eq(1.18)) we get the results reported in
Table 1.3.
Here the second column corresponds to the optimal capacity for the tolled link given
that this link applies the second best tolling. From Table 2.2 and 2.3 we see that
the optimal capacities are slightly smaller and the welfare losses are smaller with
second best tolling than with ne tolling only. Simple ne tolling with an untolled
alternative has the following drawbacks in comparison to the second best toll. First,
the second best toll can be set at a lower value in order to attract more users to
the tolled alternative that has better congestion management. Moreover, the second
best toll produces less toll revenues so that there are less excessive investments.
1.7 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed analytically and numerically the e¤ect of a strict self-
nancing constraint on the development of a network of the bottleneck type con-
sisting of one link or one link plus an untolled alternative. Tolls are either ne tolls
or a two-part toll consisting of a ne toll plus a at toll. The strict self-nancing
constraint forces the operator to spend the surplus revenues on new capacities. We
nd that the ratio between the initial infrastructure capacity and the optimal ca-
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pacity is the dominant factor in explaining the ine¢ ciency associated to the strict
self-nancing constraint. There are two reasons for this. First starting with a very
low capacity makes it more di¢ cult to reach the optimal capacity. Second, a very
low initial capacity means that the toll surplus will be larger and that investments
continue until capacity is really excessive.
The use of a two-part tari¤ where a xed part can help to build capacity more
quickly and to return excessive toll revenues once optimal capacity is reached can in
theory reduce these ine¢ ciencies. Numerical simulations show that the advantage
of this more complex tolling regime is limited. When there is an untolled alternative
in place, the strict self-nancing constraint is a handicap when one starts with a
too low capacity as the optimal ne toll generates less revenues and it therefore
takes more time to reach the optimal capacity. On the other hand it limits excessive
capacities as revenues are more limited.
Many road agencies are created after a period where government policy resulted
in insu¢ cient capacities, but these results show that it is precisely under these
conditions that the costs of the nancial constraint will be largest. This sugests
that one should be careful when imposing ncanial restrictions to institutions that
are created at a time where capacity is underprovided.
Our paper is limited to the analysis of simple one or two link cases. In the real
world, agencies have often the responsibility of a complex network. If the complex
network is an aggregate of one link problems with identical structure our results
continue to apply. Things would be di¤erent if part of the network is close to
optimal capacity while another part requires large investments. In this case, the
pooling of revenues over links relaxes the strict self-nancing constraint. A second
limitation of our analysis is that the strict self-nancing constraint is exogenous.
The strict self-nancing constraint is the result of a principal agent problem between
voters, politicians and agencies (see Besley [11]). One of the results of our paper, the
e¢ ciency loss of this constraint, is then an important input for the principal agency
game
18 STRICT SELF-FINANCING CONSTRAINT
Chapter 2
Transport Infrastructure
Investment and Demand
Uncertainty1
2.1 Introduction
Transport infrastructure is known as a lumpy investment with long lead times. The
construction of a new motorway, a new high speed rail line or a new canal may
take 10 years or more. Whether to take on a new project or not and in order to
choose the right capacity, one needs demand forecasts for the next 10 to 30 years.
Studies of past large transport infrastructure projects have shown that demand has
been systematically overestimated and that costs have often been underestimated
(Flyberg et al. [36]).
There are many sources of uncertainty in infrastructure projects. In this paper we
concentrate on only one possible source of uncertainty: the level of future demand.
in general capacity decisions are based on the expected demand level, in this paper
we investigate what happens when instead of using the expected demand level, the
uncertainty on the demand level is taken explicitely into account. We compare two
solutions: one where no account is taken of the uncertainty range and where an av-
erage ("expected") demand function is used. In the second approach (the "expected
welfare" approach) we explicitly take into account the range of demand functions.
Given that future demand is uncertain and that one needs to decide on the capacity
level now, is there a justication to "overinvest"2 rather than to "underinvest" in
infrastructure capacity? To discuss this question we use two analytical models: a
one mode model and a two mode model.
In the one mode model we are able to show analytically that "overinvestment" is
under certain conditions a better strategy than to chose the capacity in function of
the expected level of demand. These conditions are surprisingly simple: the demand
elasticity has to be smaller than one. This one mode model makes more sense when
1Proost S. and van der Loo S. (2010), Transport Infrastructure Investment and Demand Un-
certainty, Journal of Intelligent Transportation Systems, 14 (3), 129 - 139
2overinvest (or underinvest) is used here and throughout the paper in the sense of investing more
(or less) when the demand uncertainty is taken explicitely into account than when the expected
demand level is used.
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there are no easy transport alternatives for a given trip.
In the second model we deal with two modes that can easily be substituted and
where one mode has long lead times in capacity additions, but the other mode can
easily adjust its capacity. Examples are the competition between high speed rail
(long lead times) and air transport for passengers and the competition between
inland waterways (long lead times) and trucks for freight. In this case it is no longer
possible to show that "overinvestment" is systematically optimal because the other
mode serves as an escape route for high demands.
In section 2.2 we introduce the topic and illustrate the main results graphically.
Section 2.3 links our paper to the literature. In section 2.4 we use the one mode
model, section 2.5 analyses the two mode model and section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Transport investments under uncertainty: a
graphical illustration
In this section we introduce our problem setting using graphical illustrations. We
do this primarily for the case where no tolls exist. In section 1.4 we will show that
most results carry over to the case with optimal or non optimal tolling. We rst
illustrate the one mode case and then extend our illustration to the two mode case.
There is a transport planner who faces an uncertain level of future demand for
trips between two points. There is only one mode of transport, demand levels, once
realized, are constant over time and the capacity of the transport infrastructure
has to be decided before the level of demand is known. Typical examples are new
motorways, high speed rail connections, canals and ports whose construction or
extension may take 10 or more years. The level of capacity that is chosen determines
the userscosts. In Figure 2.1 we represent the simplest case where demand (for a
representative period) is price inelastic and is either equal to a level N  or equal to
N+, both with equal probability. The expected demand level is shown as N . The
Y axis represents the generalized cost of a trip which is the sum of a monetray cost
and a time cost. To simplify the analysis we put non time costs equal to zero. We
furthermore restrict ourselves to a linear average time cost function (ATC(N; K)).
The average time cost of a trip is an increasing function of the level of use and a
decreasing function of the level of capacity. In Figure 2.1, we show the average time
cost function that corresponds to the capacity level K. This capacity level is the
level of capacity that maximizes welfare (consumer surplus minus costs of capacity)
if the decision maker only takes into account the expected demand level N .
We will now show that in this case it is benecial to invest more than K when, instead
of the expected demand level N , one takes into account the explicit distribution of
demand levels N  and N+. We illustrate this by demonstrating that the expected
savings in userscosts of a small increase in capacity K are higher when explicit
account is taken of the two possible demand levelsN+ andN . The equilibrium time
cost when the demand level would be N equals P , the corresponding equilibrium
user prices equal P  and P+ if demand turns out to be low or high. Consider
now the savings in userscosts when capacity is increased by K. The savings in
users costs now equal B+ if demand is high and B  when demand is low. The
weighted sum of these areas [0:5B+ + 0:5B ] is larger than the gross benets B
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Figure 2.1: Uncertain demand levels call for larger capacities if demand is price
inelastic.
associated to the use of the expected demand level only. Hence marginal benets of
capacity extension are larger when the uncertainty of demand is explicitly taken into
account. The benets of a capacity extension are a quadratic function of the level
of realized demand3 and this explains that it is benecial to overinvestcompared
to the expected demand level.
In this paper we show that this result holds more generally whenever the price
elasticity of demand is smaller than one. Why this is the case can be easily shown in
Figure 2.1 by rotating the demand function in point A to the price elastic function
N+1 . A more price sensitive demand level implies that the realized demand increases
when capacity is extended as demand reacts to the lower time costs. At the same
time the savings in user benets become smaller: demand is larger but the savings
per user become smaller. When the elasticity of demand is larger than one, the
reduction in expected user cost savings becomes smaller than the user cost savings
associated to the expected demand level. It then becomes benecial to underinvest
compared to the expected demand level.
Let us now turn to the two mode case. The typical problem we have in mind is
the investment in a new rail line for passengers between two cities. Creating a new
rail line requires investments long before the service is operational. If both cities
have an airport it could be easier to set up a direct air connection between the two
cities. So in this example, air would be the second (competing) mode.
3The surface of the rectangles in Figure 1.1 are the realized demand multiplied by the di¤erence
in generalised prices, which is linear in the demand since the average user cost function is assumed
to be linear in the demand.
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The simplest case is where both modes are perfect substitutes (only the average user
cost matters), where total demand for both modes is price inelastic but uncertain
and where all modes are priced at marginal social cost (MSC). The mode with
the long time lag has a xed infrastructure cost. Its variable infrastructure cost is
proportional to the level of congestion. The exible mode is characterized by an
average time cost that is constant.
We can now start with a graphical illustration that is identical to Figure 2.1. In
Figure 2.2 we represent the average time cost (ATC(N; K)) and the social marginal
time cost (MSC(N; K)) and concentrate our attention rst on the expected total
demand level N . In contrast to Figure 2.1, we assume perfect pricing of the rail
mode: the user price consists of the average time cost plus a charge that equals the
extra time losses imposed on others. Let K be the capacity level that minimizes the
user costs associated to the expected demand level N .
Figure 2.2: Marginal benet (solid line) and marginal cost (dashed line) of a capacity
extension.
We now bring in the second mode by drawing an average cost function AC2. We
have drawn an AC2 curve such that the social marginal cost of the rail mode 
MSC( N;K)

is lower at a demand level N . In this case there are two possi-
ble solutions: either the xed cost of rail is relatively high and it is better to rely
completely on the second mode (air), or it makes sense to invest in rail and then
rail takes the whole market. This is a rst simple result that is useful to address the
case of uncertain demand.
We now introduce a demand level that can be either low (N ) or high (N+) and
return to our question whether overinvestmentin capacity can make sense. Con-
trary to the one mode model with uncertain and inelastic demand, one can now
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show that it is no longer always optimal to overinvestin rail capacity. Start with
capacity K; which is the optimal capacity when only the expected demand N is
taken into account. In that case we assume it is e¢ cient that rail serves the whole
market
 
MSC
 
N; K

< AC2

:When demand is high (N+) it may be e¢ cient not
to extend capacity to K + K and let from the extra demand
 
N+   N only a
part be satised by rail ( ) and the rest
 
N+   N     by using the second exible
mode. Consider now the benets of adding extra rail capacity; this will lower the
trip costs in the cases where N  and N+ materialize. Consider the benets if N+
materializes. Then the benets are limited to the area ABC instead of ABCD. The
presence of the other mode has taken away part of the congestion reduction benets
we observed in the one mode case.
2.3 A brief review of the literature
There is a large body of literature on investment decisions under uncertainty. There
is the option theory that attaches an extra value to any project that can be adjusted
or postponed until more is known about demand. This theory is now the basis
for investments in rms (Dixit and Pindyck [31]) and is also used in cost benet
assessments (Graham [38]). Another related debate is the use of a higher discount
rate in function of the riskiness of the project. Here we take a social cost benet
approach and in this case the risks of a transport project are small and diversiable,
so that the risk free discount rate makes sense (Arrow and Lind [4]).
When it comes to investments in transport, there are two strands of literature. We
classify them in function of the type of demand uncertainty. In the rst strand
demand is stochastic, in the sense that users, making their decision to make a
trip or not, do not know the aggregate level of demand or the available capacity and
therefore face an uncertain user cost or travel time (see Bosnal [12], Al-deek et al.
[1], Schmocker and Lo [57] and Higatini et al. [40]). In these papers the problem
of travel time reliability is central and it is argued that Intelligent Transportation
Systems (ITS) can play an important role in improving the reliability of transporta-
tion networks. These papers, however, do not consider investments and the e¤ect on
the optimal choice of the level of capacity. A few papers do include capacity choice
in their models. Kraus [43] has a simulation model with uncertainty in individual
demand, risk averse individuals and ex ante optimal tolling, and nds that optimal
highway capacity could be 3 to 12% greater under uncertainty. In DOuville and Mc-
Donald [32] use an analytical model to treat the same question. They have optimal
ex ante tolls, no risk aversion and also nd that optimal capacity is always larger
relative to the mean level of demand than in the case of no uncertainty. Arnott et
al. [3] use a model with uncertain demand and capacity levels, a constant elasticity
of demand function and no tolls. They have one result which is of interest to us.
With perfect information for the users, the optimal capacity level is higher in the
uncertainty case than in the certainty case if the demand elasticity is lower than
one.
The second strand of the literature deals with macro-economic uncertaintyin the
level of demand. Ex ante, demand levels are unknown to the planner but once the
investment has been made, the level of demand and users costs are known to all
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users. This is the problem we want to address.
Saphores and Boarnet [56] deal with the optimal investment time for a congestion
relief investment in a city where the population growth is uncertain. They nd that,
when the uncertainty is high and the lead times are long, it may be better to advance
the investment time compared to a traditional cost benet analysis. Our model uses
a simpler representation of uncertainty than theirs; they use a geometric Brownian
motion formulation, while we use a simple demand uncertainty representation with
a high and a low value. Our analysis could be extended to more elaborate rep-
resentations of uncertainty and very likely also to geometric brownian motion but
this would make the results less transparent without adding extra intuitive value.
Other di¤erences are that we explore the role of congestion pricing for the capacity
decision and that we only deal with the choice of the capacity level and not with
the timing.
2.4 The one mode model
2.4.1 Model structure
We have opted for a simple model that can be solved analytically. The (generalized)
average user cost without toll  , capacity cost and demand functions are assumed
to be:
C (N;K) = 

N
K
s
; (2.1)
F (K) = kK"; (2.2)
N (P ) = q0P
 ; (2.3)
where N is the volume, P the generalized price, K the capacity of the mode, 
value of time of the (homogenous) users. The parameter s  0 denotes the elasticity
of user cost with respect to the volume-capacity ratio, "  0 is the elasticity of
construction costs and   0 the demand elasticity. The model dened in (2.1),
(2.2) and (2.3) has been used previously by de Palma and Lindsey [23] to study
cost recovery properties of tolls. The average user cost function (2.1)4 becomes
independent of usage and capacity when s = 0; for high values of s we have a user
cost function that increases strongly once one hits the capacity K. The average
cost of capacity (2.2) can be constant (" = 1) or increasing in K (" > 1)5: In order
to make capacity costs comparable to the user benets we make two assumptions.
First, the cost of capacity has been corrected with a discount factor to correct for
the lag between investment and the realization of demand. Second, we measure
capacity costs as a rental cost per unit period using an annuity of the capital cost.
The demand function given in (2.3) is a constant elasticity function where  can
vary between 0 and 1.
4One could generalise the user cost function by adding a constant term. This would not a¤ect
Proposition 1.
5To ensure the concavity of the welfare function and the existence of a maximum we do not
consider decreasing average capacity functions.
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2.4.2 No Uncertainty
Equilibrium and optimal use
It is well known that, in the presence of congestion, it is optimal to charge a toll
that equals the marginal external congestion cost. Since optimal congestion tolling
may not be a realistic option because of implementation costs or political opposition
we will consider the case with and without optimal tolls. We can in general write
for the toll
 = f CNN; (2.4)
where subscripts denote a derivative e.g. @C
@N
 CN :When f = 0, we have no tolling
and when f = 1 the toll is set optimally, any non optimal toll can be considered by
using f 6= 1:
Equilibrium usage is determined by the condition that the willingness to pay of the
last user equals the trip price, that equals the user cost plus the toll:
P (N) = C (N;K) +  : (2.5)
Given (2.3), (2.1) and (2.4), this solves for N :
N (K) =
h
(q0)
1
 AKs
i 
s+1
; (2.6)
where A  1
(1+fs)
: Usage is a positive function of capacity and a negative function
of the toll (f).
Optimal capacity
In our simple partial equilibrium model, welfare is equal to the area below the
demand curve minus the total social cost:

 =
Z N
n=0
P (n) dn  C (N;K)N   F (K) : (2.7)
The rst order condition for optimal capacity is:
@

@K
=  CKN   FK + [P (N)  C (N;K)  CNN ] @N
@K
= 0: (2.8)
Substituting (2.5) and (2.4) the rst order condition can be rewritten as
 CKN   FK| {z }
(1)
+ (f   1)CNN @N
@K| {z }
(2)
= 0: (2.9)
Term (1) in (2.9) represents the savings in user costs of an extra unit of capacity
minus the marginal capacity cost. With optimal pricing (f = 1), the second term (2)
dissapears. Term (2) in (2.9) incorporates the e¤ects of induced demand. Suppose
now that usage is under-priced (f < 1). Given @N
@K
> 0 , term (2) is negative which
might suggest that the marginal benets of capacity expansion are reduced ( since
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 CKN > 0), as a result the second-best capacity would be less than rst-best
capacity. However, with a suboptimal toll usage, N and CK in term (1) are greater
than in the rst best. The net e¤ect of these opposing e¤ects is ambiguous a priori..6
Solving the rst order condition with respect to the capacity yields:
K (N) = B
1
s+"N
s+1
s+" ; (2.10)
where B  s
"k
1+fs
1+s
:
Solving (2.6) and (2.10) simultaneously, we obtain the following expressions for the
optimal usage and capacity in function of the parameters f; ; "; s and  that are
included in A, B and C.
N =
"
B
h
A (q0)
1

i (s+")
s
# s
C
and (2.11)
K =
"
B
h
A (q0)
1

i (s+1)
s+1
# s+1
C
; (2.12)
where C  (s+ ") + s ("  1) : We see that the optimal usage and capacity are
decreasing in capacity cost k. Depending on the values of s; " and , the optimal
capacity for non-optimal tolling will be either larger or smaller than the rst-best
capacity.
2.4.3 Uncertainty on demand
In our model we deal with an uncertainty of demand that is long term or macro-
economic in nature. Economic growth and location of rms are not perfectly known
at a horizon of 5 to 15 years and this means that the aggregate demand level is
unknown. We assume, however, that when the infrastructure has been constructed,
the level of demand, congestion and the (perfect or imperfect) toll are known by
everybody and there is no remaining uncertainty for the users. This is the justica-
tion for using utility functions without risk aversion. This contrasts with the models
of Kraus [43], Douville and McDonald [32] that deal mainly with stochasticun-
certainty at the level of the individual user. Their users decide while not knowing
what is the available capacity. Arnott et al.[3] deals with the two cases: what they
call perfect information caseis useful for our problem, their imperfect information
case deals more with the stochasticdemand.
The simplest way to model demand uncertainty is to assume that demand can take
only two values (low or high)78. With probability 0  P  1 the demand function
6It easily shown that if "  1 then the second order conditions ensure us to have a maximum.
7We could generalise our results by introducing continuous probability distributions, this would
however complicate the formulation without adding any new intuition. See [2] for an illustration.
8We use a model formulation where the demand level for a given price is uncertain. An alter-
native formulation would start from uncertain willingness to pay levels for a given price. Would
one obtain the same basic insights? The answer is yes but one has to take care of the e¤ect of the
model calibration.
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is given by:
N (P ) = q 0 P
 ; (2.13)
with probability 1  P it is given by:
N (P ) = q+0 P
 ; (2.14)
where q+0 > q
 
0 , so that, for equal user cost, demand will be higher. The "expected"
demand function is
N (P ) = q0P
 ; (2.15)
with
q0  Pq 0 + (1  P) q+0 : (2.16)
We are interested in comparing two solutions. One where no account is taken of
the uncertainty range and where an average ("expected") demand function is used.
In the second approach (the "expected welfare" approach) we explicitly take into
account the range of demand functions that can materialize. In the following sections
we compare the capacity levels that are optimal when only the expected demand
functions are taken into account, with capacity levels that are optimal when explicit
account is taken of the range of potential demand realizations.
Expected demand function approach
The optimal usage N and optimal capacity K when the expected demand function
is used, are given by (2.11) and (2.12), with q0 instead of q0 :
N =
"
B
h
A (q0)
1

i (s+")
s
# s
C
and (2.17)
K =
"
B
h
A (q0)
1

i (s+1)
s+1
# s+1
C
: (2.18)
Expected welfare
If instead of using the expected demand function, one can maximize the expected
welfare with respect to N and K; taking explicitly the two realizations into account.
The expected welfare is given by:

 = P
Z N
n=0
P (n) dn  C (N;K)N   F (K)

q0=q
 
o
+(1  P)
Z N
n=0
P (n) dn  C (N;K)N   F (K)

q0=q
+
0
: (2.19)
Solving the rst order condition with respect to K yields
K^ =
"
B
"
P
h
A
 
q 0
 1

i (s+1)
s+1
+ (1  P)
h
A
 
q+0
 1

i (s+1)
s+1
## s+1
C
: (2.20)
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Proposition 2 If there is uncertainty in demand, then the use of an expected de-
mand function approach leads to too low capacity levels if the demand elasticity is
smaller than one (jj < 1):
Proof. The statement that the use of an expected demand function approach leads
to too low capacity levels corresponds to stating that
K < K^
rewriting K given in (2.18) as
K =
h
BA
(s+1)
s+1
 Pq 0 + (1  P) q+0  s+1s+1 i s+1(s+")+s(" 1) ;
substituting   (s+1)
s+1
; x  q 0 and y  q+0 ; this becomes
K =
h
BA (Px+ (1  P) y)a
i s+1
(s+")+s(" 1)
:
Making the same substitutions in eq(2.20) gives
K^ =
h
BA
h
P (x)a + (1  P) (y)a
ii s+1
(s+")+s(" 1)
Using the above two expressions, and provided that s+1
(s+")+s(" 1) > 0 (which is the
case since "  1), the inequality K < K^ is equivalent with
[Px+ (1  P) y]a < Px a + (1  P) y a
Since 0  P  1 this is the same as stating that the function f (x) = x a is convex.
Since x is always positive, the function f is convex whenever its second derivative
is positive, which is true if and only if a

> 1; or  < 1: Thus, we can conclude that
if  < 1 then K < K^.
It is useful to analyze a few special cases in order to understand the intuition behind
this result.
If s = 1 (linear congestion function) and  ! 0 (inelastic demand) then we see that
the marginal benets of an increase in capacity will increase more than proportion-
ally with the realized demand level: In this case it is clear that it will be optimal to
invest more than the optimal capacity for the expected demand level N: This was
illustrated in Figure 2.1. When demand elasticity is high (jj > 1); there is a need
to invest less than the expected demand function would tell us to do. The reason
is simple; a high (generalized) price elasticity means that it is easy to reduce the
number of trips (substituting to other modes etc.). This implies that a capacity
shortage, when demands happens to be high, has only a small welfare cost.
It is important to note that our Proposition 2 holds, regardless of the pricing regime
since f can take any value. Of course the value of f will a¤ect usage and optimal
capacity, but it will do this in a consistent way. One can, however, conjecture that
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with optimal pricing (f = 1) the welfare loss of non-optimal capacity levels will be
lower because tolls are a more e¢ cient rationing device than congestion costs.
Our Proposition 2 is in line with Theorem 1 of Arnott et al. [3]. They also nd
that optimal capacity is larger when demand uncertainty is explicitly taken into
account. Their result is more general in that they use a more general form of
demand uncertainty. Our result is more general in that it holds for any tolling
policy and also for any iso-elastic capacity cost function.
2.5 Analyzing a two-mode problem with demand
uncertainty
One often faces investment problems where two modes compete. A typical example
is the rail-air competition where both rail and air compete for the same travellers
(N) going from one city to another. While air travel is supplied by airlines that can
easily adapt capacity by hiring extra planes, the supply of rail (building extra rail
tracks) is characterized by an important xed cost and requires long lead times .
The fact that for rail there is a large xed cost and a long investment lag while
air can adjust its capacity fairly easily (provided that there is already some airport
infrastructure) adds an additional feature; it implies that rail has to decide rst
whether it wants to invest or not and if it does, how much. A similar problem exists
in freight transport where the construction or improvement of inland waterways has
a long lead time while the capacity of road freight can be more easily adjusted at
least when the road network is dense. Throughout the rest of this text we will use
the rail-air interpretation.
We assume that the cost function for rail is given by
CCr = KF + lrnr + kK; (2.21)
where KF are the xed costs, lr the constant variable cost per passenger, nr the
number of passengers, k is the constant average cost of capacity and K the capacity
(tracks, trains etc.). The combination of a high xed cost and a constant marginal
capacity cost allows us to approximate cost functions with increasing returns to
scale9.
For air, we assume that the xed costs can be neglected and that the variable costs
per passenger (la) are constant. The cost function is given by:
CCa = lana: (2.22)
We use the simplest demand specication. Demand is xed (unlike the one mode
case) at levelN and users select the mode with the lowest generalized price (Wardrop
principle).
9The cost function for rail is highly simplied here. Compared to other modes like air and road
it has important economies of scale. The simpliest representation is a linear formulation with xed
costs.
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We are interested in how demand uncertainty will inuence investment decisions in
rail. To obtain a better insight into the problem we will start with the case where
there is no uncertainty.
2.5.1 No uncertainty case
User equilibrium
We assume the same functional forms for the user cost of rail as in the previous
section but take the special case that s = 1 (linear in volume capacity ratio). The
generalized price for rail use is then,
UCr = +
nr
K
+  r; (2.23)
where  is a mode specic user cost. Note that this formulation can deal with
waiting or access costs, which can be important for rail, as long as they are constant
or proportional to demand over capacity. We assume that rail is optimally priced,
i.e. toll equals the resource cost plus the social marginal external congestion cost,
i.e.
 r =
nr
K
+ lr:: (2.24)
By assumption, in air transport there is no congestion and the userscosts for air are
simply equal to the fee charged by the airline (a). Because we assume that average
costs for air transport supply are constant, we can assume that there is perfectly
competitive pricing10 as well:
UCa = a = la: (2.25)
We assume perfect substitutability between the two modes and assume that in equi-
librium, users costs are equalized across modes. The market allocation between
modes will depend on the di¤erence between the xed user cost of both modes.
Let L  la   lr   ; if the average cost for air transport is lower than the xed
users costs for rail (L < 0) everyone will travel by air (nr = 0) : For high average
costs for air transport
 
L > 2N
K

; rail will serve the whole market ( nr = N). For
values in between
 
0  L  2N
K

, both modes will attract travellers: nr = LK2 and
na = N   nr:
Optimal rail capacity
There is one interesting result in our certainty case: if it makes sense to invest in
rail it is always benecial to serve the whole market.
Proposition 3 Assuming full substitutability between modes, xed total demand,
and given the cost functions for the two modes dened in (2.21) and (2.22), if it is
benecial to invest in the high xed cost mode (rail), it is optimal to serve the whole
market.
10One could introduce monopolistic pricing by airlines but this would distract our attention away
from the central issue: the optimal level of capacity under uncertainty.
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The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix A.
The intuition can be understood as follows. Forget about the xed cost for the
moment. The best rail capacity is the capacity which minimizes the average time
cost plus the variable capacity cost. This total optimised variable cost is constant for
the capacity function we selected. Consider now total demand N , for this demand
either the total optimised variable cost is su¢ ciently lower than the average variable
air transport cost so that the rail advantage can cover the xed rail cost or this is
not the case. This implies that we have either rail or air covering the whole market.
The following proposition tells us under which circumstances it makes sense to invest
in rail and if this is the case, what the optimal capacity level is.
Proposition 4 Under the same assumptions as in Proposition 3 a social planner
will be willing to invest in rail if and only if
k <
L2
4
(2.26)
and
KF <

L  2
p
k

N: (2.27)
If both conditions are satised, then the optimal level of capacity is:
K =
r

k
N: (2.28)
For a proof, see Appendix B.
In Figure 2.3 we represent the marginal cost and marginal benets of a capacity
extension for rail. We need k < L
2
4
, before any investment in rail makes sense as
air will otherwise always be cheaper. For any k that is smaller than L
2
4
, the optimal
level of capacity increases with a lower k. For an optimal choice of K (covering the
whole market with rail) the savings in total variable cost for rail and air has to be
su¢ ciently high so that the xed rail cost can be compensated.
2.5.2 With Uncertainty
Suppose that there are two possible realizations of N : with probability P we have
N = N , and with probability (1   P) we have N = N+ where N+ > N . The
expected number of users is equal to: N  PN  + (1  P)N+:
Investment decisions will be made before knowing the realization of N . Once the
investments are made, demand is observed and prices are set with perfect knowledge
of demand levels. We are interested in nding the welfare gains a planner can achieve
when he explicitly uses the information that demand is uncertain rather than to use
the expected demand level only. We will show that, although we work with an
inelastic demand assumption, the result of Proposition 2, that overinvestment is
benecial, does not carry over to our two mode setting. The main reason is that
in the unexpectedly high demand case, calling upon the second mode may be more
economical than investing in extra capacity.
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Figure 2.3: Marginal benets and marginal costs of an increase in capacity
Expected demand approach
If the social planner takes the expected demand as only information, it is clear that
the results will be the same as before without uncertainty and with N = N we have
that: if and only if
k <
L2
4
(2.29)
and
KF <

L  2
p
k

N: (2.30)
the social planner will invest in rail and the prefered capacity level is:
K =
r

k
N: (2.31)
Expected welfare approach
The expected welfare is given by
EW (K) = PW (K) jN=N  + (1  P)W (K) jN=N+ : (2.32)
We can distinguish three cases which are depicted in Figure 2.4, where the solid line
represents the user cost for rail and the dotted (red) line represents the user cost for
air (note that both functions are shifted downwards by a constant factor + lr).
In the rst case (region I in Figure 2.4), we have that K < 2N
 
L
 K^ : In this case,
rail will only serve part of the market whether or not demand is low. Uncertainty
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Figure 2.4: The three possible cases.
of demand would thus have no inuence on the results. We know from Proposition
2 that this can never be optimal. If it is useful to build a new rail line it will take
the whole market (so at least N ) and capacity will be at least K^ :
In the other two cases, it may be benecial for rail to invest. In region III of Figure
2.4

where K > 2N
+
L
 K^+

, rail is certain to serve the whole market even in
the high demand case, while in region II of Figure 2.4

where K^  < K < K^+

rail
serves all users if N = N ; but if N = N+; then rail shares the market with air.
The resulting expected welfares are di¤erent in both cases:
EW III (K) = PWW (K) jN=N  + (1  P)WW (K) jN=N+ ; (2.33)
EW II (K) = PWW (K) jN=N  + (1  P)W P (K) jN=N+ ; (2.34)
whereWW (K) (given in (2.42)) is the welfare when rail serves all users andW P (K)
(given in (2.39)) is the welfare when rail shares the market with air 11. Solving the
rst order conditions for an optimal choice of K gives:
KIII =
r

k
qP (N )2 + (1  P) (N+)2; (2.35)
11The superscripts W and P corresponds to the welfare when rail serves the Whole market or
just Part of the market
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as optimal capacity if K > K^+. Under the constraint that K^  < K < K^+; optimal
capacity is:
KII = 2N
 
s
P
4k   (1  P)L2 : (2.36)
Whether the social planner chooses a capacity equal to KII or K

III will depend on
the parameter values of the problem. In Appendix C, we derive the conditions that
determine the apropriate region.
Will the social planner invest more or less when he uses the expected welfare
approach rather than using the expected demand approach? Using Proposition 2
we see that KIII > K
 , and in this case the social planner will overinvest. In this
case the social planner is sure to be able to serve the whole market independently
of the nal realization of the demand. The intuition behind the "overinvestment"
is the same as in the one mode situation. In the second region the social planner is
not sure whether it will have to share the market with air or not. We can show that
the planner overinvests (invests more than K ) only if
k <
L2
4
"
(1  P)   N2 
N
2   P (N )2
#
 ~k12: (2.37)
The righthand side of the inequality is constantly decreasing in P, implying that
the higher the probability of having a low demand, the less likely it will be that any
overinvestment occurs. If the di¤erence between high and low demand is large, the
social planner will be more cautious and overinvestment will again be less likely.
Summary
The results of the two-mode model are summarized in Figure 2.5. The two critical
parameters are the variable investment cost k (vertical axis) of the rail mode and
the xed investment cost of the rail mode KF (horizontal axis). We have 4 types
of solutions. First, if the variable and the xed costs are too high it is better not
to invest in rail at all: these are the North, East and North-East regions (zone I)
in Figure 2.5. In this case all tra¢ c is served by the other mode (say air). When it
makes sense to invest in rail, one will always invest such as to take the full market
in the low demand case. In the second type of solution (zone II in Figure 2.5) one
invests less in the expected welfare approach than in the expected demand approach
(K < K). This will be the case when the variable cost of capacity is relatively
high or when the probability of low demand outcome is high. In the third case
(when the variable cost of capacity is lower, zone III in Figure 2.5) it makes sense
to provide a capacity K in excess of what would be optimal for expected demand
( K < K < K^+): In the fourth case (zone IV in Figure 2.5) it is optimal to provide
a level of capacity that always takes the whole market even if the demand level turns
out to be high ( K < K^+ < K).
Overall, "overinvesting" in capacity (K > K) is not in general better in this
model. When the variable cost of capacity is relatively high it is better to serve
12The parameter ~k can easily be shown to have values between 0 and L
2
4 :
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Figure 2.5: Capacity choices in the two mode problem.
the "unexpected" part of the market with the other mode that is exible. As in
the one mode model, "overinvestment" can be optimal when the cost of capacity is
relatively high because congestion costs remain an increasing function of the demand
over capacity ratio.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed whether overinvestment in capacity, in the sense of
investing more than for the expected demand level, can be benecial. In both the
one mode and the two mode case we found that this can be the case. The main
reason is the presence of congestion costs that are increasing in the demand over
capacity ratio. Overinvestment is not optimal when demand is relatively elastic or
when a more exible substitute mode is available. Even if the full range of possible
demand realizations are taken into account, demand uncertainty remains costly when
capacity decisions have long lead times. The "overinvestment strategy", studied in
this paper, should be compared with other strategies such as investment in improved
information on future demand (as in Schmocker and Lo [57] and Higatani et al. [40])
and more exible capacity extension options.
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A Appendices
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3
In this appendix we give the proof for Proposition 2 that states that if one assumes
full substitutability between modes, xed total demand, and given the cost functions
for the two modes dened in (2.21) and (2.22), if it is benecial to invest in the high
xed cost mode (rail), it is optimal to serve the whole market.
To prove this, assume rst that rail invests so that its capacity is insu¢ cient to
serve the whole market, in other words K < 2N
L
 K^, where K^ is by denition the
minimum capacity level that decreases the users cost of rail su¢ ciently to take the
whole market. The market share of rail will be equal to nr = LK2 .
The welfare of providing rail is equal to the sum of the consumer surplus and the
toll revenues (TR), minus the total cost of providing rail (TC):
W P = CS + TR  TC = n
2
r
K
  kK  KF : (2.38)
Substituting nr = LK2 the welfare is equal to
W P =
L2K
4
  kK  KF : (2.39)
The rst order condition for optimal capacity is
@W
@K
=
L2
4
  k = 0 (2.40)
We see that, as usual, the rst order condition tells us that the social planner will
invest up to the point where marginal benets equal marginal costs13. Consequently
the social planner will choose not to invest when
k >
L2
4
; (2.41)
since then welfare will be negative.
If, however, k is smaller than L
2
4
and since the welfare function W P is linear in
capacity, the social planner will want the capacity to be as large as possible. At a
certain point K will become larger then the boundary value K^ and rail will attract
all the users.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
If capacity is such that the user costs for rail are always inferior to that of air, or if
capacity satises K  K^ = 2N
L
; then rail will serve the whole market and nr = N .
Welfare is in this case equal to
WW = LN   N
2
K
  kK  KF (2.42)
13It is also clear that the second order conditions for a maximum are fulllled.
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The rst order condition for an optimal choice of capacity is:
@WW
@K
=
N2
K2
  k = 0 (2.43)
We now see that the marginal benet of an increase in capacity

= N
2
K2

decreases
with capacity while the marginal cost (k) is constant14.
Optimal capacity is
K =
r

k
N (2.44)
The condition that it is benecial to continue to invest beyond the minimum level
to have the whole market (K > K^) is:
K =
r

k
N > K^ =
2N
L
, k < L
2
4
(2.45)
which is fullled whenever the social planner chooses to invest. Substituting the
expression for K in the welfare function, we see that it will only be positive if the
xed cost is not too high:
KF <

L  2
p
k

N (2.46)
A.3 Conditions on capacity cost and xed cost
Here we derive the conditions on capacity cost and xed cost that will determine
which of the regions shown in Figure 2.4 the problem is situated.
The social planner will invest in rail only if two conditions are fullled. The rst
condition requires that the marginal benets of a capacity expansion should exceed
the marginal costs (MB > MC). The second condition implies that the planner
will only invest if the welfare is positive (W > 0). While the rst condition can be
translated into a condition on the capacity cost k; the second condition gives us a
condition on the xed cost KF :
The marginal benets of a capacity expansion are di¤erent depending on whether
or not rail serves the whole market, and can be derived from the welfares given in
(2.39) and (2.42):
MBP =
L2
4
; MBW =
N2
K2
:
Using these we can derive the marginal benets in the three di¤erent regimes:
MBI =
L2
4
;
MBII = P  (N
+)
2
K2
+ (1  P) L
2
4
;
MBIII =

K2
h
P  N 2 + (1  P)  N+2i :
14It is also clear that the second order conditions for a maximum are fulllled for all K:
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The marginal costs of a capacity expansion are the same for all three regimes:MC =
k.
Knowing that in order to invest we need the marginal benets to be larger than the
marginal costs. We see that if
k >
L2
4
;
the marginal benets will always be inferior to the marginal costs and it will never
be interesting to invest in rail. If
MBIII

K^+

< k <
L2
4
;
then it will never be benecial to invest in a capacity that exceeds K^+; in other
words the social planner will not invest as to ensure full coverage of the market in
the case of high demand. Finally, if
k > MBIII

K^+

=
L2
4
h
P (N )2 + (1  P) (N+)2
i
(N+)2
;
then it is so cheap to invest that the social planner will have an interest to invest
in rail so that it will always serve the whole market. These conditions are in so far
that the welfare is positive, for this to be true the xed costs may not be too large.
The conditions on the xed cost KF are:
EW III (KIII) > 0, KF < L N   2
q
k
P (N )2 + (1  P) (N+)2 (2.47)
EW II (KII) > 0, KF < PLN : (2.48)
Chapter 3
The European road pricing game:
how to enforce optimal pricing in
high-transit countries under
asymmetric information
3.1 Introduction
A standard result of transport economic theory is that e¢ ciency requires prices
equal to the marginal social cost (the extra costs to society associated with an
additional trip made). This result, however, is only valid in a rst-best setting
and amendments to this simple rule are necessary in the presence of additional
constraints. This paper focusses on one particular second-best constraint that has
not yet been studied in detail in the context of transportation, namely the presence
of incentive and information problems regarding external costs when there is more
than one policy maker.
We know that when di¤erent levels of governments have conicting objectives,
this leads to uncoordinated and ine¢ cient pricing policies. These kind of conicting
objectives can occur in the EU between the Commission and the member states
or within one country between the federal government and the regions. While the
upper level (EU, or country) is concerned with the welfare of all the citizens and
wants social marginal cost based pricing, a lower level government (a member state
or region) may prefer much higher transport charges to extract revenue from transit
(this has been empirically validated for state gasoline taxes in the USA by Levinson
[46]).
In a White Paper of the European Commission [14], the EU indeed acknowledges
that pricing of transport infrastructure should relate to the marginal social cost
associated with the use of the infrastructure, but the current interpretation (for
tolling roads) is to impose a toll cap related to the infrastructure costs and not to
the external costs. One of the arguments why the EU can not impose rst-best
marginal social cost pricing is that it may lack the necessary information about the
marginal social cost of the di¤erent member states or that it is too costly to check
the validity of the information received from the member state. If this is the case,
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the member states with a high fraction of transit users can pretend to have much
higher external costs than in reality or claim that their region is substantially more
a¤ected by the adverse impacts from transport than the average. They can argue
that their ecosystem is very vulnerable (eg Alpine and Pyrneen regions or Omberg
in Sweden [58]) or that their urban planning is such that more people are exposed
to air or noise pollution than in other regions (eg Frankfurt airport in Germany
and Copenhague in Denmark [58]). Switzerland, for example, claims that the the
damage imposed by road tra¢ c in the Alpine region is on average a factor of 2
higher than for a at normalarea (Maibach et al. [48])). There is in general no
consensus on the magnitude of external costs and large di¤erences can be found in
the literature. In this paper we do not focus on the uncertainty in the magnitude
of the external costs due to di¢ culties of measurement or denition, we do argue
that how uncertain these values may be, it is very likely that a local authority will
be better placed to gather the necessary information to estimate the real external
costs and so will at least have more accurate estimates than a federal authority.
Alternatively, it can have the legal presumption to know better the local conditions.
When a lower level government has a better knowledge on the distribution of some
costs than the higher level government we have a problem of asymmetric information
The natural uncertainty on the magnitudes of external costs makes it even easier
for a local government to exploit the problem of asymmetric information.
In the rst part of this paper we investigate whether a federal authority can still
implement optimal pricing under such asymmetry of information Under asymmet-
ric information the federal authority can ask the regions to report their marginal
external costs and implements pricing accordingly. We analyze the problem in a
very simple setting; one link crossing a single state that is used by local and transit
tra¢ c1. This problem is very close to papers that deal with regulating rms (i.e.
monopolies) when the regulator lacks some crucial information. Indeed, production
costs are not always known by the regulator (or it is too costly to acquire the in-
formation) but are known by the rm. As a result rms will set their prices at an
ine¢ cient level to earn prots. In the case of a monopoly several regulation schemes
are possible (see La¤ont and Martimort [44] and references therein) to minimize the
excessive pricing, one of them being the compensation schemes. In such schemes,
monetary transfers are given to a rm which reports a low production cost in order
to induce the rms to reveal their true costs. Since transfers are typically seen as
a cost to society, there will be a trade o¤ between information revelation and e¢ -
ciency. The policy maker will be willing to deviate from the rst-best outcome in
order to reduce the information rent (i.e. the monetary transfer needed to gather
the true information). In our paper we make the simplifying assumption that trans-
fers are between governments and are, as such, not considered as a real cost, this
means that the higher level government will impose the rst-best outcome and there
will be no trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and information. On the other hand we are
concerned with transportation where the main external cost is congestion. This ex-
ternality di¤ers in one important way from other externalities: the social marginal
cost depends explicitly on the level of use or demand and inversely, the level of use
depends on the externality. For other externalities such as pollution or noise the
1By restricting ourselves to one single country we neglect strategic interactions when transit
uses networks of several regions as studied in De Borger et al. [17] and De Borger et al. [15].
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level of the externality does not inuence the level of use and the marginal social
cost is independent of the demand. The presence of a congestion externality will
alter the results signicantly.
Transfer or compensation schemes are only one of the instruments available to
the federal authority to minimize the welfare losses due to ine¢ cient pricing. The
transfer schemes, if one exists, will, however, be able to reduce the welfare losses
to zero. Other instruments, such as, toll caps will perform less well but have the
advantage of being more easy to implement. In this paper two di¤ernet toll caps will
be considered: one where the toll cap equals the toll that maximizes the expected
welfare and the one used by the EU where the toll cap is eaqual to the average
infrastructure costs.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we analyze the rst
best solution that can be achieved by an omniscient federal government that has to
deal with air local pollution or road congestion. In the third section we introduce a
local government that has di¤erent tolling preferences and focuses on air pollution
externalities only. Here we nd that a revelation mechanism exists that allows the
federal government to make the local government implement the rst best pricing
solution by a well designed transfer scheme. In the fourth section we concentrate on
the more di¢ cult case of congestion externalities. We show that, if the transit tra¢ c
share is su¢ ciently large, the federal government is unable to set up a transfer scheme
that leads to rst best results. In section ve we illustrate the orders of magnitude
of the ine¢ ciencies associated to the assymetric information problem and of a toll
cap equal to a toll that maximizes the expected welfare. In the sixth section we
generalize the model by including road capacity decisions and examine the solution
advocated by the EU for roads: constrain the local road tolls to be smaller or equal
to the average infrastructure costs. The last section sums up our ndings and adds
some caveats.
3.2 First-best pricing
As a benchmark case we analyze the setting where only local tra¢ c is present. When
only local tra¢ c is present and neglecting political economy issues, both federal and
local government will have the same objective and we get the standard rst-best
results. We discuss rst the case of air pollution and then congestion.
3.2.1 Air pollution
We use a partial equilibrium model to analyze pricing decisions of a single (isolated)
link crossing a country (or region). In this section there is only one kind of user,
namely local users. The usage is denoted by XL. In order to get explicit analytical
results, we assume that the usage is determined by a linear downsloping inverse
demand function PL
 
XL

PL
 
XL

= aL   bLXL; aL > 0; bL > 0: (3.1)
The objective function of both governments (local and federal) is the sum of the
surplus of the users (rst two terms in eq(3.2)), plus the toll revenues minus the
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external costs.
W =
Z XL
0
PL (x) dx  XL + XL   eXL (3.2)
where  is the toll levied on transportation, e the constant marginal external cost
of one unit of XL. Important in our analysis is that the marginal external cost is
constant, does not a¤ect the level of usage and has a purely local impact. Local air
pollution damage could be an example, accident externalities imposed by cars on
cyclists and pedestrians could be another.
In equilibrium, demand will be equal to the user cost. As we neglect here the other
private resource costs, the user cost consists of the toll only. The equilibrium volume
is then given by XL () = aL 
bL
. An increase (or decrease) in the toll will reduce (or
increase) the tra¢ c volume:
@XL
@
=   1
bL
< 0: (3.3)
Both local and federal government will choose  such as to maximize the social
welfare function given in eq(3.2). The rst order condition with respect to  is2:
@W
@
= P
 
XL
 @XL
@
   @X
L
@
+ (   e) @X
L
@
= 0:
Using eq(3.1) and eq(3.3), the optimal toll is equal to the marginal environmental
damage:
  = e:
As the marginal air pollution damage is constant, the Pigouvian tax solution is very
simple.
3.2.2 Congestion
In the case of congestion, the marginal external cost depends on the usage level of the
infrastructure. The user cost now equals the toll plus the time cost, where the time
cost is an increasing function of the usage. The time cost and the discomfort of travel
will in principle increase when a higher volume is loaded on the same infrastructure:
average speed will decrease, in the train, passengers wont have a seat etc.. We
assume that the user cost function is linear in the volume of transport3:
C
 
XL

= + XL +  ;  > 0;  > 0: (3.4)
The objective function for both local and federal government is the sum of the
surplus of the users minus the user cost (rst two terms in eq(3.4)), plus the tax
revenues (now the external costs are incorporated in the user cost function):
W =
Z XL
0
PL (x) dx  C
 
XL

XL + XL: (3.5)
2The linear demand function ensure us that the second order conditions for a maximum are
fullled and will not mention them in the rest of the chapter unless needed.
3The linear user cost function could be seen as the reduced form cost function of a simple
bottleneck model with homogeneous users Arnott et al. [2].
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In equilibrium, demand will equal the user cost (PL
 
XL

= C
 
XL

); and the
equilibrium volume is:
XL =
aL     
 + bL
: (3.6)
Contrarily to the case of air pollution, the level of congestion will now a¤ect the
level of usage (feedback e¤ect). If the infrastructure is more easily congestible, say
the capacity of the infrastructure is smaller,  increases and the usage decreases:
@XL
@
=   X
L
 + bL
< 0: (3.7)
Again the governments will maximize the social welfare (now given by eq(3.5)) with
respect to the toll. The rst order condition is:
@W
@
= P
 
XL
 @XL
@
  @C
 
XL

@
XL   C  xL @XL
@
+XL + 
@XL
@
= 0;
and the optimal toll is (using eq(3.4), eq(3.7) and P
 
XL

= C (X));
  = XL: (3.8)
As expected, the more congestible the infrastructure (the higher ), the higher the
marginal external cost and the higher the optimal toll:
@ 
@
=
bL (aL   )
(2 + bL)
2 > 0:
3.3 Enforcing marginal social cost pricing when
air pollution is the only externality
Introducing transit tra¢ c will create a divergence between local and federal govern-
ment objectives. Transit tra¢ c is tra¢ c by residents of another locality belonging
to the federation. In order to concentrate on the asymmetric information issue we
neglect the strategic interactions when transit tra¢ c uses networks of several regions
as studied in De Borger et al. [17] and De Borger et al. [15]. The local government
maximizes the surplus of the local users plus the revenue it can extract from transit.
The federal government is interested in maximizing welfare of all users and wants
therefore to control the tolling practices of the local government. To emphasize the
di¤erence in local decision making when transit tra¢ c is present or not we ,rst
analyze the case where there is only transit tra¢ c and generalize later to the case of
transit and local tra¢ c. As the type of external cost is crucial for the enforcement
of rst best pricing, we rst focus on air pollution.
3.3.1 The case of only transit tra¢ c
The local government collects the tolls paid by the transit users and is not interested
in their welfare. Its objective function is therefore equal to the total toll revenue
minus the (local) external cost caused by the tra¢ c:
 = (   e)XT ; (3.9)
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where  is the toll, e the constant marginal external cost and XT the transit volume.
The demand function for transit is assumed similar to that of local tra¢ c used in
the previous section:
PT
 
XT

= aT   bTXT ; aT ; bT > 0: (3.10)
The federal government, on the other hand, is concerned by the welfare of all citizens,
including the transit users and will maximize an objective function similar to eq(3.2)
where XL is now replaced by XT : The optimal toll from a federal point of view will
therefore be again equal to the Pigouvian tax, namely
  = e:
The toll preferred by the local government
The local authority will charge a toll N to the users of the facility that maximizes
its welfare given in eq(3.9). This toll will solve the rst order condition for  which
is
XT + (   e) @X
T
@
= 0;
implying
N = e+ bTX
T =
e+ aT
2
:
The toll increases with the marginal environmental damage. In fact the marginal
environmental damage can be considered as a marginal cost for the local government.
The toll charged by the local government N exceeds the social marginal cost because
the local government is able to raise revenues by charging transit users,
N > e =  :
Note that we need aT > e to ensure XT > 0; the maximum willingness to pay for
usage of the infrastructure must be at least the damage caused by usage.
When the local government is free to set the toll equal to N ; its welfare is
 =
(aT   e)2
4bT
> 0;
deriving this expression with respect to the damage cost gives us
@
@e
=  (aT   e)
2bT
;
which is negative since aT > e : the higher the damage cost, the lower the local
welfare. When e = aT , then the local welfare is zero.
Federal toll regulation with asymmetric information
We now suppose that the marginal environmental damage e is unknown to the federal
authority: it only knows that the region has either a low marginal environmental
damage
 
e = eL

or a high one
 
e = eH > eL

. This uncertainty is not unrealistic.
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Some regions pretend their ecosystem is very vulnerable or that their urban planning
is such that more people are exposed to air pollution than in other regions.
The game is the following: in the rst stage, the regional government reports
its marginal environmental cost ~ei 2 eL; eH	 to the federal government. In the
second stage, the federal government imposes a toll contingent on this report. To
ensure truthful reporting we assume that the federal government can make a nan-
cial transfer to the regions. These nancial transfers M (~ei) will be such that a
region always has the incentive to report its true marginal damage, i.e. the incen-
tive constraints are satised. Note that this problem is similar to the problem of
regulating a monopoly with unknown costs (see Baron and Myerson [10]) but since
we assume that the monetary transfers do not represent a real cost to society there
will be no trade o¤ between e¢ ciency and paying "information rents". Whereas in
the classic principal-agent problem the principal will be willing to deviate from the
e¢ cient outcome in order to pay less rent, here the principle (in casu the federal
government) will always implement the rst best tolls. Our aim is to check whether
it is possible for the federal government to implement rst-best tolls while ensuring
truthful reporting.
The lower level government, knowing that it will have to charge a toll equal to
its reported marginal damage, will choose to report a marginal damage ~ei such as
to maximize following function:
max
~ej

 
~ej; ei

=

~ej   eiXT   = ~ej+M  ~ej ; i; j = fL;Hg ;
(~ej; ei) being the local welfare for a region with marginal damage ei; reporting
a marginal damage equal to ~ej and thus charging a toll equal to ~ej:The transfer
scheme M (~ei) is such that it is benecial for a region to report its true marginal
damage. Since it is the di¤erence between transfers that will be important we can
setM
 
~eH

= 0 andM
 
~eL

=M (M can in principle be negative) and the incentive
compatibility constraints can be written as:

 
~eH ; eH
    ~eL; eH+M; (3.11)

 
~eL; eL

+M    ~eH ; eL : (3.12)
These are the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints. The rst constraint en-
sures that a region whose true marginal damage is high will prefer to report a high
marginal damage ~eH and receive no nancial transfer rather than to lie and report
a low marginal damage and receive M: The second constraint ensures in the same
way that a region with a low marginal damage will have no incentive to misreport
its marginal damage.
Let us rst look at the behavior of the local authority when there are no transfers.
A region with low marginal damage will have an incentive to misreport its damage
because it can increase its welfare by pretending to have a high marginal damage 

 
~eH ; eL

> 
 
~eL; eL

. A region with high marginal damage, will, on the other
hand, have an incentive to tell the truth since 
 
~eH ; eH

> 
 
~eL; eH

. This is
easily seen in 3.1.where I () ; I = L;H stands for the local welfare of a region
with low/high marginal cost.
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Figure 3.1: Local welfare functions with air pollution and only transit tra¢ c.
In order for a region with a low marginal damage to tell the truth, it must
be compensated with a nancial transfer. The lowest transfer needed to induce
truthtelling from such a region will be M = 
 
~eH ; eL
     ~eL; eL : It remains to
check wether the IC of the high marginal damage region (3.11) is satised. Using

 
~eH ; eH

= 
 
~eL; eL

= 0, (3.11) reduces to 
eL   eH  eH   eL < 0:
This is always true since eH > eL; which leads to the rst proposition:
Proposition 5 When there is only transit tra¢ c and when the environmental dam-
age is unknown to the federal government, the federal government can still im-
plement the rst-best tolls. For a region with low environmental damage eL to
report truthfully, it will, however, need a nancial compensation equal to M = 
eH   eLXT  eH :
When the di¤erence between the two marginal damages is large, the greater is
the gain for a low damage region to pretend to have a high marginal damage and
the larger the compensation for truthtelling needs to be.
If a transfer is not possible, the federal government could impose a cap on the
toll. The most obvious cap is a cap that equals the toll that maximizes the expected
federal welfare:
EW = PW   ; eL+ (1  P)W   ; eH :
where p is the probability of a low mecc. The cap will then be equal equal to the
expected environmental damage:
 E = PeL + (1  P) eH
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If this toll cap is set, a region with high mecc will always select a toll equal to the cap
since  E <  H < NH but note that in this case a region with high environmental
cost will end up with a negative welfare and may prefer an extreme solution like
closing down the road.
3.3.2 The case with transit and local tra¢ c
When there is both local and transit tra¢ c, the local government will only be
concerned about the welfare of the local users and the revenues generated by the
transit users. Its objective function is the sum of the surplus of the local users (two
rst terms), the total toll revenues and the total external costs:
 =
Z XL
0
PL (x) dx  XL + (   e)X; (3.13)
where X = XT + XL; the total amount of users. The federal government, on the
other hand, takes into account the welfare of both local and transit users:
W =
Z XL
0
PL (x) dx+
Z XT
0
P T (x) dx  X + (   e)X:
The federal rst-best toll is again   = e:
The toll preferred by the local government
Solving the rst order condition of (3.13) with respect to  yields the preferred toll
N , which is of the form
N = e  X
T
@X
@
:
Substituting @X
@
in the expression for N we get a toll level that is excessive:
N = e+
bLbT
bL + bT
XT >  : (3.14)
Moreover, the more transit users there are, the higher the locally preferred toll will
be. Note that the presence of local users will partly protect the transit users of
being excessively tolled since bT > bLbTbL+bT and the toll levied when no local users are
present will be even higher.
Federal toll regulation with asymmetric information
As in the case when there was only transit tra¢ c, we now assume that the environ-
mental damage is only known to the local government. Again the local government
reports a marginal damage costs ~ei 2 eL; eH	 : Doing so it will have to implement
a toll equal to ~ei and receive a nancial transferM (~ei) which is zero for ~ei = eH and
equal to M when ~ei = eL: We saw that a region with high environmental damage
will charge a toll that is higher than the corresponding marginal damage, which on
its turn is larger than the rst-best toll for low environmental damage:
NH >  H >  L;
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where  i    (ei) ; i = L;H and Ni  N (ei) ; i = L;H. The local objective
function is a parabolic function of the toll with a maximum for NH = N
 
eH

,
which implies that for a region with a high environmental damage there will be no
incentive to lie since

 
~eH ; eH

> 
 
~eL; eH

:
Graphically, we have the following situationh
Figure 3.2: Air pollution case: Local welfare with both local as transit users.
The incentive compatibility constraint for a low damage region is

 
~eH ; eL

= 
 
~eL; eL

+M:
In 3.2 we see that whether region with low damage will have an incentive to lie when
no transfers are available depends on the relative position of the rst-best toll in
case of high damage
 
 H

and the locally preferred toll for low damage
 
NL

. We
can show that when the locally preferred toll satises following inequality
NL < eL +
eH   eL
2
;
then a low damage region will never have an incentive to lie about its marginal
damage cost and the federal government can implement rst best tolls without
having to make any transfers, i.e. M = 0: Since the deviation of the locally preferred
toll from the rst-best toll depends on the volume of transit (see eq(3.14)), this
inequality tells us that if transit tra¢ c is not very important, then a low damage
region will never have an incentive to lie about its marginal damage cost. If transit
tra¢ c is important enough, however, a region with low damage costs will have
to be compensated in order to report truthfully, the transfer will be equal to M =

 
~eH ; eL
   ~eL; eL. This transfer could in principle induce a high damage region
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to mimic a low damage region in order to receive the transfers. It is, however, easy
to check that the IC constraints for a high damage region given by:

 
~eH ; eH

> 
 
~eL; eH

+M;
are equivalent with
X
 
eH

> X
 
eL

which is always the case since by assumption eH > eL:
Proposition 6 When there is both local and transit tra¢ c and the marginal en-
vironmental damage is unknown to the federal government, a truthful mechanism
exists in which each region sets its toll equal to its marginal environmental damage.
If
XT
 
N ; eL

<
 
eH   eL (bL + bT )
2bLbT
;
no compensation is needed i.e. M = 0,
if this condition is not satised, then a nancial compensation is needed in order
to induce a "low cost" region to report its cost truthfully. This compensation must
be equal to
M =

2bL
 
aT   eH
  bT  eH   eL  eH   eL
2bLbT
:
The larger the uncertainty on the marginal damage cost, the larger the di¤erence
between the two rst-best tolls. For a low damage region to be willing to pretend to
have a high marginal cost (and thus constraint to charge the  H ; the rst-best toll
given that the region has a high damage cost) it will need a lot of extra revenues
from transit to compensate the loss of local consumer surplus loss. This will only
be the case if there is a large fraction of transit. Conversely, the less transit there
is, the less likely that any monetary compensation will be needed to induce truthful
reporting.
As was the case where there was only transit, the toll that maximizes expected
welfare from the federal point of view when no compensation can be paid is the
expected environmental damage.
3.4 Enforcing marginal social cost pricing when
congestion is the only externality
3.4.1 The case of only transit tra¢ c
In the following sections we assume that congestion is the only externality present.
A distinctive feature of congestion is that it, contrarily to externalities discussed in
the previous sections, it a¤ects the users of the infrastructure and will inuence the
demand levels. The local government is not interested in the welfare of the transit
users, it will only be interested in the congestion costs of transit users in as far
as they a¤ect transit demand and the toll revenues. When only transit users are
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present the objective function of the local government is therefore very simple: it is
equal to the total toll revenue
 = XT ; (3.15)
where  is the toll andXT the transit volume. The federal rst-best toll is   = XT
(see eq(3.8)).
The toll preferred by the local government
Solving the rst order condition of eq(3.15) yields
N =
aT   
2
; (3.16)
the toll is independent of the congestion level. The local welfare will however depend
on the level of congestion;

 
N

=
(aT   )2
4 ( + bT )
;
and the more congestible the infrastructure (the higher ), the lower the local wel-
fare:
@
@
=
  (aT   )2
4 ( + bT )
2 < 0: (3.17)
Federal toll regulation with asymmetric information
In this section we suppose that the federal government is not well informed about the
marginal external costs of congestion. Again this is not an unrealistic assumption.
The marginal external cost depends on values of time (so on composition of tra¢ c).
It also consists of schedule delay costs (see Arnott et al. [2]) so that observations
on the length of queues etc. are insu¢ cient information. The lack of information
concerns the slope of the average user cost function, or more precisely, the parameter
: We assume that the federal government only knows that the slope of the user
cost function can be either  = L or  = H , where H > L: The larger the
parameter , the more easily congestible is the infrastructure and so we will refer
to a region with  = L as a region with "low marginal external congestion cost
(mecc)" and to a region with  = H as a region with "high mecc". As was the
case in section 3.3.1 we will check whether with the help of nancial transfers, it is
possible to implement the rst-best outcome.
The problem for the local government is to choose its reported mecc ~
i 2
L; H
	
such that it maximizes its welfare taking into account that it will be
forced to charge the rst best toll corresponding to the reported mecc



~
j

:


~
j
; i

= 

~
j

XT



~
j

; i

+M

~
j

;
where 

~
j

= ~
j
XT



~
j

; ~
j

; the rst-best toll given that the mecc is equal
to the ~
j
. Again we can assume M

~
H

= 0 and M

~
L

= M , where M has to
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satisfy the incentive constraints:


~
H
; H

 

~
L
; H

+M


~
L
; L

+M  

~
H
; L

.
When no transfers are available, we can see in Figure 3 that a country with a low
mecc will have an incentive to misreport its mecc. On the other hand, if a country
has high mecc, it has an incentive to tell the truth and thus M = 

~
H
; L

 


~
L
; L

> 0: A country with low mecc will need to be compensated to be truthful
and the IC constraints reduce to


~
H
; H

  

~
L
; H

> M:
Figure 3.3: Local welfares for di¤erent road congestibility and tolls.
In Figure 3.3 we see that for an identical toll, the toll revenues of a region with low
mecc will be higher than for a region that has a more easily congestible infrastructure
since there will be more tra¢ c using its infrastructure: 
 
 ; L
     ; H for
all  : Both welfare functions will be equal to zero when  is 0 or equals : These
two properties imply that
@2(;H)@2  < @2(;L)@2  ; which on its turn implies that
for every M > 0 and for every 0   1 <  2   :

 
 1; 
L

+M     2; L)    1; H+M     2; H ;
where the equality on the right-hand side only holds when the left-hand side holds
for equality. This property holds for every  1 and  2 and thus also for the special
case where  1 = ~
L
and  2 = ~
H
and we see that there is a conict with the
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IC constraints. This means that the federal government will not be able to nd
a transfer scheme that induces a region to declare its true mecc and implement
the corresponding rst-best toll, even if it has access to nancial transfers. In fact
the result holds for any pair of tolls and nancial transfers M; and the federal
government will never be able to induce a truthful report of the mecc. Note that
the major di¤erence with the air pollution type of externalities is that there the
second derivative of the local welfare is constant. This di¤erence reects the fact
that congestion has an inuence on the demand levels, while air pollution does not.
Proposition 7 When there is only transit tra¢ c and the marginal external cost
of congestion (mecc) is unknown to the federal government, no truthful mechanism
exists that allows the federal government to implement marginal social cost pricing.
In this case, when the federal government does not know whether the region has
a low or high cost, it will not be able to impose rst best tolling. One possibility
is that it imposes a toll cap equal to the toll that would maximize the expected
welfare. As long as this toll is inferiour to the locally prefered toll, each region will
choose to implement the cap.
The expected welfare is
EW = PW   ; L+ (1  P)W   ; H :
The toll which maximizes the expected federal welfare is,
 E =
1
M
"
P L@X
T
 
 ; L

@
+ (1  P)  H @X
T
 
 ; H

@
#
: (3.18)
whereM = P@XT
 
 ; L

+ (1  P) @XT
 
 ; H

:It is easy to see that
 E <  H :
Since  H < N independently of the mecc of the region, when this toll cap is
imposed the local government will charge a toll equal to  E:
3.4.2 The case with transit and local tra¢ c
When there are also local users, the welfare function of the local government will
be the sum of the user surplus of the local users (rst two terms) plus the total toll
revenues:
 =
Z XL
0
PL (x) dx  C (X)XL + X: (3.19)
In contrast, the federal government will also take into account the user surplus of
the transit users:
W =
Z XL
0
PL (x) dx+
Z XT
0
P T (x) dx  C (X)X + X:
Equating the demand functions for transit and local users (equations eq(3.10) and
eq(3.1) respectively) to the linear user cost function similar to eq(3.4), yields us the
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transit and local volumes in function of the mecc and the toll. Deriving the resulting
expressions for the volumes with respect to the toll yields:
@XL
@
=
 bT
B
< 0; and
@XT
@
=
 bL
B
< 0
where B   (bL + bT ) + bLbT : As expected, both user volumes decrease when the
toll increases.
The toll preferred by the local government
We obtain an expression for the locally preferred toll by solving the f.o.c. with
respect to  of eq(3.19):
N = XL   X
T
@X
@
:
Since @X
@
< 0;
N > lmecc
The toll exceeds the local marginal external cost, dened as the marginal external
cost imposed on the locals, and the more transit there is, the larger will be the
di¤erence between the locally preferred toll and the federal optimal toll (see De
Borger et al. [17])
Substituting @X
@
in the expression of N we get
N = X ( ; ) +
bT bL
bT + bL
XT ( ; ) (3.20)
and so
N > X ( ; ) = mecc. (3.21)
The toll charged by the local government exceeds the social marginal cost4.
Deriving eq(3.20) with respect to  yields:
@N
@
=
bT
(bT + 2bL)
X > 0:
For higher mecc (higher ) the local authority will charge a higher toll and so
N
 
H

> N
 
L

as expected.
Federal toll regulation with asymmetric information
Take now the case where the exact value of 
 
L or H

is unknown by the federal
government.
We see in Figure 3.4 that, as usual, a region with high mecc never has an incentive
to lie since 

~
L
; H

< 

~
H
; H

; but a country with low mecc will in some
4Note that the volumes are, however, the volumes for  = N and not the rst-best volumes. It
can be shown that the rst-best toll is lower than the locally preferred toll whenever  (bT + bL)+
bT bL > 0, which is always the case.
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Figure 3.4: Local welfares for di¤erent congestion functions when there is local and
transit tra¢ c.
cases have an incentive to lie when no transfers exists. Similarly to the case of air
pollution type of externalities, when
 H > 2NL    L;
a low mecc region has no incentive to lie. This last condition can be rewritten:
XT
 
NL; L

<
A
 
H   L (bT + bL)
2
 
2H (bT + bL) + bLbT

(bLbT )
; (3.22)
where A  aT bL + aLbT   (bT + bL) (for the derivation see Appendix). When
there is an incentive for a low mecc region to mimic a region with high mecc, we
will again have cases where the monetary transfers needed to induce truthtelling
will be such that the IC for a high mecc region will be violated. This will happen
when the share of transit is relatively high (in the next section we will show that for
some parameters this will already be the case when half of the tra¢ c is transit.). In
other words; only when the transit share is small enough, the regions will declare
their true mecc. If the transit share is larger, a region with low mecc will have an
incentive to overstate its mecc.and compensation will be needed. When the share of
transit is large, this compensation will induce a high mecc region to declare it has
low mecc and it is impossible to implement the rst-best outcome.
Proposition 8 When there is both local and transit tra¢ c and the marginal external
congestion cost is unknown to the federal government, there are three cases
1. conditions (3.22) is satised: the federal government can set the toll equal to
the mecc corresponding to the declared 
3.5. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 55
2. condition (3.22) is not satised but the share of transit is relatively low: the
federal government can set toll equal to the mecc corresponding to the declared
 but needs to make a nancial transfer if a region declares it has a low mecc
3. condition (3.22) is not satised and the share of transit is relatively high: no
mechanism exists where the federal government can induce a region to report
its mecc truthfully and impose the corresponding rst-best toll.
3.5 Numerical Example
This section illustrates the results using a numerical example. In this example we
put the maximum willingness to pay for any type of tra¢ c equal to 5 (aL = aT = 5) :
The demand functions are calibrated such that the total volume of tra¢ c is equal to
unity when the generalized price (without congestion) is equal to unity. The relative
share of local and transit demand translates into di¤erent slopes of the aggregate
local and transit demand functions: bL = bT : For  < 1 the share of transit will
be inferiour to that of local tra¢ c, for  > 1 the opposite is true. The values and
probabilities5 for the marginal external costs are:
eL eH L H
value 1 3:5 0:5 3
probability 0:8 0:2 0:8 0:2
Table 3.1: Marginal external costs and the probabilities
We will consider four scenarios: (i) no regulation is in place and the local govern-
ment can freely choose their tolls, (ii) the federal government imposes rst best tolls
but relies on the reports of the local governments since it does not have the neces-
sary information, (iii) the federal government has perfect knowledge of the value of
the mecc and imposes the rst best tolls and (iv) the federal government imposes
a toll cap equal to the toll that maximizes the expected federal welfare. We will
call the rst scenario the "laissez fair" (LF) scenario, the second the "asymmetric
information" (AI) scenario, the third one the "rst best" (FB) scenario and the last
one the "toll cap" (TC) scenario. We compute the expected welfares losses for the
various scenarios. The value of information can be dened as the di¤erence between
expected welfare in the FB scenario and the expected welfare in the AI scenario.
3.5.1 Air pollution externality
In Table 3.2 we present the welfares for the federal and the local governments for
di¤erent combination of their true mecc and tolls ( H is the rst best toll when
the mecc is high,  L is the rst best toll when the mecc is low and N is the toll
prefered by the local government). When transit is present it will depend on the
relative amount of transit tra¢ c whether a low region will want to misreport its
5We could take the case where the low or high outcome are equally probable but since the
informational problem occurs when there is a chance of a low cost region to pretend to be high
cost we assume that there is a higher chance for the region to have a real low mecc.
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mecc or not. We will therefore consider three di¤erent values for ; in the rst case
40% of the tra¢ c is transit, in the second case 80% will be transit and nally in the
last case all tra¢ c is transit.
40% transit 80% transit 100% transit
Welfares Welfares Welfares
(mecc,toll) Fed Local Fed Local Fed Local 
eH ;  H

0:28 0:17 0:28 0:06 0:28 0 
eH ;  L
  0:50  1:32  0:5  2:10  0:5  2:5 
eH ; N

0:26 0:20 0:23 0:16 0:21 0:14 
eL;  L

2 1:18 2 0:4 2 0 
eL;  H

1:22 1:10 1:22 0:99 1:22 0:94 
eL; N

1:83 1:42 1:6 1:11 1:5 1
Table 3.2: Welfares for air pollution and transit and both local and transit tra¢ c
We see that a region with high mecc will never have an incentive to lie: if it
does its welfare will be negative (the local welfare for
 
eH ;  L

is in all three cases
negative). The local welfares for a region with a low mecc when it is forced to
implement the right rst best toll (i.e.  L) will exceed the local welfare given that
the toll is the "wrong" rst best toll (i.e.  H) only when the share of transit is low
(40%). In the other cases, a low mecc region will report a high mecc.
In Table 3.3 we report the monetary transfer needed to induce truthtelling, the
value of information and the welfare losses of the di¤erent scenarios compared to
the rst best welfare.
share of transit 40% 80% 100%
transfer (M) 0 0:59 0:94
Value of Information 0 0:625 0:625
Welfare loss from asymmetric information 0% 38% 38%
Welfare loss from Laissez Faire 8:5% 20% 25%
Welfare loss from toll cap 7:5% 7:5% 7:5%
Table 3.3: Results for numerical example for air pollution and both local and transit
tra¢ c
We see that, when transfers are needed, the value of information is quite signif-
icant, nearly 40% of the expected welfare. This reects the large di¤erence in the
rst best toll levels. In these cases it can be worthwhile to invest in better informa-
tion. We can also see, however, that if the federal government would impose a cap
equal to the expected mecc instead of trying to impose rst best tolling relying on
the information given by the local government, it would entails a far smaller welfare
loss namely 7:5%; we see that, in this case even no regulation would perform better.
3.5.2 Congestion externality
Again the results will depend on the share of transit. We will consider four cases: in
the rst case the share of transit is approximately 13%, in the two next cases the
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total tra¢ c will consists of 33% resp 52% of transit. In the last columns we report
the results for the case where tra¢ c consists only of transit tra¢ c.
13% transit 33% transit 52% transit 100% transit
Welfares Welfares Welfares Welfares
(mecc,toll) Fed Local Fed Local Fed Local Fed Local 
H ;  H

1:25 1:18 1:25 1:08 1:25 0:99 1:25 0:75 
H ;  L

1:15 1:04 1:15 0:87 1:15 0:72 1:15 0:32 
H ; N

1:25 1:18 1:23 1:10 1:21 1:03 1:15 0:89 
L;  L

2:5 2:24 2:5 1:83 2:5 1:45 2:5 0:50 
L;  H

2:38 2:22 2:38 1:97 2:38 1:74 2:38 1:17 
L; N

2:48 2:26 2:39 1:97 2:28 1:76 2:01 1:39
Table 3.4: Welfares for congestion and both local and transit tra¢ c
In the rst case where 13% of the tra¢ c is transit no region has an incentive to
lie. In the other cases the low region will want to pretend having a high mecc.
The transfers needed to induce truthtelling, the value of info and welfare losses are
summarized in the next table:
share of transit 13% 33% 52% 100%
transfer (M) 0 0:14 0:29 0:67
Value of Information 0 0:1 0:1 0:1
Welfare loss from asymmetric information 0 4:4% 4:4% 4:4%
Welfare loss from Laissez Faire 0:8% 4% 8% 18:5%
Welfare loss from toll cap 0:76% 0:76% 0:76% 0:76%
Table 3.5: Results for numerical example for air pollution and both local and transit
tra¢ c
The transfers listed in the above table will give a low cost region the right incentives
to report its true cost, but the transfer needed in the case half of the tra¢ c is transit
will however induce a region with a high mecc to pretend to be low. Indeed, charging
the low rst best toll and receiving the transfer will yield him a higher local welfare
than charging the high rst best toll (local welfare for
 
H ;  H

= 0:99; while local
welfare for
 
H ;  L

plus the transfer is 0:72+0:29 = 1:01 which is larger). Imposing
the rst best tolls will thus not be possible. Instead of using transfers, the federal
government can impose a toll cap. The welfare losses when imposing the toll cap
are again quite low.
Table 3.5 gives one surprising insight. Although the possibility to exploit transit
tra¢ c is clearly there, the loss in welfare due to the assymetric information remains
relatively low in the case of congestion. The value of information is 4:4%. This is
clearly lower than the 38% found as value of information in the case of air pollution.
So although, in the case of congestion, no mechanism exists to attain the First
Best, the loss in welfare remains low. The intuition is that the welfare loss when
a region has a low mecc but reports a high mecc is a function of the square of
the excessive toll (di¤erence between high rst best toll and low rst best toll). In
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the case of air polution the excessive toll can be quite high. When we deal with
congestion, the high external congestion cost comes down to a lower "excessive toll"
or market distortion because the rst best tolls depends on the demand, which on
its turn decreases with increasing toll. This feedback e¤ect reduces the e¤ective toll
needed and the high rst best tolls will be relatively lower than in the case of an air
polution type externality. As the welfare loss is proportional to the square of the
market distortion, the welfare loss associated to assymetric info (and the value of
info) is much larger in the case of air pollution than in the case of congestion.
3.6 The European solution: a toll cap equal to
the average infrastructure costs
We have seen in the previous section that in the case of congestion (or any kind of
externalities with feedback e¤ects) when there is transit tra¢ c, there is no obvious
way to implement rst-best tolling when there is some uncertainty about the mag-
nitude of the externality. As said in the introduction, the current practice in the
EU is to constrain the toll level by a toll cap which equals the average infrastruc-
ture cost. In this section we analyse to what extent this practice makes sense. The
advantage is that such a cap does not require any knowledge about the level of con-
gestion and will therefore not rely on the reporting of the marginal external costs
from the regional governments. The federal government needs only to know the
total infrastructure costs and the toll revenues. Assuming constant returns to scale
in road capacity costs, the total infrastructure costs (TC) are equal to
TC =
k

;
where k is the unit cost of capacity and 1= is the level of capacity. It is cheaper
to provide a highly congested or badly serviced road (low capacity, high ). Note
that both the unit cost of capacity and the level of capacity can be unknown to
the federal government, we only assume that the total costs are known. The toll
revenues collected by the regional government can not exceed the total infrastructure
cost, so
X < TC:
Note that the local government has now the freedom to choose not only the toll
level  but also the capacity level 1= . We will see, however, that this extra
freedom generates rst best results for the tolling and for capacity choices of the
local government since it will always choose the optimal level of investment given
the level of usage. The resuts of the previous sections will therefor still be valid.
3.6.1 The case of only transit tra¢ c
The objective functions are as before but include now the infrastructure costs which
are born by the local government. With only transit tra¢ c, the objective function
equals the toll revenues minus the infrastructure costs:
 = XT   k

: (3.23)
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The federal welfare is given by
W =
Z XT
0
P (x) dx  C  XT XT + XT   k

: (3.24)
The toll and investment level preferred by the federal government
It is interesting to see what would happen if the federal government had the possi-
bility to choose toll and capacity. If this would be the case it would choose  and
 such as to maximize federal welfare. It will have to solve the following two f.o.c.
simultaneously
@W
@
= 0 and
@W
@
= 0:
The rst f.o.c. yields the rst-best toll
  = XT ( ; ) :
The f.o.c. for  can be rewritten as

   XT  @XT
@
 XTXT + k
2
= 0:
Using,  = X and the fact that  should be positive we have that:
 =
p
k
XT ( ; )
: (3.25)
The higher the marginal infrastructure cost, the more congested the infrastructure
will be since the government will invest less. The more transit, the more revenues can
be extracted and the more can be invested. Substituting  back in the expression
for the rst-best toll we get
  =
p
k
and this produces the well known cost-recovery result.
The toll and investment level preferred by the local government
It is instructive to see what the local authority would choose as its capacity level
(1=) and toll if it is not subjected to regulation. The problem of the local govern-
ment is to solve the next two equations simultaneously:
@
@
= XT + 
@XT
@
= 0;
@
@
= 
@XT
@
+
k
2
= 0:
The rst equation gives us the same result as previously (see eq(3.16)):
N =
(aT   )
2
:
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Using the derivatives with respect to ; @X
T
@
=   XT
bT+
and substituting the result
of the f.o.c for  = (aT )
2
= X
T
bT+
in the rst order conditions for ; we get an
expression for the capacity level preferred by the local government:
N =
p
k
XT
 
N ; N
 :
This is the optimal capacity from the federal point of view (see eq.(3.25)) given the
level of usage. This means that if the federal government could induce optimal charg-
ing, the regional government would automatically opt for the optimal investment
level.
A toll cap equal to the average infrastructure cost
Now the local government has to observe the following constraint:
XT ( ; )  k

:
The optimization problem for the local government becomes:
max
;
 (3.26)
s.t. XT ( ; )  k

 0 (3.27)
where  is given in eq(3.23). It is clear that in this case the local government
will choose toll and capacity levels such that the toll revenues exactly equal the
infrastructure costs since otherwise it will have negative welfare and will choose not
to invest at all. The local government will be indi¤erent to all pairs of tolls and
capacity levels that yield zero welfare and that satisfy XT ( ; ) = k=. Using the
equilibrium expression for XT = aT  
+bT
, we see that the constraint reduces to:
 (aT     ) = k + kbT

:
so for every  in a feasible range there is a  that satises the constraint and there
is an innity of solutions that satisfy this constraint but only one is optimal from a
federal point of view.
3.6.2 The case of transit and local tra¢ c
Federal price setting
The federal optimization problem yields the same result as in the case where there
is only transit tra¢ c but now the transit ow XT is replaced by the total ow X :
  = X (;  )
 =
p
k
X (;  )
substituting  in  , the rst-best toll becomes
  =
p
k
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Local pricing and investment strategy
Without regulation, the local authority would choose its investment level () and 
such to maximize its welfare   k

, where  is given in eq(3.19). It has to solve the
next two equations:
@
@
= X + 
@X
@
+ P (XL)
@XL
@
  @C
@
XL   C@X
L
@
= 0
@
@
= PL (XL)
@XL
@
  @C
@
XL   C@X
L
@
+ 
@X
@
+
k
2
= 0
The rst equation gives us a toll
N = X
 
N ; 

+
bT bL
bT + bL
XT
 
N ; 

The f.o.c. for  is  
   XL @X
@
 XXL + k
2
= 0
Substituting N and using @X
@
= 1
X
@X
@
gives
N =
p
k
X
 
N ; N

Again, the capacity will be set optimally. Note that the toll level is larger than the
optimum so that ows are smaller. The local authority will thus invest too little
and charge too much.
With local tra¢ c, the local government could in principle charge tolls smaller
than the average infrastructure cost and still have positive welfare. Under the con-
straint, the optimization problem for the local government becomes:
max
;
, (3.28)
s.t. X   k

 0 (3.29)
where  is given by eq(3.19).
Dene the Langragian
L = 

X   k


then the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
@L
@
= 0 (3.30)
@L
@
= 0 (3.31)
  0; X   k

 0and 

k

  X

= 0 (3.32)
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the rst and the second equation gives
 =
B
(bT + bL)
X   bT bL
(1  ) (bT + bL)X
L (3.33)
k
2
=

bT bL
(1  )A

XXL +
(bT + bL)
B
X (3.34)
where B =  (bT + bL) + bT bL
The last equation is satised when either  = 0 or k

 X = 0: It is easy to show
that when  = 0 (or with other words there is no constraint), that the toll revenues
will always equal or exceed the infrastructure costs. So this leads us to conclude
that the constraint is binding. If this is so, we have an unique solution, namely we
have a solution
 =
p
k;  =
p
k
X
; (3.35)
which corresponds exactly with the rst best solution6. This means that when the
higher level has no knowledge about the marginal external congestion cost, it can
still achieve the rst-best by letting the local government decide about capacity
levels and tolls, provided that the average infrastructure cost cap holds.
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper it is assumed that the federal government lacks information on the
external costs created by tra¢ c.The local government knows the external costs and
uses this asymmetry in information to charge transit and local tra¢ c more than the
marginal social cost. We have shown that if the external cost does not a¤ect the
use of the infrastructure (as in the case of some forms of air pollution), there exist a
transfer scheme by which the federal government can induce the local government to
charge the right tolls. If monetary transfers are not possible the federal authority can
impose a toll cap equal to the expected value of the marginal external cost. When
the external cost is of the congestion type so that the level of congestion a¤ects
the level of use, a transfer scheme to induce the local government to implement the
right toll only exists if transit tra¢ c is not su¢ ciently important. These results are
summarized in Table 3.6.
Air pollution Congestion
low
transit
high
transit
low
transit
medium
transit
high
transit
Transit with transfers no mechanism
Local and
Transit
without
transfers
with
transfers
without
transfers
with
transfers
no mech-
anism
Table 3.6: Conditions for which a mechanism exists that induces truthfull reporting
of the marginal social costs
6the langargian multiplier  is then equal to the proportion of the transit tra¢ c in the overall
tra¢ c

 = X
T
X

:
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Stated di¤erently: the classic solution to asymmetric information problems,
namely proposing some transfer scheme to induce the lower level authority to report
its true marginal external cost, breaks down in the case of congestion. The welfare
loss due to this lack of information, however, turns out to be rather small when the
externality is of the congestion type. The reason is that because demand reacts to
the toll and the rst best toll reacts on the level of use, the level of rst best tolls will
be lower than when such feedback e¤ects are not present. This reduces the welfare
loss when charging the wrong rst best toll (i.e. the rst best toll for a high mecc
when the true mecc is low). For the air polution type of externality the excessive
toll is high because, in our case, it did not depend on the volume of tra¢ c.
In both cases one could also impose a toll cap that equals the toll that maximizes
the expected welfare. In the numerical example used in this chapter, the welfare
losses are substantially less with such a cap than when the federal govenrment tries
to impose the rst best but it lacks the necessary information and relies on the local
government signal. The current European regulation imposes a toll cap equal to the
average infrastructure cost. This regulation turns out to perform well under certain
circumstances: if there is only type of tra¢ c and there are constant returns to scale
in capacity extension, one can achieve a rst best outcome for prices and investment
by using as toll cap the average infrastructure cost.
In this paper we assumed that there is only one type of users and that their
contribution to the externality is identical. When transit and local tra¢ c have the
same unitary air pollution or congestion e¤ect, there is only one parameter that is
unknown to the federal government. The propositions derived in this paper can be
generalized to the case of several types of users if their relative contribution to the
externality is known. This would be the case if the relative emission rates of trucks
and cars are known or if the relative congestion contribution of cars and trucks are
known. Having di¤erent types of users does however most likely create problems to
use the average infrastructure cost as toll cap. In this case the federal government
does control neither the toll nor the investment levels. When there are more types
of users the federal government can control easily the absence of discrimination
between local and transit tra¢ c for each type but this will be insu¢ cient. Whenever
the transit share of one type of users is larger, there will be an incentive for the local
government to overcharge this group. This is a well known result in the tax exporting
literature. The implication is that the rst best character of a toll cap equal to the
average infrastructure cost most probably will break down. To see this, take an
extreme example and assume that all trucks except one are transit trucks but that
all passenger cars are local tra¢ c. Tolls for trucks will be ine¢ ciently high and the
toll cap can not prevent this and the powerful result that using toll caps equal to
the average infrastructure cost is enough to ensure e¢ cient pricing and investment
breaks down.
This paper uses a very simple model and several extensions are worth studying.
One extension is the use of more complex networks. The competition for transit
tra¢ c may limit the pricing power of local government levels in the case of parallel
networks De Borger et al. [17]. A second extension is to consider a wider range
of instruments, besides transfer mechanisms and toll caps; one may also consider
quality standards for roads or uniform xed tari¤s.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of condition (3.22)
The equilibrium volume are determined by the Wardrop equilibrium concept where
aT   bTXT = + 
 
XT +XL

+  = aL   bLXL
Solving this for XT and XL and using X = XT +XL we get
X
 
 ; A

=
aT bL + aLbT   (bT + bL)
BA
  (bT + bL)
BA
 =
A
BA
  (bT + bL)
BA
 (3.36)
where BA  A (bL + bT ) + bLbT and A  aT bL + aLbT   (bT + bL).
From eq(3.8), eq(3.21) and solving the equilibrium volumes we know that
 A = AX
 
 A; A

(3.37)
NA = AX
 
NA; A

+
bT bL
bT + bL
XT
 
NA; A

(3.38)
Substituting eq(3.37) in eq(3.36) yields,
X
 
 A; A

=
A
2A (bT + bL) + bLbT
(3.39)
Substituting eq(3.38) in eq(3.36) and using eq(3.39) we get
X
 
NA; A

= X
 
 A; A
  bT bL
2A (bT + bL) + bLbT
XT
 
NA; A

(3.40)
With the help of these four last equations (rst using eq(3.37) and eq(3.38), then
substituting eq(3.40) and after rearranging the terms we substitute eq(3.39)) we get
the result that the inequality  H > 2NL    L can be rewritten as
XT
 
NL; L

<
A
 
H   L (bT + bL)
2
 
2H (bT + bL) + bLbT

(bLbT )
Chapter 4
Assessing transport investments -
towards a multi-purpose tool1
4.1 Introduction
Cost-Benet analysis calls upon several disciplines such as transportation economics,
engineering and nance, including public nance (see Layard and Glaister [45]).
Several models have been developed and are used in practice, but there have been
very few attempts to o¤er the di¤erent dimensions needed to help the decision
makers. Decision makers face the choice of which infrastructure should be developed,
when it should be built, how its use should be priced and how it should be nanced.
This paper presents the methodology and analytical description of the MOLINO-
II model2. It is a multi-purpose model that allows to assess investments as well as
strategic pricing behavior by operators in a simplied network. The network can
contain di¤erent types of modes and can deal with freight and passenger transport
simultaneously. A beta version of the model has been used to assess investment
and pricing of a bridge, and four large infrastructure projects that applied for EU
funding.
What is the role of a model like MOLINO-II ? Take a private investor or a gov-
ernment agency (World Bank, European Investment Bank, European Commission
etc.) that subsidizes transport investments in di¤erent regions and is confronted
with demands for project subsidies that deal with roads, rail, canals etc.. Lets
consider two cases. In the best case, the agency has a detailed cost benet as-
sessment for each project and a more crude assessment at a broader network level
that gives the possible interaction between projects. In this best case, our model
can have a double function: rst it can serve as second opinion tool to verify the
individual and mode specic assessments and second, it allows to analyze possible
conicts and strategic pricing behavior between operators. Unfortunately, in most
cases, there are only incomplete cost benet analyzes of one particular investment
available, using a specic modelling tool for the region at hand. In this case our
model can fulll the second opinion function and serve to study strategic pricing
1de Palma A., Proost S., Van der Loo S. (2010), Assessing transport investments - towards a
multi-purpose tool, Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 44, (7), 834-849
2For a less technical description see de Palma et al.[26]. A rst version (MOLINO-I) containing
only two parallel links is documented in de Palma et al. [24]
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but can also be used to analyze the possible interaction with nearby projects. Of
course the model we present can not solve all questions. Its ambition is not to carry
out the analysis starting from scratch but rather to perform an extra check or a
more strategic appraisal of a project that has been evaluated using existing models.
What is the value added of a model like MOLINO-II? There is a huge xed cost
in constructing and maintaining state of the art models that contain an explicit de-
scription of the whole multi-modal transport network of an entire region or country.
The network models often have a high degree of detail and describe users behavior
via discrete choice techniques. Our modelling approach di¤ers from the traditional
one in three respects. First, we focus on a simplied network that is directly relevant
for the investment. Second, we use aggregate modules to represent behavior as they
can be calibrated with a minimum of data. Third, we allow di¤erent types of strate-
gic pricing behavior by network operators and governments. The latter feature is
becoming increasingly important when all transport can be priced and the funding
of investment relies more and more on user pricing. Most network models are so
detailed that they focus on the correct computation of a user equilibrium but are
incapable of analyzing the strategic interactions between operators.
We start the paper with an example to show how we represent the network and
the supply. We describe the modelling of the users, operators and infrastructure
managers as well as the objective functions of local and federal governments. Section
4.3 discusses the calibration and simulation use of the model. In Section 4.4 we
describe the software. Section 4.5 uses the model to illustrate Nash equilibria in a
simple parallel network example and for a real investment project. In the conclusion
we briey discuss possible extensions of this model.
4.2 Model
We describe the model starting with the network representation and supply. Next
we discuss the analytical representation of the users of the transportation network
where we distinguish passenger and freight transport behavior.
4.2.1 Network representation and supply
The model we present is mainly used for investment analysis and this will guide the
network denition. An investment project aims to improve the quality or speed on
a given link (or set of links) that connects some origins and destinations. We start
from the links that are improved, examine what type of trips are a¤ected and add
to the network denition the competing links that may be a¤ected by the project.
Before we start with the formalization, an example can clarify the concepts.
Consider the GdanskVienna/Bratislava corridor, which is a roughly 900 km long
North-South corridor, linking the Baltic Sea port of Gdansk to the Central European
capital cities Vienna and Bratislava (see Figure 4.1). The Northern part of the
corridor, which stretches from the Baltic sea to the heavily industrialized region of
Silesia around Katowice and Krakow, comprises two alternative routes, one of which
includes the Polish capital Warsaw. South of Katowice, the corridor splits in two
branches, one to Vienna via the Eastern Czech Republic and the other to Bratislava
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via Slovakia. Besides linking major centres of the countries it crosses, the corridor
also provides access to the sea port of Gdansk. Within the TEN-T priority projects
a new road project (denoted by NR1, NR2, NR3, NR4 and NR5 in Figure 4.1) and a
upgrade of an existing rail axis (denoted by NT1 and NT2 in Figure 4.1) are planned
in this corridor.
Figure 4.1: An example of a network in MOLINO-II.
The projects will have an impact on the existing road and rail network and so
these links are also included in the network description. In order to model the
improvements on this corridor a network with 7 nodes needs to be set up. Each
pair of nodes is linked to each other by a sequence of links. Such a sequence of
links will be denoted as a path, for example:the origin node Gdansk is connected to
the destination node Katowice, amongst others, via the path [NR1,NR2, NR3] or
[NT1,NT2]. In this way 18 OD pairs linked by 38 paths were constructed.
To describe the model more formally we need the following notation and concepts:
Let O be the set of origins, D the set of destinations and d = fO;Dg the set of
OD pairs, L = f1; ::; l; : : : L) is the set of links and P = f1; : : : ; r; : : : R) is the set
of paths. Moreover, the notation fr; lg means: all paths r which contain link l,
similarly fd; lg stands for the OD pairs where there is at least one path of which l is
part of, l 2 r stands for the links l that are part of the path r and l 2 d stands for
the links l that are part of a path which connects the origin and destination node
of d:
The model uses a horizon of T periods of one year t = 1; : : : ; t; : : : T; each year
is represented by a typical day and that day has m subperiods, to simplify one
distinguishes between peak and o¤-peak subperiods. Between each origin and des-
tination, di¤erent types of users can travel; we distinguish between k = 1; : : : K
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classes of users. Classes of users can represent di¤erent types of freight transport
(container, bulk etc.), di¤erent types of motives of passenger transport and/or dif-
ferent levels of income. The behavior of every class is given by a representative
individual or shipper. The total transport volume of a representative user of type k
travelling between OD pair d, on a given link l (or a path r) during the subperiod
m in year t is represented by Xdkml (t) (or X
dk
mr (t)):
The generalized price for a trip for a user of type k using path r during period m;
is the sum of a monetary term T kml (t) plus the time cost, tt
k
ml (t) :
pkmr (t) =
X
l2r

T kml (t) + tt
k
ml (t)

: (4.1)
The monetary term is the sum of a resource cost, taxes and a toll ( kml (t)) for link
l; these can further di¤er among subperiods and user types. The time cost for link
l expresses the value of the time needed for a user of type k to make a trip on the
link, given the volume of the di¤erent users and the available capacity:
ttkml (t) = V OT
k
ml (t)
dl (t)
vmaxlk (t)
2666641 + Al (t)
0BBB@
X
k0;fd;lg
k
0
mlX
dk0
ml (t)
sl (t)
1CCCA
Bl(t)
377775 ; (4.2)
where V OT kml (t) is the value of time of a user of type k travelling during subperiod
m on link l in year t: For every link l and every year t we dene a length dl (t), a
capacity sl(t) and the maximum speed vmaxlk (t) : The parameter 
k
ml is the relative
contribution to congestion of user class k during subperiod m on link l and Al (t)
and Bl (t) are parameters dening the appropriate speed-ow relation for link l. As
can be seen, the congestion on a link is the result of the use made by di¤erent types
of users of this link. This is the most elementary representation of congestion, one
could expand the model to include congestion at crossings, make the monetary cost
dependent on total tra¢ c ow, etc..
The network structure denes OD pairs and the alternative paths. For each OD
pair we dene the behavior of users: how many trips each category of users make
and what path they select.
4.2.2 User behavior
For both passenger and freight transport we opt for an aggregate representation of
behavior. Disaggregate choice behavior is clearly superior if a representative sample
is available for simulation. Our experience is that this sample is often not available
if one wants to go for a quick check of an investment project, so we rely on more
aggregate data. We distinguish between passenger transport and freight transport.
Passenger transport
Passenger transport is modeled in an aggregate way by making use of a nested CES
(Constant Elasticity of Substitution) utility function. For every user class and every
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OD pair we calibrate a nested CES utility function with four levels as is illustrated
in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Nested Utility tree for passenger transport
We allow consumers on each OD pair to choose the aggregate transport level, the
period in which they travel and the path. The path can contain combinations of
modes. This means we rule out substitution between destinations. The elasticity
of substitution chosen for every branching of the tree will determine the ease of
substitution and the cross price elasticity between di¤erent paths and, implicitly,
also modes. For perfect substitution possibilities between paths we end up in the
Wardrop equilibrium but substitution can also be imperfect. This means that, in
general, we do not use the Wardrop principle for the choice of paths. Instead,
we rely on the concept of Stochastic User Equilibrium, which is well known in
transportation, when the user choice on a network is described by a discrete choice
model (see She¢ [59]). Here we use the same concept, but the discrete choice
approach is replaced by a CES model. The Logit and the CES model are both
demand models for di¤erentiated goods . The Logit model is a disaggregate demand
model, while the CES model is a representative consumer model. The Logit model
has a representative consumer formulation, where the direct utility has an entropic
form. The CES model can be derived as a two step disaggregate model, where
the rst stage is which good to buy, while the second stage is concerned with how
much to buy. In this case, the indirect utility function is logarithmic in income, i.e.
there are income e¤ects. The two models are related, and can be given a common
denominator, either at the aggregate level or at the disaggregate level (see Anderson
et al. [6]) . The main advantage of the CES is that it can be easily calibrated ,
while the Logit approach (the discrete choice approach), is more amenable to the
individual data. As such data are harder to nd for several transportation studies,
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we have preferred to use the aggregate CES form. The calibration of a CES requires
the elasticities of substitution at each branch plus the total quantities and prices at
the lowest level of the utility tree. Finally note that the Logit has been criticized in
the literature, since it requires that the demands satisfy the IIA (independence of
irrelevant alternative) property.
We dene the nested utility function by specifying the di¤erent utility components.
Following Keller ([42], equations (4), (6), (8) and (10)), we assume that all the utility
components are linear homogeneous CES functions of the associated components at
the next lower level3. Formally, at the nth level, the utility component qn;i (8n > 1)
is given by
qn;i =
"X
j2i
(n 1;j)
1 n;i (qn 1;j)
n;i
# 1
1 n;j
; n;i =
n;i   1
n;i
; (4.3)
where n 1;j  0; 0  n;i  1 and
X
j2i
n 1;j = 1: Note that we suppress here the
superscripts d and k corresponding to the OD pair and user type in order to lighten
the notation. The parameter n;i in eq(4.3) is the elasticity of substitution at level
n of the tree and the parameter n 1;i is a share parameter at the next lower level.
The notation j 2 i indicates those js for which qn 1;j 2 qn;i.
For each utility component, an aggregate quantity index and corresponding aggre-
gate price index can be computed. It is a property of CES functions that the utility
component, qn;i, is itself a consistent quantity index and that the corresponding
price index, pn;i, takes similar functional forms i.e.:
pn;i =
"X
j2i
n 1;j (pn 1;j)

0
n;i
# 1

0
n;j
; 
0
n;i =

0
n;i   1

0
n;i
; 
0
n;i =
1
n;i
; 8n; i .
(4.4)
At each level the sum of the expenditures of the lower level equals the total income
computed with the price and quantity indexes at that level,
yn;i =
X
j2i
yn 1;j = pn;iqn;i; 8n; i . (4.5)
It can be shown that the demand functions are
q0;i =
y
p3
3Y
n=1
n 1;i

pn;i
pn 1;i
n;i
; 8i . (4.6)
The demand for transport services q0;i will correspond to the aggregate number of
trips on a path r during a period m for a category of users k on OD pair d; also
3The utility components at di¤erent levels are said to be associated if the higher-level component
is a function of the component at the lower level. If two utility components qn;i and qm;j ( with
m < n) are associated we write qm;j 2 qn;i. Notice that for utility components at level n  1 the
notation is not necessarily unique.
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denoted by Xdkmr . The lowest price index p0;i corresponds with the generalized price
of making a trip using path r during period m for a category of users k; previously
denoted by pkmr given in eq(4.1).
The main advantage of the nested CES formulation is its ease of calibration. The
drawbacks of a limited number of parameters are the implied restrictions. First there
are unitary income elasticities for all transport goods - this can be mitigated by
recalibrating the utility function when large income variations are foreseen in future
years. Second the compensated cross price elasticities between goods of the same
nest are only a function of the initial budget share and the elasticity of substitution
for that nest.
Freight transport
For freight transport we use a similar approach. We assume that the production
function of each rm that needs transport services is a nested CES function of the
di¤erent production inputs: labor, capital and di¤erent transport services. For each
rm, keeping production levels constant, the minimization of the rms production
cost, generates demand functions for inputs including the demand for di¤erent trans-
port services. In practice we aggregate the non-transport goods into one nest and
transport into another nest. The transport nest is then disaggregated into peak/o¤
peak and into paths. The structure is then similar to the one used for passenger
transport (see Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3: Nested Cost tree for freight transport..
The demand functions for inputs are conditional on the production level of the
rm and the prices of all the inputs, including the prices of non transport inputs.
MOLINO-II is a partial equilibriummodel that concentrates on the transport market
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and takes the prices of all other inputs, as well as all product prices other than
transport services, as given.
A major assumption is that we take production locations and production levels
as given. This allows us to derive and calibrate demand functions easily. If we
want to integrate endogenous location we need a spatial general equilibrium model.
This is beyond the model scope we have in mind: a exible model that can be
calibrated to an existing study. This leaves us with the question: how important
are the changes in production and location compared to changes in transport and
distribution over paths and modes in response to changes in the prices generated by
a particular infrastructure project? As transport costs are for most rms maximum
5 to 10 % of total costs , a new project may strongly a¤ect the modal choice but in
a new equilibrium total production costs may change by 1 to 2% . This is in most
cases a second order e¤ect compared to the transport changes for given production
levels
4.2.3 Behavior of operators, infrastructure managers and
governments
Behavior of operators and infrastructure managers
There are two types of agents involved for each link of the network: the manager of
the infrastructure and the operator of the transport services. The manager of the in-
frastructure decides upon (and pays for) the capacity maintenance and investments.
He receives a fee (or infrastructure-use charge) from the transport services opera-
tor. The operator sets the level of tolls, collects the toll revenues and pays for the
operation cost and the infrastructure-charge. Figure 4.4 presents this schematically,
arrows stand for payments.The model also traces the position of the infrastructure
fund that is fed by subsidies and taxes and which can be used to nance the invest-
ments of the infrastructure manager (see Figure 4.5).
The prot of the operator of link l; (orl ) ; can be computed. We have:
orl = Tollrevl   INFCl   orl OPCl + suborl ; (4.7)
where Tollrevl are the tollrevenues on link l collected by the operator, INFCl de-
notes the infrastructure-use charge of link l which consists of the sum of a xed
infrastructure-use charge and a variable infrastructure-use charge per vehicle paid
to the infrastructure manager by the operator, OPCl, the operation cost on link l,
which again is a sum of a xed operation cost and a variable cost depending on the
number of travelers and is paid by the operator. The variable suborl denotes possible
subsidies received by operator of link l (in the case that the operator has to pay
taxes to provision the fund then subopl is negative): The (exogenous) parameter 
or
l ,
captures the e¢ ciency of the agent as a function of the market organization. This
parameter will depend on the type of contract between the principal (in casu the
operator) and the agent (e.g. the rm responsible for operating the link). With ten-
dering the parameter will be close to 1 (this means at the minimum technologically
feasible costs) while without tendering it will be higher since e¢ ciency will then
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Figure 4.4: Money ows.
Figure 4.5: The Infrastructure Fund.
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decrease4 (see Engel et al. (2001)). If the same operator is in charge of di¤erent
links, its prots will be the sum of the prots on each of its links.
In the same way, the prot of infrastructure manager of link l, denoted by infl is
given by:
infl = INFCl   infl  INV Cl   infl MCl + subinfl + Salvage value (4.8)
where INV Cl denotes the investment costs of link l; MCl denotes the maintenance
costs of infrastructure on link l; which consists of the sum of a xed maintenance
cost per unit capacity and a variable cost per vehicle, subinfl are the possible subsidies
received by infrastructure manager of link l and "Salvage value" is the salvage value
of the investments made by the manager of link l. The parameter infl is similar to
the parameter orl in eq(4.7).
Operators pay infrastructure charges to the infrastructure managers and set prices
for transport services that maximize their objective function. We foresee two types
of behavior: either prot maximization and setting monopoly or regulated prices or
welfare maximization and setting prices equal to marginal social costs. The marginal
social marginal costs is the resource cost plus the marginal external cost. We assume
that the behavior is static (one maximizes the prot or welfare for the given year)
and takes all other prices as given (Nash behavior).
Similarly, infrastructure managers charge fees for the use of their infrastructure and
can decide on the investments. Again we foresee two types of behavior for user fees:
prot maximization or setting prices equal to the marginal social cost.
The investment behavior is either exogenous or can be substituted by a naive rule
where each year the benet of capacity extension is compared to the annuity of
the total cost of extension. As the model is solved year by year and is not for-
ward looking, the benet of capacity extension for the future years is based on an
extrapolation of the current benets. We call it therefore a naive investment rule.
Local and federal governments
Every link of the network falls under the jurisdiction of a local and of a central
(or federal) government. Both can charge taxes and tolls (if the government is the
operator of the link) and do so with di¤erent objectives in mind. Local governments
may be interested in the user benets of the local voters and in the toll revenue raised
from the transit transport users, while a central government will also be interested
in the benets of the transit transport user. This can give rise to di¤erent pricing
and investment behavior (see De Borger et al. [15]). We represent the objective
function of each government by a social welfare function (SWF ) that is a weighted
sum of the welfare of its voters. If the welfare of all voters receives an equal weight,
we obtain the total benets and costs, traditionally used in cost-benet analysis. If
the weights are di¤erent, we have a political economy approach where the objective
4We assume here that OPCl are set equal to the minimum operation costs. If this is not the
case, the tendering parameter will be di¤erent.
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function translates the weight of di¤erent voters or lobby groups as in a common
agency model (see Dixit et al. [30]).
The welfare function SWF is a weighted sum of di¤erent terms:
SWF =
X
k2p
wkUk  
X
k2f
wkPCk (4.9)
+fC ( w)  C Taxcen + fL ( w)  L Taxloc
+
X
l
f orl ( w)
or
l +
X
l
f infl ( w)
inf
l
 wextEXTC + Fund.
In the two rst terms, Uk is the utility of an individual of type k and PCk represents
the production costs of a rm of type k, both terms are computed by the model using
the nested CES utility functions and production costs. The weights wk represent
the social weight the decision maker gives to the di¤erent passenger user types or
di¤erent types of freight. If the di¤erent user types correspond to di¤erent income
groups, one may want to give the lower income group a higher weight per person.
In the case of freight one can, for example, make the distinction between local and
non local freight. For a local rm, an increase in transport costs will a¤ect the local
households via a higher cost of consumption goods or via lower prots on exports.
In order to allocate this e¤ect over di¤erent groups of voters one can, for instance,
allocate the benets in proportion to the relative consumption of the di¤erent income
groups of the output of that rm or via the ownership shares. Summing the weighted
consumption or ownership shares over individuals gives the weight wk for that rm.
Changes in the production costs of non local transport rms do not have a direct
e¤ect on the local population, only total tax and toll revenues matter for them. In
the case of a local government which is only interested in the welfare e¤ects on its
local population the weight of the production costs of the non local transport rms
is set to zero. This is only one of the many possibilities, every case study will need
its own interpretation.
The 3rd and 4th terms in eq(4.9) represent the total transport tax revenues
collected by central (C) and local (L) governments. Each of these terms receives
two weights:  C:or:L: ;the marginal cost of funds (MCPF) and a distributional weight
function fC:or:L: ( w), where w represents the vector of weights wk: w =
 
wk

:The
marginal cost of funds parameter stands for the marginal welfare cost of one unit of
public revenue raised by a given tax. If, for example, distortive labor taxes are the
marginal source of tax revenue, then this parameter can be larger than one. Extra
government tax revenues raised on transport then allow to decrease distortions in
the rest of the economy. The distributional weight function f:C:or:L ( w) translates
tax revenues into utility changes for di¤erent income groups by using an assumption
for the nal incidence of the redistributed tax revenue. Both functions are of the
following form:
f:C:or:L ( w) =
X
k
kC:or:L:w
k; with
X
k
k:C:or:L = 1
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The way the transport tax revenues are redistributed is often more important for the
nal incidence of a transport charge than the relative use of the transport facility
itself (see Mayeres and Proost (2001)).
The 5th and 6th term in eq(4.9) compute the ultimate incidence on voter groups of
the prots of operators and infrastructure managers. This again requires the speci-
cation of some distributional weight functions f or1 ( w) and f
inf
1 ( w) : To determine
these functions we need to know whether link l is privately or publicly managed
(operated). If it is privately managed (operated), whether prot taxes go to local or
central government, or if it is publicly managed (operated), whether it is managed
(operated) by local or central government. If a link is publicly operated (managed)
then the weight functions will be equal to the MCPF times the distributional weight
function f::: ( w) of the previous paragraph:
f
or/inf
l ( w) = f::: ( w)  ::::
If a link is privately operated (managed) then the prot taxes will be collected by
some government (local or central) and will receive a weight similar to the weight
of the tax revenues. The prots after tax will be allocated between di¤erent user
types such that:
f
or/inf
l ( w) = f::: ( w)  ::: prot +
 X
k
kor/inf,lw
k
!
(1   prot) ;
with
X
k
kor/inf,l = 1;
The 7th term captures the e¤ect of external costs EXTC other than congestion,
congestion is already accounted for in the travel time. The last term is the net
account of the infrastructure fund.
Summing up, in eq(4.9), the weights
 
wk

allow to measure the impact of a policy
on political acceptability. Using uniform weights wk comes down to a standard cost-
benet analysis.
The model allows to compute cooperative equilibria where the two government
levels agree to maximize a common objective and where the tolling and investment
are fully controlled by the government. Alternatively, one can also compute non-
cooperative equilibria where two or more private or public operators of parallel or
serial links maximize prots. Often reality is much more complex as governments do
not have full control on operatorsbehavior and there are institutional constraints
in place.
4.3 Calibration and convergence
Once the network characteristics, the alternative paths and the type of users have
been specied, one needs to calibrate the utility and cost functions for each user
type to complete the demand side of the model.
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4.3.1 Calibration
In the utility functions (eq(4.3)), the unknown parameters are the shares () of the
components at each level of the nested CES utility functions. We assume that the
elasticities of substitution are known5. Making use of the known market demand
quantities and generalized prices for each of the transport modes and preferences
(as captured in the elasticities of substitution or price elasticities), the shares can be
computed. This means that, given observed quantities, generalized prices, the nest-
structure and the elasticities of substitution, it is possible to calibrate the demand
functions and the utility function.
We use following procedure in ve steps:
1. calculate the commodity level expenditures (y0;i) using eq(4.5).
2. for every cluster of nodes (utility elements associated with a common utility
element one level higher up), calculate the share parameters 0;i using the
following expression
n 1;j =
yn 1;j
yn;j

pn 1;j
pn;j
n;j 1
; (4.10)
and knowing that for every cluster, the sum of the 0;is is 1 (see example
below).
3. calculate expenditures of the next higher level (y1;i) using eq(4.5).
4. use these results to calculate price indices of the higher level (p1;i) using eq(4.4).
5. repeat steps 2 to 4 to the highest level.
Example of the calibration procedure
As an example, consider following simplied decision tree:
This cluster has two lower level elements (q0;p1 and q0;p2) which correspond to
observed quantities (respectively during the peak on option 1 and during the peak
on option 2). Together with the observed generalized prices for these commodi-
ties (p0;p1 and p0;p2) one can easily compute the expenditures (y0;i) (step 1). Using
equation 4.10 we can write a0;i as:
0;i =
y0;i
y1;i

p0;i
p1;i
1;i 1
; i = 1; 2: (4.11)
Divide 0;p1 by 0;p2 to obtain
0;p1
0;p2
=
y0;p1
y1;p1

p0;p1
p1;p1
1p1 1 y1;p2
y0;p2

p1;p2
p0;p2
1;p2 1
: (4.12)
5The elasticities of substitution are not common information but they can be easily related to
price and cross-price elasticities for which one can rely on the literature.
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Figure 4.6: Example of a simplied decision tree.
The two elements q0;p1 and q0;p2 have a common next higher level and thus q1;p1 =
q1;p2. This implies that p1;p1 = p1;p2 , y1;p1 = y1;p2 and 1;p1 = 1;p2:The equation
then simplies to:
0;p1
0;p2
=
y0;p1
y0;p2

p0;p1
p0;p2
1p1 1
: (4.13)
Knowing that
X
i=p1;p2
0;i = 1, the parameters can be calculated knowing the expen-
ditures and prices at this level. For the example considered the procedure stops
here. If, however, there are several higher levels, we compute the next higher level
parameters 1;i in similar way using the total expenditure of that particular level;
y1;i = y0;p1 + y0;p2 (using eq(4.5)) and price indexes p1;i which are computed using
eq(4.4).
The cost functions are calibrated with the same type of procedure using the
shares of transport in total transport, prices of transport and other goods as well as
the total quantities of the di¤erent goods.
4.3.2 Simulations
Once the demand parameters are calibrated and the time cost parameters in eq(4.2)
are specied for each link, we can calculate the behavioral response in quantities
Xdkmr (or q0;i) after a change of the generalized prices p
dk
mr (or p0;i). A change in
the generalized price can be due to a change in the level of the toll, taxes or other
components of the monetary term T kml (t) in eq(4.1) or can be due to a change of the
speed-ow relation dened in eq(4.2) that species the time cost. A change in the
generalized price on a specic link can have an e¤ect on the demand for all links in the
network. The change in volume implies, in turn, a change in congestion conditions
on the di¤erent links which on their turn inuences demands. It is therefore clear
that we need an iterative procedure to compute the new equilibrium.
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Simulation of the e¤ects of a change in the toll levels
We will consider, for example, a change in the level of the toll on some link l :
 kml ! ^ kml
which implies a change in the monetary term T kml ! T^ kml: We use the following
algorithm:
1. First compute the new generalized prices holding the quantities constant bpkmr (0)
(where the argument 0 does not stand for the time but should be interpreted
here as an iteration index):
bpkmr (0) =X
l2r
h
T^ kml + tt
k
ml ( 1)
i
(4.14)
where ttkml ( 1) is the time cost when the quantities are the equilibrium quan-
tities

X^dkmr (0)

for a toll equal to the original level  kml.
2. Using equation eq(4.4) one computes the induced price indices p^n;i (0) for the
higher levels all the way up to p^3 (0).
3. Starting from the top and knowing p^3 (0), one calculates the expenditures us-
ing the expression given in eq(4.10) where now the n;i parameters are known.
This requires one additional assumption: we assume that for passengers, in-
come is constant , so that y^3 (0) = y3: In the case of freight, it is not the income
but the total production quantity (the quantity index at the highest level, q3)
that is constant, so that in this case y^3 (0) = q3  p^3 (0) : Using the new y^3 (0)
we can then compute the lower level expenditures all the way down to y^0;i (0) :
Once these lowest level expenditures are known we can easily calculate the
new demands q^0;i (0) (or X^dkmr (0)) using the fact that y^0;i (0) = p^0;i (0) q^0;i (0).
4. Since the time cost is a function of the quantities, these will change and we
thus have to compute the time cost bttkml (0) by substituting X^dkmr (0) into eq(4.2)
Dene the new time costs as:
ttkml (0) =
~0tt
k
ml ( 1) +

1  ~0
 bttkml (0)
where
~n =
~
n+ 1
; 0  ~  1:
5. Compute the new generalized prices:
bpkmr (1) =X
l2r
h
T^ kml + tt
k
ml (0)
i
:
One repeats steps 2-5 until convergence i.e.:
ttkml (n)  ttkml (n  1)
ttkml (n)
< ":
When the last inequality holds, we have the new equilibrium quantities and gener-
alized prices.
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Improvement of an existing link
Investments on an existing link aim to improve the quality or the speed on that
given link. This means a change in the parameter values of the speedow relation.
Denote the new speed-ow relation by ettkml. To compute the new equilibrium after
the improvement we use very much the same procedure as described above. As
before we rst compute the new generalized prices holding the quantities xed but
now using the new speed-ow relation ettkml:bpkmr (0) =X
l2r
h
T kml + ettkml ( 1)i :
The remainder of the procedure stays the same.
Adding a new link
MOLINO-II is not a forecasting model, so we assume that the e¤ects on demand
ows and generalized prices once the new link is added are known. The model
is then recalibrated using the new paths and quantities. The "without new link"
equilibrium is simulated by setting extremely high generalized prices on the new
link.
4.4 Software implementation
The MOLINO-II model was reprogrammed in a user-friendly way using WinDev
that contains an appropriate user interface. The user interface operates as follows.
It rst asks to dene types of agents (users, operators, governments), number
of subperiods and number years in the planning horizon. This is followed by the
construction of the network. First the nodes are labeled. Next one selects the links
between nodes that make sense, and the user help is also required to dene the paths
of interest as an automatic generation of all possible paths quickly gives a very high
number of paths to deal with.
For every link one needs information on length, speed ow relation, capacity of
the link, variable operating cost, number and type of users as well as the type of
operator (private/public and what type of public operator), resource costs, values
of time, local and central taxes on use.
When elasticities of substitution are provided by type of user, the model is
automatically calibrated for every year by computing users costs and combining
these with quantity of trips to construct utility and demand functions as explained
in 3.1.1. Once the model is calibrated one can specify the policy simulations of
interest.
Solving a case study as described in section 5. takes of the order of a couple of
minutes on a PC.
4.5 Illustrations of the use of MOLINO-II
Our model can be used for cost-benet analysis of real world investments in a trans-
port network but it also allows for a more general analysis like the simulation of
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Nash equilibria between competing prot maximizing operators who each control
part of the network. We rst illustrate this feature for a simple parallel network,
then we discuss a real world case-study: the investment in the Brenner tunnel.
4.5.1 Nash equilibrium tolls
We illustrate how the model can be used to analyze Nash toll competition between
operators on a network. Operators typically compete along several dimensions.
Among these, the price is a key one, others can be capacity, quality or the level of
maintenance. When a new operator comes into the market, the incumbent operators
react, and usually cut their price, since the market is now more competitive. The
failure to take this reaction into account can be a disaster for a new investment,
as we have observed in the past, for instance, in the case of the Chunnel (tunnel
between France and UK) that did compete ferry services who cut their prices in
response to the arrival of the Chunnel (see Kay et al. (1989)). We use the Nash
non-cooperative equilibrium concept: at equilibrium, every agent (operator) takes
the prices of the other players as given and no agent can increase his prot level
by unilaterally changing his price. Computing Nash equilibria can, even for very
simple networks, quickly become a di¢ cult analytical exercise if one wishes to use
general functional forms for the demand functions. So one needs to rely on numerical
simulations for which MOLINO-II is very well suited.
Consider a very simple network consisting of two nodes, A and B connected by two
links as depicted in Figure 4.7 .
Figure 4.7: A parallel network.
For simplicity we assume only one type of user and one subperiod. Each link is
operated by a di¤erent private operator which has following objective function orl :
orl = ( l  OPCl) ql; l = 1; 2: (4.15)
82 THE MOLINO-II MODEL
where  l is the toll on link l; cl the operating cost and ql the demand on link l.
Demand is described by the nested CES functions as in eq(4.6). Here we write them
in an abbreviated form: ultimately the demand function can be written as a function
of the generalized prices pl on both links:
q1 = F (p1; p2) ; (4.16)
q2 = G (p1; p2) : (4.17)
For the sake of clarity, we assume a simple form for the generalized prices: we use a
linear time cost function so that generalized prices become a linear function of the
volume: pl = al + blql +  l where al; bl > 0:
In a Nash equilibrium, operators will set their tolls such that their prots are max-
imized taking the toll of the competitor as given. Solving the two rst order condi-
tions simultaneously gives us the Nash toll:
 l = OPCl   qldql
d l
:
If we simplify the problem even further and restrict ourselves to the symmetric case
where b1 = b2 = b; the derivative of demand with respect to the toll reduces to (see
Appendix for details):
dq1
d 1
=
F1 + b

(F2)
2   (F1)2

(1  bF1)2   (bF2)2
=
dq2
d 2
; (4.18)
where Fl  @F@pl and Gl  @G@pl (in the symmetric case at hand the direct- (resp. cross-)
price derivatives are equal: F1 = G2 and F2 = G1): If there is no congestion (b = 0)
the decrease in demand due to an increase in the toll will be equal to F1, the direct
price e¤ect. For b > 0; the decrease in demand will be smaller because the volume
on the own route will decrease, so the time cost decreases and total generalized cost
increase is lower. In addition, some of the tra¢ c is deviated to the other route so
the generalized price on the other route increases and this tends to also decrease
the e¤ect. We see that, even with all the simplifying assumptions, the expressions
remain highly implicit and no general result can be derived analytically. To test
the sensitivity of the Nash tolls to the congestion function parameter (b) and to the
substitutability between the two routes we need to rely on our numerical model.
The values used for the main parameters are reported in 4.1
veh/h per link when  = 0 2
a (free ow time cost) 0:5
operation cost per veh (OPC) 0
elasticity of subst between transp and other consumption 3
elasticity of subst between links 1:1
all other user costs 0
Table 4.1: Parameter values for the parallel network
The Nash equilibrium tolls   in function of the parameter b are depicted in Figure
4.8.
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Figure 4.8: Nash toll in function of the congestion parameter for a parallel network.
A higher b corresponds to more congestion. If the free-ow speed is 120 km/h, then
a b of 0.25 corresponds to a peak-period speed of 60 km/h, a b of 1.75 with a peak-
period speed of 15 km/h and a b of 0.08333 corresponds with a peak-period speed of
90 km/h. The fact that for higher levels of congestion, the equilibrium toll increases
is in line with the theory e.g. De Borger et al. [17] and de Palma and Leruth [21].
In Figure 4.9 we show the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium toll to the substitutabil-
ity between the two routes. The Y-axis reports the toll charged by an operator. The
X-axis reports the substitution elasticity between the two routes. We assume the
congestion parameter bl for both links to be equal to 0:25:
As can be seen, a higher substitutability between the two routes reduces the toll.
If the substitution elasticity tends to zero, we approach the monopoly solution. At
the other end of the spectrum, with perfect substitutability, the toll converges to the
marginal external congestion cost as this is a Bertrand equilibrium: the marginal
external congestion cost equals here bq; or approximately (0:25) (2) = 0:5.
This simple numerical example has demonstrated the need and the capacity of
a numerical model to compute network equilibriums with endogenous toll setting.
In the next section we show how the model can be used for a real world case study.
4.5.2 Evaluation of a large-scale investment: the Gdansk-
Vienna corridor
The improvement of both the road and rail network in the Gdansk-Vienna corridor
is one of the TEN-T priority projects and has been studied using our model (see
Haller and Emberger (2008) for full details). The main arguments brought forward
in favour of the projects are their relevance on a European scale due to a high
share of international tra¢ c, a desired shift towards rail for long-distance transport
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Figure 4.9: Nash toll in function of the elasticity of substitution between the two
routes.
and the improvement of road safety as well as an alleviation of congestion. The
network used for this case study has been depicted in Figure 4.1. The resulting
network is a simplication of the real transport network, since it is restricted to the
links on the Polish territory. Nonetheless, the network reects the most important
characteristics of the transport going from Gdansk to Vienna or Bratislava. The
transport model covers passenger and freight transport and distinguishes domestic,
incoming/outgoing and transit ows, resulting in a total of six user types.
Di¤erent combinations of infrastructure and pricing scenarios are analyzed using
the model. As to infrastructure the following infrastructure policies are distin-
guished: (i) building nothing, (ii) building the road projects only, (iii) building the
rail projects only and (iv) building both the road and rail project. For pricing policy,
the options are (a) the pricing regime currently in force in Poland , (b) implement-
ing a marginal social cost pricing scheme or (c) to toll the new or upgraded links
on a cost recovery basis6. Marginal cost pricing is applied to the whole network of
the case study, whereas the cost recovery tolls in scenario (c) are limited to new
or upgraded links. Figure 4.10 reports the main results of the di¤erent scenarios.
The rst column gives the values for the baseline. All other columns give changes
compared to the baseline.
All scenarios lead to an increase of welfare but the welfare gain will be much
higher when marginal cost pricing is implemented (scenarios B1, C1 and D1 perform
far better than their counterparts with existing pricing, namely B0, C0 and D0).
It should be noted, however, that with MSC pricing, foreign users will be worse of
since they do not benet from toll revenues redistribution.
6In this scenario it is assumed that the link manager/operator completely skims the generalized
cost savings from transport users. This leaves demand unchanged compared to the reference
scenario without project implementation.
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4.6 Extensions and conclusions
The MOLINO-II model presented in this paper is a multi-purpose model to assess
transport investments using a minimum of data. It can be used for two purposes.
First, as second opinion tool to verify the modelling results obtained using di¤erent
mode specic model assessments. Second, because it has a lighter network structure,
it allows to analyze possible conicts and strategic pricing behavior between oper-
ators. The model has been tested successfully on a number of investment projects.
Applications included investment projects like the Brenner-tunnel, the Betuwe rail
line, the canal Seine-Escaut (see Proost et al. [52]) as well as applications to pricing
issues (see de Palma et al. [25]). There are di¤erent avenues for extension.
First, the model does not allow for substitution between destinations: for a given
OD pair, consumers and rms decide only on number of trips, paths and modes. One
can redene destinations in a broader sense and dene them as goods. The physical
destination then becomes part of the path. Take as example a Belgian exporter who
wants to export to China, and has a choice of using the train or the truck to bring his
goods to the harbour, say the port of Antwerp. One could redene the destination
as China and include alternative ports (Antwerp, Rotterdam) in the denition of the
path. For consumers one could change the destination "London" for a shopping trip
by "shopping" where the paths contain London, Paris etc... This broader denition
of transport goods allows to study the interaction between imperfect competition
and transport access as in Dunkerley et al. [33].
Second there is a need to develop a consistent approach to deal with the huge
uncertainty in long term developments in demand and costs. One can of course use
a Monte Carlo approach using a probability distribution for each of the uncertain
parameters. This generates a distribution of the welfare and nancial indicators.
Project mistakes are often due to missing joint distributions of uncertain parameters:
growth in demand for a particular link may be correlated to exogenous changes in
cost parameters (e;g. oil prices). The challenge is to recognize these correlations
and to include them.
Third, when checking existing project assessments, these are often incomplete.
They are only made for a representative year, some categories of tra¢ c or some of
the competing modes are not included, etc.. For models like MOLINO-II who need
existing data and forecasts for the initial calibration, this is a problem. There is
no easy remedy, on the basis of experience with previous studies one could build
a range of default parameters for the missing modes and tra¢ c so that one can at
least test the sensitivity of the omissions.
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A Appendices
A.1 Nash equilibrium tolls in a parallel network
The Nash toll is
 l = OPCl   qldql
d l
:
To derive dql
d l
; we dene Fl  @F@pl and Gl  @G@pl , and derive the equations q1 F = 0
and q2  G = 0 w.r.t.  1: This gives us:
dq1
d 1
  F1 

b1
dq1
d 1
+ 1

  F2 

b2
dq2
d 1

= 0 (4.19)
dq2
d 1
 G1 

b1
dq1
d 1
+ 1

 G2 

b2
dq2
d 1

= 0 (4.20)
From the last equation we get:
dq2
d 1
[1 G2  b2] = G1 

b1
dq1
d 1
+ 1

(4.21)
Substituting this into eq(4.19) yields:
dq1
d 1

1  b1F1   b1b2F2G1
1  b2G2

= F1 +
b2F2G1
1  b2G2 (4.22)
In the symmetric case we have b1 = b2 = b; and the direct- (resp. cross-) price
derivatives are equal: F1 = G2 and F2 = G1: The equations then simplify to:
dq1
d 1
=
F1 + b

(F2)
2   (F1)2

(1  bF1)2   (bF2)2
(4.23)
the expression for dq2
d2
is derived in exactly the same way.
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A.2 Variables and parameters tables
In table 4.2 we present all sub- and superscripts used in the paper. Next we dene
all variables and parameters used to describe supply (Table 4.3), demand (Table
4.4), operators and infrastructure managers (Table 4.5) as well as the social welfare
function (Table 4.6).
d OD pair
l link
r path
k type of user
m subperiod
t year
Table 4.2: sub- and superscripts
Xdkml (t)
total transport volume of a representative user of
type k travelling between OD pair d on link l dur-
ing the subperiod m in year t
T kml (t)
monetary cost for a user of type k during subperiod
m on link l at year t
ttkml (t)
time cost for a user of type k during subperiod m
on link l at year t
pkmr (t)
generalized price for a trip for a user of type k
using path r during period m at year t
V OT kml (t)
value of time of a user of type k during subperiod
m on link l at year t
^ kml (t)
toll for a user of type k during subperiodm on link
l at year t
dl (t) length of link l at year t
sl(t) capacity of link l at year t
vmaxlk (t)
maximum speed for a user of type k on link l at
year t
kml
passenger car equivalent for a user of type k during
subperiod m on link l at year t
Al (t) ; Bl (t) speed-ow parameters of link l at year t
Table 4.3: supply variables
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qn;i utility component at level n
n;j share parameters at level n
n;i elasticity of substitution at level n
pn;i price index at level n
yn;i expenditure at level n
Table 4.4: variables of the nested-CES utility functions
orl prot of the operator of link l
infl prot of the infrastructure manager of link l
T ollrevl toll revenues on link l
INFCl Total Infrastructure use charge on link l
OPCl Total operation costs on link l
INV Cl Total investments costs for link l
MCl Total maintenance costs on link l
suborl ; sub
inf
l
subsidies to or from the operator or infrastructure
manager of link l
orl ; 
inf
l
tendering parameter associated to the operator/
infrastructure manager of link l
Table 4.5: variables and parameters related to operators and infrastructure managers
Uk utility of a user of type k
PCk production costs of a rm of type k
Taxcen; Taxloc
total transport tax revenues collected by central/
local government
EXTC external costs other than congestion
wk social weight given to users of type k
wext social weight given to external costs
 C ;  L
marginal cost of public funds of the central/ local
government
kC:; 
k
L:; 
k
or,l, 
k
inf,l distribution parameters
Table 4.6: variables and parameters related to the social welfare function
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Chapter 5
The Oosterweel junction
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to use the transport model MOLINO-II to assess the
costs and benets of several tunnel investment and tolling schemes in Antwerp,
Belgium. Antwerp straddles the Scheldt river as shown in Figure 5.1 . Three tunnels
cross the Scheldt: one very small tunnel in the city centre (the Waasland tunnel-
wltin Figure 5.1), the Kennedy tunnel (KEN) to the south and the Liefkenshoek
tunnel (LFK) far north of the city. The Kennedy tunnel lies on the ring road that
circles the centre of Antwerp to the east of the Scheldt. Tra¢ c in Antwerp is heavy
on weekdays, and congestion is particularly severe on the Kennedy tunnel which
conveys a daily two-way ow of about 125,000 vehicles. This is in sharp contrast
with the LFK which carries a much smaller daily ow of about 20,000 vehicles. The
ring road is a crossroad for several motorways, and it is heavily used by cars and for
national and international/transit freight transport.
A proposal has been made to build an additional tunnel under the Scheldt be-
tween the Kennedy and Liefkenshoek tunnels. The future tunnel , known as the
Oosterweel junction(or for short OWV), would branch o¤ the ring road and o¤er
a shorter route for tra¢ c heading to or from the north of Antwerp. Building a new
tunnel would alleviate tra¢ c congestion through the Kennedy tunnel and on the ring
road generally. In addition it would facilitate the access to the port of Antwerp.
The new tunnel is expected to cost e1.35 billion 1 (price level 2004, BAM (2004)
[7]). Part of this cost should be covered by the revenues raised by tolling the in-
frastructure. The agreed level of the tolls is 2 euro for passenger cars and 13 euro
for trucks above 3.5 tons (all prices are VAT excluded). Together with the toll on
the new infrastructure, freight will be banned from the Kennedy tunnel.
Although there is a clear mobility problem in the Antwerp area, the new proposal
has been subject to much criticism. A lot of these discussions were, however, focused
on the precise trajectory of the infrastructure and other specications of the tunnel.
In this paper we do not wish to go into this discussion. We want to broaden the
discussion and consider also alternative solutions. For example, is it not possible to
solve, at least part, of the mobility problem around Antwerp with a better pricing
1This is the cost of the tunnel only, the cost of the Masterplanof which the tunnel is part of
is estimated at e2.25 billion.
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Figure 5.1: Antwerp
of the existing infrastructure avoiding such expensive investments? Is the banning
of freight in the Kennedy tunnel welfare improving or is it just a means to divert
tra¢ c to the tolled tunnel to generate revenues?
It is therefore of interest to compare several alternative investment and tolling
regimes. In total nine scenarios will be compared, ve where the new tunnel is not
built and four with the new OWV.
The ve scenarios without any new investment are (1) the business as usual sce-
nario, where no new pricing nor investment is undertaken; (2) refrain from building
the new tunnel, but ban freight from the KEN to alleviate congestion in the tunnel
and on the ring road; (3) set tolls equal to zero in the LFK to attract tra¢ c into
this underused tunnel; (4) introduce a kilometercharge on the Belgian motorway
network for trucks and keep actual tolling on LFK; (5) to alleviate congestion in the
KEN, by charging a toll on the KEN for trucks and cars.
If the OWV is built, four possible scenarios are of interest: (1) the OWV is built
but remains untolled; (2) the OWV is tolled as proposed but the KEN remains free
for freight; (3) the proposal is applied in its entirety (tolls and ban on freight in the
KEN); (4) instead of a ban, the KEN is tolled.
For the comparison of the di¤erent scenarios we use the MOLINO-II model which
is briey described in section 5.3. In Section 5.2, we briey review the existing
studies concerning the new crossing. After the description of the model and how it
is applied to the project in Section 5.3, we discuss the basic data and calibration of
the model in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 analyzes the results and section 5.6 concludes.
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5.2 Review of existing studies
The construction of the new tunnel has been subject of a long lasting debate and
several studies have been performed. In this section we summarize the main studies.
For every project that will potentially a¤ect the environment an environmental
impact report (EIR) is requested by the Flemish authorities. The e¤ect of the OWV
has been the subject of two such reports, the Plan-MER Masterplan Antwerpen,
BAM (2005) [8] assesses the impact of the broader Masterplanfor Antwerp, which
the OWV is part of, whereas Plan-MER Oosterweelverbinding, BAM (2007) [9]
concentrates on the OWV project itself.
In the rst report (Plan-MER Masterplan Antwerpen) the OWV has been com-
pared to an alternative tunnel that would lie next to the existing KEN. More in-
terestingly, three di¤erent toll regimes have been considered (no toll, the proposed
toll levels and half of the proposed toll levels). The report concludes that the best
performing strategy is the one where the OWV is built with agreed toll levels. This
conclusion is the result of a multi-criteria-analysis. There is, however, a lack of
quantitative results; the conclusion is merely drawn on a qualitative basis and not
on a monetized costs and benets basis. Moreover, all strategies with OWV are
combined with a ban on freight in the KEN and no scenario with tolling of the KEN
is considered. Only the strategy that performed qualitatively best in the report has
been subject of a monetized cost-benet analysis (BAM (2004)). This cost benet
analysis compared the OWV project with the proposed toll level with the do-nothing
scenario and concludes that the project has positive net benets at a discount rate
of 4%.
The second EIR report (Plan-MER Oosterweelverbinding, BAM(2007) [9]) is
focused on the OWV itself. After public critisism, other alternative trajectories
of the OWV were incorporated in the analyses and more interestingly, more toll
scenarios were included. To be more precise, three scenarios were compared: (1)
proposed toll in OWV and ban on freight in KEN; (2) same toll on OWV and KEN
for freight and passenger cars and (3) same toll for freight on KEN as on OWV.
The report concludes that the additional scenarios do not provide any added value.
Again the argumentation is very qualitative and there is no cost-benet study of the
alternative tolling scenarios.
After those reports the public debate has largely been dominated by the precise
trajectory of the tunnel. In 2009 an additional study compared three alternative
trajectories (Arup-Sum (2009) [5]). They nd that each trajectory had its benets
and proposed yet another alternative trajectory. The role of correct pricing was
mentioned as important but further analysis of other pricing schemes was not part
of the task and thus disregarded.
In De Borger and Proost [16], an attempt is made to redirect and broaden the
discussion. They calibrate a very simple bottleneck model with two parallel links
(KEN and Oosterweel) and homogeneous drivers to the Oosterweel data. They nd
that better use of the existing capacity by pricing of KEN merits serious analysis
and could be a better alternative than the current Oosterweel proposal. Recently,
another study group (Forum 2020 [37]) proposed an alternative plan with a stepwise
investment plan for the broader Antwerp region. They stressed the importance of
pricing in all scenarios.
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5.3 The MOLINO-II model and its application to
Antwerp
In this section we give a brief introduction to MOLINO-II and how it is applied to
the case-study, for a detailed overview of the model features we refer to de Palma
et al. [22].
5.3.1 Structure of the model
The MOLINO-II model was developed to assess transport pricing, investments and
regulatory regimes with emphasis on the allocation of revenues from user charges.
The model has been used in a variety of case studies that involve several modes (see
Proost et al. [51]). Since the model has to be applicable to very diverse problems
covering all kinds of modes, it is kept abstract and general.
The model is a multi-purpose model that allows assessing investments as well as
strategic pricing behavior by operators in a simplied network. It is calibrated to an
exogenous transport baseline that can be developed with any transport forecasting
model. The time horizon, which can be chosen by the user, typically covers 10
to 50 years. MOLINO-II is a partial equilibrium model of the transport market:
income levels of the private transport users, and production levels of the rms using
freight services as input, are taken as given. The model includes separate modules
for demand, supply, equilibrium, and the regulatory framework.
For each transport problem a simple network is dened with the main Origins and
Destinations (OD). The ODs are connected via a network with links. Combination
of links allows to dene di¤erent paths for each OD. The model will determine what
paths are used for each OD.
The total transport demand for each OD is determined in the demand module.
The demandmodule for passenger transport features an aggregate nested CES utility
function with three levels: choice between transport and consumption of a compos-
ite commodity, choice between peak and o¤-peak periods, and choice between the
transport alternatives. Elasticities of substitution at each level are parametrically
given. Passengers can be segmented into classes that di¤er with respect to their
travel preferences, incomes and costs of travel time. The demand module for freight
transport is based on an aggregate CES cost function (production levels are given)
and also features three levels. The rst level encompasses choice between transport
and other production inputs, and the second and third levels are the same as for
passenger transport.
Transport users of a given path pay the sum of the generalized costs of its links.
The generalized cost of a link contains several components: a resource cost (say fuel
for a car), taxes levied by central and local governments (say fuel taxes and car
taxes), a user fee (toll or rail fare) and a time cost that will be a function of the
relation between the total number of users and the available capacity.
For each transport alternative a distinction can be made between an operator
who takes care of maintenance and can set tolls or user charges, and an infrastructure
supplier who decides on capacity extensions and on infrastructure charges. The costs
of the operator have a linear structure: a xed cost, constant variable maintenance
and operation costs that depend on the type of vehicle or load, and nally a payment
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for infrastructure use that can be specied in di¤erent ways. The infrastructure
provider also has a linear cost structure where the main costs are the investment
and associated nancial costs for the infrastructure. Operator and infrastructure
suppliers can be private or public agents, and the cost level can depend on the
contractual form.
The model includes a local and a central government that can pursue di¤erent
objectives and control di¤erent tax and subsidy instruments including fuel taxes,
public transport subsidies and prot taxes. Given the demand and cost functions
the equilibrium module computes a xed-point solution in terms of prices and levels
of congestion for the transport alternatives. Primary outputs from MOLINO-II are
equilibrium prices, transport volumes, travel times, cost e¢ ciency of operations, toll
revenues and nancial balances, travellerssurplus and social welfare.
5.3.2 Application of the model to the Oosterweel case study
Users
The model allows specifying di¤erent types of passengers and freight users. For this
case study we distinguish for passengers between commuters (WORK) and non
commuters (OTHER). They will di¤er in their values of time and in the ease that
they can substitute between peak and o¤-peak periods. For freight we allow for
three di¤erent types of freight: local, transit and harbor related tra¢ c. The main
distinction here is their route choice. Transit tra¢ c (TRANSIT) has an origin or
a destination outside the Belgian borders , local tra¢ c (LOCAL) is dened by
having both origin and destination within the Belgian border but di¤erent from the
harbor of Antwerp. Harbor tra¢ c (HARBOR) is tra¢ c with origin or destination
in the harbor of Antwerp.
The Network
A user travels from an origin to a destination and to do so he can choose between
di¤erent paths. A path consists of a sequence of links, each link connecting two
nodes. In the MOLINO-II model the network is deliberately kept simple, only the
key links are considered. In the next sections we argue the choices made for the
road and rail network.
Road: The OWV has several functions. The main goal of this new infrastructure
is to alleviate tra¢ c on the existing tunnel (the KEN) and on the southern part of
the Ring road around Antwerp. It is therefore clear that these two segments must be
incorporated in our network. At the moment two alternatives for the KEN already
exist: the Waaslandtunnel (WLT) and the Liefkenshoektunnel (LFK). The WLT
is an old tunnel in the city center which has a very limited capacity and which is
forbidden to freight, for these reasons we believe that this tunnel can not be a serious
alternative. The LFK does have enough capacity but is now underused. Reasons for
this are twofold; rst the tunnel lies north of the city which considerably lengthens
the journey for users heading southwards, and second this tunnel is tolled while the
KEN is not. For users heading to the north or for tra¢ c from or to the port of
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Antwerp this tunnel is, however, a good alternative so this link should be part of
the considered network.
The simplied network is shown in Figure 5.2:
Figure 5.2: The road network
Tra¢ c with origin LB(Left Bank) can be tra¢ c coming from Gent or France via
the E34 or E17 or can originate at the left bank of the port of Antwerp. These
users can choose between two (or three in 2015 with the OWV) tunnels to cross the
Scheldt. Tra¢ c heading southwards (towards Mechelen and Brussels via the A12
or E19) will leave the network at the node S. The rest of the tra¢ c heads to the
North (Netherlands), East (Hasselt or Germany) or the right bank of the Port, this
tra¢ c has as destination RB.
We thus limit ourselves to tra¢ c that crosses the Scheldt using the LFK, OWV
or KEN or tra¢ c that uses the southern part of the ring road. Since tra¢ c ows
are more or less symmetric we will only consider ows from West to East.
Rail: Due to a lack of consistent data rail is not taken as an option for passengers.
Public transport (tram, bus ect.) is, however, taken into account in an indirect way
since the expected data for road use when the tunnel has been built are generated
by a model where public transport is part of the network.
The rail network for freight is given schematically in Figure 5.3. Again, we will
simplify the network to a network with three nodes: LB, Sand RBand only
consider tra¢ c that crosses the Scheldt from West to East. Tra¢ c from the rail
lines L59 and L10 will enter our network in LB. Freight with destination Brussels or
France will use the KEN rail tunnel (KT) and leave the network in S via the lines
L52, L27 or L15. Freight that uses the KEN rail tunnel can also continue to the
north via the link T and leave the network at RB where it can head to the north
(or east) via L12 or to the right bank of the harbor. The simplied road and rail
networks are put together in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.3: The rail network
ROLO
Z
Road
Rail
LFK
OWV
KT
K R2
T
R1
Figure 5.4: The MOLINO-II network
ODs, links and paths: Since we are only considering tra¢ c ows from East to
West and tra¢ c on the ring road (R) we need four ODs : LB-RB, LB-S, S-RB,
RB-S. Each origin of each OD is linked to the associated destination node by a path
which consists out of one or more links. The network consists of seven links:
LFK= Liefkenshoektunnel from LB to RB
KEN = KEN from LB to RB
OWV = Oosterweelverbinding from LB to RB
R1 = ring from North to South
R2 = ring from South to North
KT = KENrailtunnel from LB to RB
T = railway from S to RB
The paths of interest in this case study are given in the Table 5.1 and Table 5.2:
For passengers we have only paths consisting of road links:
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OD LB-Z LB-RB S-RB RB-S
Paths KEN KEN, R2 R2 R1
OWV, R1 OWV
LFK, R1 LFK
Table 5.1: paths for passengers
For freight we have two modes, rail and road2:
OD LB-Z LB-RB S-RB RB-S
Paths KEN, R2 KEN R2 R1
OWV OWV, R1 T
LFK LFK, R1
KT KT,T
Table 5.2: paths for freight
Agents
There are four di¤erent agents involved in the project, two public and two private
agents. The two public agents are the Flemish government (which we call the local
government) and the federal government (or central government); the two private
players are the operators of the LFK and the operator of the new OWV. We do not
consider the rail operators explicitly since we do not have enough data on the costs
and on the charges of the rail network. This means that for the rail operators, the
prices charged to the customers cover the marginal costs of the operators.
Scenarios
Table 5.3 summarizes the di¤erent scenarios analyzed:
Table 5-3: the scenarios
2The MMA2+ model which generated the data used for calibrating MOLINO-II does not con-
sider inland shipping, we were therefore limited in the modelling of freight to road and rail. Im-
plicitly, the 2007 inland shipping volumes and their evolution is kept xed and independent of the
policy scenarios considered.
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There are ve scenarios without any new investment, these are (BAU) the business
as usual scenario, where no new pricing nor investment is undertaken; (A1) refrain
from building the new tunnel, but ban freight from the KEN to alleviate congestion
in the KEN and on the ring road; (A2) set tolls equal to zero in the LFK to attract
tra¢ c into this underused tunnel; (A3) introduces a kilometercharge for trucks only
on the Belgian motorway network and keeps present tolling on LFK; (A4) to alleviate
congestion in the KEN, tolls are now also charged on the KEN for passengers and
trucks.
If the OWV is built, four possible scenarios are of interest: (B0) the OWV is built
but remains untolled; (B1) the OWV is tolled as proposed but the KEN remains
free for freight; (B2) the proposal is applied in its entirety (tolls on OWV and ban
on freight in the KEN); (B3) instead of a ban, the use of the KEN is tolled for trucks
and cars.
It is assumed that all changes to the BAU scenario in terms of tolls and capacity
start from 2015 onwards. In this way there is enough time to prepare the imple-
mentation of new toll systems and to build a new bridge. All scenarios are assessed
for the period 2007-2030.
In the scenarios the better use of the LFK is given a prominent role and we
assume in this study that tolls can be freely varied on this tunnel. This requires
some justication. The LFK tunnel was originally a privately nanced project where
the tolls were supposed to cover its costs. In the meantime, the tunnel has become
public property and there may still be short term commitments in terms of toll
revenues. We assume that from 2015 onwards, there are no commitments to the
private sector anymore and the tolls can be freely chosen by the government.
Welfare
One of the outputs MOLINO-II provides is the welfare. For this case study we dene
the welfare as the sum of the userssurplus and the toll and tax revenues on the
di¤erent links, minus the external costs (except congestion), the operation costs and
the investment cost3. To stay close to the parameter values used in BAM (2004), in
this paper we give equal weights to variations in government income, toll revenues
and consumer surplus. It is possible to give a premium to government income (the
marginal cost of public funds approach, see Calthrop et al.(2010)). This is not
done yet as the nancial construction to nance the investment is not yet clear.
The premium for government revenues may also be important if there is a global
nancial constraint for all investments in the Antwerp region. Also this nancial
constraint is not clearly dened.
We will consider three di¤erent welfare functions: Domestic, Total and Simple.
The Domesticwelfare disregards the changes in utility of the transit freight while
the welfare function Totalsets them on equal footing as the local surpluses. For
the Simplewelfare we did not take into account the changes in tax revenues nor
the changes in external costs since it can be argued that the diverted tra¢ c will use
other parts of the Belgian network and will generate taxes and external costs on the
part of the network that is not explicitly modelled.
3We need to add the toll and tax revenues since these are included as a cost in the userssurplus.
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5.3.3 Data and Calibration
Demand data: current and expected
The demand data are produced by the MMA2+ model of the Tra¢ c Centre of
Flanders (Verkeerscentrum Vlaanderen). This model contains a far more detailed
network than MOLINO-II but has several drawbacks: it only models an average
peak hour and total demand volume is inelastic; congestion in the peak will only
lead to a change in route choice, there is no possibility to change the departure time.
The data we used are so called selected link analyses(SLAs) on the di¤erent
links of the network. These SLAs tell us how many passenger vehicles, light trucks
(<3.5 tons) and heavy trucks use a specic link and what their origin and desti-
nations are. The model divides Belgium and the Netherlands in 3320 zones. Data
are available for an average morning peak hour (8h) or evening peak hour (17h)
in 2007 and 2020. In 2020 it is assumed that the whole Masterplan-Antwerpen is
operational. This means that in 2020 the OWV is built and tolled at the levels set
by the BAM and that freight is not allowed to use the KEN.
For rail tra¢ c only the data for freight were useful to us. In this dataset the
whole of Europe is modeled. The SLAs give us the yearly tonnage on each link and
are available for 2004 and 2020.
To convert these data into data that can be fed into MOLINO-II some assump-
tions had to be made (see Appendix A.1 for MMA data and assumptions). Table A
1 and Table A 2 report the demand data for 2007 and 2020 in veh per day per user
type per period of day for every path.
Generalized Prices
Users will base their decisions on the generalised cost of a trip. These costs comprise
a monetary term and a time cost. The monetary term has four components: (i) the
resource costs (rc) which includes the netto purchasing price of the vehicle, the
insurance costs, the maintenance costs and the fuel costs (all excl taxes)); (ii) taxes
paid to the federal government (tax(fed)) which consists of the the purchase tax,
the car ownership levy and fuel tax; (iii) taxes paid to the Flemish government such
as the rst registration tax, tra¢ c tax and the eurovignet and (iv) the toll.
The resource costs and taxes are reported in the following table (for more details,
see Appendix A.2):
Passenger car Freight Rail
rc 0.16 0.28 32.45
tax (fed) 0.08 0.10 0
tax () 0.02 0.02 0
Table 5.3: Resource costs and taxes in euro/vehkm
the toll levels used for the LFK and the OWV are (for more details see Appendix
B):
The second component of the generalised price is the time cost which is the value
of time of a user (VOT) times the time needed to accomplish the trip (tt). In this
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WORK LEISURE FREIGHT
LFK 3.2 4.4 13
OWV 2.4 2.4 13
Table 5.4: Tolls in euro/veh
case study we assume that the travel time is a linear function of the tra¢ c ows4 .
The travel time is dened by the speed-ow relation:
tt =
l
vmax

1 + 

q
cap

where l is the length of the link, vmax is the maximum speed on the link and q is
the number of PCE per hour on the link. The parameters  is equal to one for road
links and zero for rail links (we assume that on rail links there is no congestion).
The parameter cap is chosen to t the existing speed-ow data for each link5 .
Other costs
Operation, Maintenance and Investment costs The investment costs for the
new crossing are, according to BAM (2004) [7], estimated to be e1.344 billion for
the tunnel itself and e2.25 billion for the project as a whole . These costs are spread
in time and the total discounted investment cost for the tunnel amounts to e1.083
billion6 . The lifetime of the investment is 55 years and the discounted salvage value
is e234 million.
The operation and maintenance costs per year are estimated at 1.5% of the
investment cost or approximately e20 million per year (BAM(2004) [7])7.
External costs and other data The external congestion costs are included in the
generalised costs, the other external costs are the environmental, noise and accident
costs. We use the estimates of the TREMOVE model (De Ceuster et al. [19]). In
[veh/km] these are:
Passenger car Freight
Road 0.11 0.36
Rail 4.41
Table 5.5: external costs in veh/km
4This the subject of many debates in the tra¢ c literature, see Small & Verhoef [60]. As we
use a rather macro model, we prefer to use a linear average time cost function. Such a function is
consistent with a bottleneck interpretation of congestion where consumers trade-o¤ schedule delay
and queuing costs (see Arnott et al. [2]).
5For the values of the parameters of the speed-ow relation we refer to Appendix B and C.
6In BAM (2004) [7] it is assumed that the tunnel will be operational in 2010. since this is
obviously not the case we delayed all investments and thus costs by ve years. We assume a
discount rate of 4% as in BAM (2004) [7].
7We assume that there are no ine¢ ciencies in the operation or maintenance of the two tunnels
managed by the private sector (LFK and OWV).
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To calibrate the nested CES functions of the MOLINO-II model one needs two more
inputs; for each level we need to specify the elasticity of substitution and we need
to give the share of income (or total production costs for freight) that is dedicated
to transport. The elasticities are reported in Table 5.6, the share of income that is
used for trasport is 5% for passengers and the share of transport expenditures of the
total production cost is 10%:
WORK LEISURE FREIGHT
transport/other 0,2 0,2 0,2
periods 0.9 2 2
paths 7 7 7
Table 5.6: Elasticities of substitution
Calibration
For the calibration of the MOLINO model we have two reference points: the ob-
served 2007 data (as reported in Table 5.13) and the o¢ cial forecast for the
transport ows in 2020 in the presence of the new OWV tunnel8 and with a ban on
freight in the KEN (given in Table 5.14). The model parameters are calibrated with
the OWV in such a way that the model reproduces in a satisfactory way the 2007
data without OWV 9 .
Table 5.8: Demand data 2007 used for calibration in pas or ton/day (where NA
stands for Non Available).
8The data used for 2020 are with all investments of the Masterplan carried out  so we also
assume implicetely that the whole masterplan has been carried out. Strictely speeking we invetigate
the added value of the OWV to these investments.
9Calibration data in Table 5.8 are constructed based on data of 2020 from the Flemish Tra¢ c
Center (see Table 5.13 in Appendix A.1) such that after a simulation where the OWV is made
unavailable by charging very high tolls on the OWV the demand levels of the year 2007 without
OWV given in Table 5.14 are reproduced.
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Table 5.9: Simulation results for 2007 when OWV is made unavailable in pas or
ton/day
5.3.4 Simulation results
For the simulations we use a time horizon of 23 years starting in 2007. If the new
tunnel is built, it is assumed to become available in 2015 and a salvage value is
computed at the end of the horizon in 2030. An annual social discount rate of 4%
is used to compute present values10 . We assume an exogenous demand growth of
1% per year. The outputs generated by MOLINO-II that are of interest to us are
rst of all the demand in 2030 and the corresponding generalized costs, the toll and
tax revenues on the di¤erent links and the welfare of the di¤erent user classes.
The simulation results are summarized in Table 5.10. The rst four rows summa-
rize the scenarios, the next twelve rows give the changes in tra¢ c ows (in [veh/day])
compared to the BAU (remember that we focus on the West to East ows). The
rest of the table are the discounted sums of the di¤erent welfare components. The
changes in time costs and generalised costs are reported in Table 5.15 and Table
5.16 in Appendix A.4.
10A four percent annual discount rate is used in the cost benet analyzis performed by BAM
(2004) [7].
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Table 5.10: Simulation results
Scenario A1: no OWV, freight is banned from KEN
Freight road tra¢ c going east or north is forced to use the LFK. The absence of
trucks in the KEN implies an improvement in tra¢ c conditions for passenger cars
in the tunnel. This improvement leads to an increase of passenger cars in the KEN.
Freight tra¢ c heading south will either switch to rail or will choose another route
outside of our network, which explains the reduction of total freight tra¢ c that
crosses the Scheldt (-15%). The time costs in the KEN improves while those in the
LFK deteriorate. There is also a strong increase in rail use.
From a transport economic point of view the welfare increase can be explained.
In the original situation one has a tolled (LFK) and an untolled alternative (the
KEN). It is well known that in such a framework, the untolled alternative will have
ine¢ ciently high tra¢ c ows while the tolled alternative will be underutilised. A
policy that forces part of the tra¢ c to use the tolled alternative can therefore be
welfare improving.
Freight transport is now forced to change its routes and to pay toll. For all routes
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West-South, the ban on trucks in the KEN implies an important cost increase as
the LFK route is much longer. The main beneciaries are passenger transport that
experiences less congestion in the KEN and the toll revenues. Overall there is a
discounted totalwelfare gain of 327 Mio e.
Scenario A2: no OWV, no tolling on LFK
In order to increase the use of the LFK, one can either force freight to use the
tunnel (A1) or make the tunnel toll free. So in this scenario all tolls on the LFK are
abolished for freight and for passengers.
The biggest changes occur for tra¢ c having RB as destination, for this tra¢ c
LFK now becomes much more attractive and there is a large shift in tra¢ c from the
KEN to the LFK and also from rail to road for freight. Due to the decrease in the
use of the KEN and the part of the Ring South to East (R2) there will be a small
increase of the use of the KEN for tra¢ c heading south and more tra¢ c will use the
ring road to travel from S to RB. Compared to scenario A1 the tra¢ c intensity in
the LFK is higher but this is partly due to a modal shift from rail to road.
The utility of all users increases since the absence of toll will reduce their gen-
eralized prices. The loss in toll revenue is largely compensated by the increase in
consumer surplus for passengers as well as for freight; the largest gains are for the
harbor related tra¢ c. The reduction in external costs is mainly due to the reduction
in tra¢ c. There is a clear welfare gain compared to BAU but the LFK will see its
revenues drop to zero from 2015 onwards.
This scenario performs much better than a ban for trucks on the KEN. There
is now a discounted welfare gain of 618 million e. The main reasons are rst that
trucks heading South are no longer forced to take the detour via the LFK. Second,
also the pricing of cars is more balanced and more cars use the LFK and this also
means a congestion relief on the Ring Road.
Scenario A3: no OWV, kilometer charge
There is a kilometer charge on the motorways in Belgium for freight. This is modeled
by introducing an increase in resource costs for trucks on the links that are part of
the Belgian motorway network, being the KEN and the Ring road. Since there is
already a toll on the LFK we assume that on this link the kilometer charge is not
applied. As level for the kilometer charge we take gures from the TML study (De
Ceuster et al. [20]). In this study they analyze the e¤ects of di¤erent kilometer
charges. In total nine schemes are analyzed, the cost of a vehkm increases between
0 and 25.5% depending on which scheme is chosen. In scenario A3 we will assume
that the cost per km will increase by 25% for freight on the KEN and the ringroad.
The toll on the LFK is kept at the present level.
The e¤ects of the kilometer charge is minimal, there is a small reduction in
overall tra¢ c which leads to a small reduction of congestion in the KEN. There is a
small increase in total discounted welfare of 166 million e.
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Scenario A4: no OWV, tolling of the KEN and LFK
In this scenario we want to check whether a toll on the KEN could solve part of
the mobility problems around Antwerp without having to invest in a new expensive
infrastructure. We looked into the welfare e¤ects of several toll combinations. We
report here results for the following toll structure that is not necessarily optimal:.
KEN LFK
Passenger cars 0.6 1
Freight 1.925 3.15
Table 5.11: Tolls used in scenario A4 in [euro/veh]
These tolls are much lower than the current tolls on the LFK and this is logical.
When car and truck use on both tunnels can be tolled, there is a much better use of
current capacity, congestion levels decrease and the overall toll levels can be much
lower. This scenario performs best in welfare terms because all tra¢ c is tolled at a
balanced level so that route choice is more in line with the social costs. Discounted
welfare increases by 632 million e.
Scenario B0: OWV, no tolling on OWV
This rst scenario has only tolls on the LFK and let users freely choose their pre-
ferred tunnel to cross the Scheldt. There is no ban on trucks for the KEN. It can
be compared with scenario A1 but now there is an extra crossing. There is less
congestion so more users cross the Scheldt. There is a clear shift from the KEN and
the LFK to the OWV. The LFK is almost not used anymore. Another interesting
result is the decrease in tra¢ c on the Ringroad. Congestion is improved but this
improved situation causes a modal shift from rail to road.
Compared to the BAU scenario the surplus of all the users (freight and pas-
sengers) increases. We have a decrease in tax revenues due to a decrease in total
kilometersdriven.
Overall userssurplus increases strongly but this insu¢ cient to compensate the
loss in toll revenues of the LFK and the large investment cost of the OWV. Net
discounted welfare decreases by 289 million e compared to the BAU scenario.
Scenario B1: OWV tolled
Due to the toll on the OWV, the switch to the new tunnel seen in scenario B0 is
less important and the decrease in time costs on the KEN is smaller. The gain in
surplus for the freight tra¢ c will also be considerably less. There is an increase
in toll revenues on OWV but overall welfare decreases even more than in the rst
scenario because truck tra¢ c is using too much the KEN. This is the worst scenario
of all: one makes large investments in capacity but the tolling makes sure all tunnel
capacities are badly used. The total discounted welfare decreases by 763 million e.
Scenario B2: OWV tolled and freight banned from KEN
This is the o¢ cial BAM scenario. It has tolls for trucks and cars on LFK and on
OWV plus a ban for trucks on the KEN. Since the total cost for a trip crossing
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the Scheldt will considerably increase for freight we have an important reduction in
freight tra¢ c. They see their costs increase by 334 million e. Comparing across all
alternatives, this is the second worst outcome (after scenario A1 that also includes
a ban for KEN but o¤ers only a tolled LFK). The cars are net beneciaries.
In terms of overall welfare, the scenario with a ban on trucks in the KEN perfoms
better than the previous scenario. As in the case of scenario A1, the ban on the
KEN for trucks reduces the overall use of the KEN so that the overall use of the
three tunnels is more balanced and uses capacities better. The major disadvantages
that remain are that passenger cars still face the wrong pricing and the trucks going
South are forced to make a large detour. The overall welfare outcome of this scenario
is -285 million e. This means that the investment in the OWV is not justied under
these conditions.
Scenario B3: OWV, LFK and KEN tolled
As in scenario A4 it is not easy to determine the welfare maximising tolls. Here we
report rst results tor the following tolls:.
KEN OWV LFK
Passenger cas 0.6 0.6 1
Freight 1.925 1.925 3.15
Table 5.12: Tolls used in scenario B3 in [euro/veh]
As can be seen the tolls that are simulated are much lower than the present tolls
in the LFK and than the tolls planned for the OWV. The logic is again that all
tra¢ c is charged and capacity has been increased so tolls need to be lower if we
want them to be closer to the marginal social cost.
Lower tolls but applied to all tunnels, in combination with the absence of a ban
on trucks in the KEN, generate the best welfare result in the presence of the OWV.
The surplus of car users and of truck users increases because they all have more
choice options at relatively low tolls. Total toll revenues for the three tunnels are
more or less equal to the toll revenues in the reference scenario where only the LFK
is tolled. Overall welfare is slightly positive: +22 million e. This is a meager welfare
outcome for an investment of 1,085 million e. The slightest unforeseen increase in
investment costs will make also the welfare outcome of this scenario negative.
Once one tolls all tunnels, one can easily increase the overall toll level and gen-
erate more toll revenues. This will generate some welfare losses if tolls exceed the
marginal external congestion costs but this is the best way to meet revenue con-
straints.
5.4 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed alternative pricing and tolling scenarios for the case
where the foreseen Oosterweeljunction is build and is not build.
We start with a reference scenario where the existing capacity is not e¢ ciently
used because one tunnel (LFK) is tolled and the other (KEN) is not.
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The tolling scenarios that manage to improve the use of the existing tunnel
capacities perform best in overall welfare terms. A simple scenario that abolishes
the tolls on the use of the LFK can generate an important welfare gain of more than
600 discounted million e. More complex scenarios can do better and there also exist
scenarios that increase welfare and increase overall toll revenues.
The scenarios with Oosterweelbridge generate in general a negative welfare out-
come. The only scenario that generates a small welfare increase is a scenario that
contains relatively low tolls on all the three tunnels. The main reason why the Oost-
erweelbridge perfoms not well in welfare terms is that by using better the existing
capacity, one avoids important investment costs. Whenever, as is the case with most
investment projects, the investment cost turns out to be larger than foreseen, our
conclusion is re-inforced.
There are several provisos for our analysis. First we only analysed a limited
number of scenarios for which su¢ cient information was available. There are cer-
tainly many transport management measures other than pricing that can be studied
and can improve the existing capacity. The same holds for broader road investment
plans like the ones studied by FORUM 2020 [37]. These merit further study as our
analysis was limited to macro scale measures for which information was available.
Second, our model is simple and like all models too simple. It is a calibrated
model on the basis of some observations but uses also computations with another
model. It has to be considered as a sophisticated calculator to explore other options.
When these options are revealed interesting they merit further study.
The transport project analysed in the paper is not a stand alone case: large
transport investments that, from an economic view point, do not make sense are
common. In a recent study of 22 large European transport projects (the TEN-
projects) it turned out that for more than half of the projects, the costs exceeded
by far the benets (Proost et. al. (2010)). Among them are the Brenner tunnel
connecting Austria to Italy, the Messina bridge in Italy and the Betuwelijn in the
Netherlands. In most cases the existing capacity (existing railways, canals, compet-
ing tunnels, e¢ cient ferry services,. . . ) was su¢ cient but overlooked. It is clear that
the choice of the projects were not a result of careful analyses but rather the result
of regional lobbying. In cases where politicians can achieve large investments in
their region with federal tax money a double check of the costs and benets related
to the projects as performed in this paper for the OWV can be very useful.
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A Appendices
A.1 Quantities
In this appendix we give the tra¢ c data used for the simulations and the data needed
to convert them into suitable data for the MOLINO-II model.
Road tra¢ c between 17h-18h in 2007 (veh/h)
Source: computations on basis of data of Verkeerscentrum Vlaanderen
- Rail tra¢ c in 2004 (ton/jaar)
Source: computations on basis of data of Verkeerscentrum Vlaanderen
Road tra¢ c between 17h-18h in 2020 (veh/h)
Source: computations on basis of data of Verkeerscentrum Vlaanderen
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- Rail tra¢ c in 2020 (ton/jaar)
Source: computations on basis of data of Verkeerscentrum Vlaanderen
These need to be converted into passengers (or tons) per peak period and o¤-peak
period. Data needed for convertion are
Resulting demand data are:
Table 5.13: Demand data for 2007 in pas or ton/day, where NA stands for Not
Available
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Table 5.14: Demand data for 2020 in pas or ton/day, where NA stands for Not
Available
A.2 Generalized prices
In this appendix we present the data used to compute the generalized prices used
in the simulations.
The values used are:
The gures in De Ceuster et al . (2004) are from 2002, these are corrected and
converted to e 2004
This gives us for road [euro/vehkm]:
Passenger car FREIGHT
rc 0.16 0.28
tax (fed) 0.08 0.10
tax () 0.02 0.02
resource cost and taxes for rail [e/vehkm] are
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RAIL
rc 32.45
tax (fed) 0
tax () 0
source: Resource cost TREMOVE (All countries)
The tolls on LFK found on the website are [e 2009/veh] :
PW FREIGHT incl btw FREIGHT excl btw
Manueel 5.5 18 14.88
Tele tol 3.23 12.88 10.64
credit card 4.5 16 13.22
Source: website Liefkenshoektunnel
We assume that commuters all pay the cheapest toll (Tele Tol), while for Leisure
and freight, we take an average toll. This gives us following toll levels
toll levels in [e/veh]
WORK LEISURE FREIGHT
LFK 3.2 4.4 13
OWV 2.4 2.4 13
Note that we assume that VAT is payed by passengers but that freight do not pay
VAT.
Data needed to compute the time costs:
Type dimension Source
VOT work 8.51 e/veh-h BAM (2004)
leisure 5.3
freight 38.42
PCE Passenger cars 1 BAM (2004)
Freight (road) 2.5
KEN OWV LFK Ring KT T
length 5.6 10 14 8 5.6 8 km
max speed 100 100 100 100 250 250 km/h
cap 13000 13000 8500 17500 N N
beta 1 1 1 1 N N
alpha 1 1 1 1 0 0
Source: Auhorscalculation
The length of the links LFK and R are based on the average length of a trip from
LB to RO using the LFK or KEN and R respectively (see Appendix C).
The speed-ow relations are taken to be linear in the tra¢ c volumes (beta equal to
one). To calibrate the function we used observed quantities and speeds on the links
of interest as given by the Tra¢ c centrum of anders, for the OWV we assume that
it has the same capacity as the KEN.
A. APPENDICES 113
A.3 Lengths of links
To calibrate the model we need the lengths of each link, in this section we present
the method we used to obtain these and the data used.
Vehicles using the KEN and have as destination RBcan leave the ring road at
three di¤erent locations: they can leave at the exits East, Northor Harbor
(see Figure 5.5 for location of exits). The proportion of vehicles leaving at the
di¤erent exits and the total lentgh of their trip is given in following table:
Vehicles [%] trip length [km]
East 58 10
North 36 16.1
Harbor 7 29.4
Source: Verkeerscentrum Vlaanderen and Authorscalculation
The path length of the path (KEN, R) is thus a weighted average of these di¤erent
lengths which is 13.56 km. Knowing that the KEN is 5.6km long, this gives us the
length of the link R, namely 8 km.
To compute the length of the link LFK we follow the same procedure. Vehicles
using the path LFK to go from the origin LBto the destination node RBleave
the ringroad at two di¤erent exits Harboror North(according to the data no
vehicle using the LFK tunnel exits the Ring road at Eastor South):
Vehicles [%] trip length [km]
Harbor 91 13
North 9 23
Source: Verkeerscentrum Vlaanderen and Authorscalculation
The average length is thus approximately 14km for the link LFK.
Figure 5.5: Exits on the Ring road around Antwerp
A.4 Changes in time costs and generalised prices
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